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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis studies Thai bourgeois individuality as reflected in selected Thai 
biographical films released since 2006, an important year in Thai political history, when 
the military staged a coup, toppling former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. In 
particular, it examines how different forms of individuality in these films allow us to 
understand the political agenda or desire of many members of the urban middle class 
in the midst of on-going political crises and conflicts after 2006. 
 Since the late 1990s, Thai film culture has seen a rise in the number of 
biographical films. However, in academic literature this film genre has remained under-
explored and theorised, notably in the context of the socio-political transformation of 
Thailand in the same period of the emergence of these films. In this thesis, I attempt to 
provide both a theoretical understanding of the rise of biographical films and critical 
insight into how the production of these films can be viewed as integral to the 
conservative Thai middle-class culture of the present time. I approach these 
biographical films by using a framework that combines knowledge of the historical 
development of the Thai middle class—in which this thesis posits that this class has 
emerged and developed by allying itself with the power of the feudal establishment—
and how this class‘s ideology is represented in biographical film narrative. Each chapter 
reveals how different aspects of Thai middle-class ideology are portrayed through forms 
of individuality represented in each film, particularly the form of individuality that is 
embodied in the characterisation of the protagonist. 
 The central argument of this thesis is that the forms of individuality embedded 
in the protagonists of biographical films reflect the hybrid bourgeois-feudal cultural 
values of the Thai middle class. These hybrid cultural values of the Thai middle class 
serve to promote the power of the traditional establishment group as well as to maintain 
 vi 
the middle class‘s coalition with the establishment. Most importantly, when looking at 
the political situation in the country after 2006 through these biographical films, the 
forms of bourgeois-feudal individuality and cultural values depicted in the films become 
a set of parameters that helps identify and specify different kinds of political agendas 
and desires of many members of Thailand‘s urban middle class in the context of the 
challenging political situation in this period. In particular, this thesis studies Thaksin‘s 
political group and the Red Shirt movement as forces which, since 2006, have 
challenged the coalition of the middle class and the establishment. 
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NOTE ON THAI TRANSCRIPTION AND CITATION  
 
This thesis follows a modified version of the Thai Royal Institute system. This 
system does not make a distinction between long and short vowel forms, and tones are 
not represented. The system used in this thesis differs slightly from the Royal Institute 
system as follows: “j” is used for the Thai consonant jor jan, not “ch”, and “eu”, “eua”, 
“euay” (not “ue”, “uea”, “ueay”) are used for these vowels and diphthongs. Dashes are 
used to separate the units of Thai compound expressions that are translated as single 
terms in English, such as khwam-pen-Thai for “Thainess”.  
This thesis follows the Thai norm of referring to Thai authors by given names, 
not surnames. All citations by Thai authors, in the bibliography and elsewhere, are in 
alphabetical according to given names order. For the titles of films, books, or other 
literary texts, if these texts have an official English title, the English title will be used as 
a main reference, and the Thai title or a literal translation in Thai will be put inside 
parentheses. For instance, The Unsung Hero (Khun Rorng Palat Chu). If the text does 
not have an official title in English, the Thai transcription will be used as a title 
reference, followed by a literal translation in parentheses. For example, 16 Pi Haeng 
Khwam Lang (“In the past 16 years”). 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction: The Bourgeois Individuality of the Thai Middle Class and 
Thai Biographical Films after 2006 
 
I.I Introduction 
―First‖ and ―Tee‖ are two primary school classmates. Even so, First is a 
domineering person during school activites. One day, they pair up as a team to 
participate in a school recycling project in which they create something from 
used ice-cream sticks and present it on the show-and-tell day at school. At 
First‘s house, First and Tee exchange ideas but cannot agree on what to do. 
First‘s mother steps in to help settle the argument with a stick drawing game. 
―Whoever picks the shorter straw loses,‖ says First‘s mother. Tee draws a stick 
first. However, after he draws it, First‘s mother immediately tells him that he has 
the shorter stick. Tee believes her and lets First decide what to create, which is a 
spaceship. After a while, when the mother and her son are away in another 
room, Tee notices that the other straw on the table, the one he did not draw, is, in 
fact, the same length as the one he drew. When First meets Tee again in school, 
Tee asks First whether his mother had cheated for him. ―There is no way that my 
mother would cheat! And you should know that I am the one who always wins,‖ 
First answers. However, at home that evening, First asks his mother if she 
cheated so he would win the stick drawing game. Instead of a clear answer, his 
mother tells First, ―Is it not good that you get to build your spacecraft?‖ Then, 
she also surprises First by handing him a completed and beautifully assembled 
spacecraft, ―Use this one, instead. I think it is better.‖ Tee feels unhappy with 
what his mother has done and does not accept his mother‘s spacecraft. On the 
show and tell day at the school, First and Tee meet again, with First bringing his 
self-made spacecraft, and with Tee bringing a planet earth made from paper. 
While First is making up his mind to tell Tee about his mother, unexpectedly, 
Tee confesses to First, ―I am sorry, First. My father told me, ‗If you lose, you 
have to learn to accept it.‘‖ First decides not tell his friend about what his 
mother had done. Both smile at each other and go to the stage to show their 
invention. 
 
The synopsis above is of the Thai short film 30 (dir. Kulp Kaljaruk, 2014), 
which has a story line that satirises a society where a cheater or a corrupt person is 
allowed to get away with their unethical activity and still be honoured. Indeed, this 
satirical message is relevant to any society, not just Thailand, as it represents a form of 
universal morality that society should not tolerate corrupt people. However, if one looks 
at the production profile of the film, one would notice a political and ideological agenda 
embedded in the film‘s satirical meaning. 
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30 is one of twelve short films funded by the project called ―The Twelve 
Official Thai Values Films‖ (Phapphayon Khaniyom Lak Sip-Sorng Prakan) promoted 
by the military government led by General Prayuth Chan-O-Cha, who came to power 
after the coup in May 2014. The Twelve Official Thai Values Films project, which 
received a budget of 25 million baht from the military government, was given 
exclusively, by a somewhat a dubious process, to twelve selected filmmakers, including 
Kulp Kaljaruk, the director of 30, who is also a family descendant of a long-standing, 
establishment-linked entertainment company, Kantana Group, to produce films to 
endorse the twelve official cultural values promoted by the government (see figure 1.1). 
In particular, 30 was made to promote one of the twelve ―official Thai‖ values, 
particularly the seventh value, which states that (one should) ―understand and learn 
about democracy, which has the King as the righteous head of state‖ (―khaojai rianru 
kan pen prachathippatai an mi phra maha kasat song pen pramuk thi thuk torng‖) (see 
item number 7 in Figure 1.1). In the film, this value is shortened and scripted in a 
subtitle as ―learn the sovereignty of the public‖ (―rianru athipatai khorng pracha‖). 
This particular value about ―democracy‖ has been mostly appropriated by the military 
and the establishment elites, because they believe the term has been ―misinterpreted‖ by 
the majority of Thai people, especially the political camp of the recent governments of 
prime ministers Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–2006) and Yingluck Shinawatra 
(2011−2014), and many liberal political groups. Often, the military will try to explain 
that ―good democracy‖ is not the product of a one-man-one-vote electoral politics. 
Many times, the military and members of the establishment condemn this kind of 
electoral model as giving opportunities for supposedly ―bad politicians‖, like Thaksin, 
to gain power. This ideological view has also been shared by many conservative Thais, 
especially the urban middle class, who support the military and the establishment‘s 
powers. This is why in 30 the ―election‖, or the part where Tee and First draw sticks, is 
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portrayed as a corrupt process, in order to politically signify and link to the conservative 
discourse that a one-man-one-vote election is supposedly not a means to ―good 
governance‖. Viewed in this political context of Thailand, 30 serves as a filmic 
production, made by a conservative middle-class agent, that provides legitimacy of 
power to the establishment elites. Moreover, it legitimises the producer‘s social 
privilege, and conotes the signifier ―bad image‖ with the establishment‘s political 
enemies, namely the Shinawatra family.
1
 
 
 Figure 1.1. A screenshot of the announcement of the Twelve Official Thai Values proclaimed 
by the military government after the coup in May 2014, from the website of Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment.
2
 
                                                     
1
 The fact that the film project was sponsored by the military government, who used the tax 
money of all Thai citizens to create a discourse against the establishment‘s ―enemies‖ in the 
Shinawatra family, also became controversial. After the films were released, many people 
criticised the films and the filmmakers who received the money from the military government. 
Divas Café, a television variety show, provides a forum for public discussions. One episode of 
the show, which was aired on 22 December 2014, criticised the legitimacy of the films funded 
by this project of the junta government. See the news report of this episode of the show in 
http://news.voicetv.co.th/entertainment/146859.html. Retrieved 10 July 2015. 
2
 The literal translation of the Twelve Official Thai Values is: 
1. Love the nation, religion and the monarchy 
2. Have honesty, self-sacrifice, patience, and the righteous set of ideologies that is 
beneficial for the  public 
3. Have gratitude for one‘s father and mother, parents, and teachers 
4. Keep learning and study hard both in direct and indirect ways 
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The above account of the politics behind 30 exemplifies one disturbing 
characteristic of Thai film culture in recent years. When the society has encountered 
intense socio-political conflicts and crises and has been taken over by the old 
establishment, many filmmakers, who are mostly from middle-class backgrounds, have 
seized the opportunity to promote their socio-economic interests by allying themselves 
with the establishment and producing cinematic arts that help legitimise the 
establishment‘s power. Actually, the short films sponsored by The Twelve Official Thai 
Values Project are not the first group of cinematic productions that reflect the 
ideological agenda of the state. When Thai society and its film culture were exposed to 
the most recent wave of globalisation in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many popular 
national films or, as May Adadol Ingawanij (2006) calls them, ―heritage films‖, which 
aimed to attract the then growing international market, also willingly incorporated the 
cultural values constructed by the establishment in the country. From a broader 
perspective, this phenomenon is, of course, not unique to Thai film culture. Andrew 
Higson (2003) has also found a similar case happening in the British film industry 
during the same period of globalisation. Higson contends that the rise of British heritage 
films is related to ―the consolidation of a heritage industry: a potent marketing of the 
past as part of the new enterprise culture, a commodification of museum culture‖ 
(Higson, 2003, p. 1). However, in the case of Thailand, and as one can see reflected in 
                                                                                                                                                           
5. Preserve Thai beautiful culture and traditions 
6. Have morality and good will for others 
7. Understand and learn about democracy which has the King as the righteous head of 
state 
8. Have discipline, follow the law, the younger ones must respect their elders 
9. Have a presence of mind, learn to think and act properly, and follow the suggestions of 
the King 
10. Follow the King‘s Sufficiency Economy Philosophy, save money for the future, only 
expand business when it is ready and has enough security 
11. Be strong both physically and mentally, never give up to evil power or desire, and fear 
for sin as stated in the principles of religion 
12. Think of the common and national interest, rather than personal one 
See http://www.mnre.go.th/ewt_news.php?nid=3230. Retrieved 28 July 2015. 
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the making of the Twelve Official Thai Values films, the rise of these Thai cinematic 
productions with ostensibly conservative and nationalist appearances, (including 
heritage films), is due, not just to the allure of the global film market alone, but 
specifically to a subservience to the ruling power of the establishment and of the 
docility of Thai middle-class cultural logic in general. As May Adadol argues in her 
study, the Thai film industry ―created a culturally legitimate body of ‗national films‘ 
and promoted an attendant mode of film viewing to appeal predominantly to the 
sensibility of society‘s culturally authoritative group‖ (May Adadol 2006, p. 12).  
However, one should not misunderstand these films as being identical to the 
state‘s piece of propaganda. Given many of them are made for commercial purpose, the 
filmic productions influenced by this ideological logic of Thai middle class can be seen 
containing the ambitiously creative and individualistic characteristics of the middle-
class cultural value, yet while still conforming to the power of the establishment. 
Notably, during the recent intense socio-political crises, the ideological coalition of the 
Thai middle class and the establishment have become highly supportive of each other, 
in order to maintain their respective socio-economic statuses and interests. 
This thesis explores this aspect of the Thai middle-class‘s ideological coalition 
with the power of the establishment through the medium of Thai biographical films that 
have been released since the military coup that toppled then Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra in 2006. The coup staged in that year was an important symbolic political 
event for Thai society. Supported largely by the urban middle class, the 2006 coup 
reflected the increasing presence of, and the open support of, the urban middle class in 
supporting the legitimacy of the elites of the establishment over and against the electoral 
political system of the country. In particular, I examine the theme of bourgeois 
individuality in post-2006 Thai films, and seek to understand how the forms of 
expression of this bourgeois individuality in the films selected for study in this thesis 
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allow us to understand more about Thai middle-class culture, especially in a time of 
social crisis, when the privileges and interests of these middle-class people have been 
challenged. In recent decades, Thai film culture has seen a significant increase in the 
number of biographical films. However, previous studies of Thai cinema have not 
analysed or provided a particularly critical understanding of the rise of this biographical 
film genre. The broad aim of this thesis is to examine this genre of films in order to 
develop a critical and conceptual knowledge of biographical films in relation to the 
transformation of Thai middle-class culture in the recent period of socio-political 
changes. 
Apart from conceptualising the genre of biographical films, this thesis also 
examines the theme of individuality in the films, in order to sketch the distinctive 
features of Thai middle-class culture in the recent period of social crisis and 
transformation. Individuality is not only the most important narrative element of 
biographical films; it is also the fulcrum of middle-class culture and is integral to 
bourgeois class development in a capitalistic society. However, the individuality 
developed by the members of the Thai middle class contains particular characteristics 
that distinguish it from forms of individuality in other societies. Unlike the situation in 
classical studies of the rise of the bourgeoisie in European history, in which the 
ideology of individuality was expressed to undermine the values of the feudal state, 
Thai bourgeois individuality has evolved to be supportive of traditional Thai feudalistic 
values. By taking into account this peculiarity of Thai bourgeois individuality, this 
thesis illustrates that many Thai biographical films indeed represent ideological 
expressions that work to maintain the socio-economic status and interests of both the 
establishment and the middle class. Particularly in biographical films that were made 
after 2006, the year which marks the visible intensification of political polarisation and 
crisis, the ideological form of Thai bourgeois individuality is expressed in a more 
 7 
visibly paradoxical way. It shows an even more firmly entwined set of ideological 
values of the Thai middle class and the establishment, while being able to maintain the 
appearance of being supposedly ―new‖ or ―individualistic‖ at the surface level of filmic 
representation. This characteristic is somewhat different from biographical films 
released prior to 2006, in which many examples tend to represent the more general 
values of middle-class culture, and the aesthetics are less shaped by contemporary 
political discourse. In the rest of this introductory chapter, I clarify in more detail why it 
is necessary to conduct research on this particular topic. I also summarise the main 
arguments presented in this thesis about Thai biographical films and Thai middle-class 
culture. Moreover, I briefly explain how each chapter of the film analyses in this thesis 
documents, expands and clarifies the main arguments. 
 
I.II  Main Contributions and Arguments 
  This thesis contributes original empirical and conceptual knowledge to the two 
intersecting fields of Thai film studies and Thai cultural studies, by specifically 
contextualising these fields in the recent socio-political transformation since 2006. 
Firstly, this is the first study that provides a conceptual and analytical account of 
the biographical film genre in Thailand. In this thesis, I regard the emergence of this 
film genre as a distinct form of cultural production deriving from the transformation of 
the Thai middle-class culture shaped by rapid socio-economic transformations in 21st 
century Thailand. In a lecture delivered at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 
2007, social scientist and literary critic Thak Chaloemtiarana (2007a) observed that 
there has been a rise in the number of auto/biography pocketbooks of public figures and 
celebrities in the book market in Thailand. Thak speculates that the rise of these books 
may have served a didactic purpose—for the members of the middle class to learn to 
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follow the pathways of those who have succeeded.
3
 On the one hand, the increase in the 
number of biographical films in Thailand since the first decade of the 21st
 
century could 
be viewed as an attempt by members of the middle class to guide others to achieve the 
same economic goals, similar to those expressed in the auto/biographical pocketbooks. 
On the other hand, however, as I illustrate, when carefully considering the ideological 
values in the biographical films selected in this thesis, the lessons in these films seek to 
guide the audience on more matters than just how to achieve socio-economic success in 
life. As I argue, these biographical films reflect and support the legitimacy of the old 
establishment and its set of ideological values. The rise in production of Thai 
biographical films in the 21st century film culture and market works to maintain the 
power of the alliance of the Thai middle class and the feudal values of the 
establishment. 
The second contribution that this thesis makes is to the conceptualisation of the 
notion of Thai bourgeois individuality. The analyses of Thai middle-class culture 
produced in previous studies (for example Nidhi, 1993; Ockey, 2004; Shiraishi, 2006) 
have not thoroughly explored the behavioural or the mental dimensions of this class‘s 
subjection to, incorporation within, and co-optation by the power of the establishment, 
in a time when the ruling establishment elites have suffered a crisis of political 
legitimacy. Focusing on biographical films and the theme of individuality in the films, 
this thesis proposes that individuality is the key conceptual and thematic element that 
permits us to gain a more critical understanding of the coalition of the Thai middle class 
and the establishment. In particular, during the intense socio-political crises and 
conflicts, the individuality expressed by many middle-class people allows us to 
                                                     
3
 Thak‘s lecture has never been released to the public. I took the liberty of contacting him 
personally and asked for his lecture notes, which he kindly provided. My reference to his lecture 
came from these notes. 
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understand why many Thais willingly accept and help legitimise the ruling power of the 
establishment. 
 
I.III   Why the Thai Middle Class and Who are They? 
 The Thai middle class (chon chan-klang) is a social group that in the past few 
decades has played a critical role in transforming Thai society, especially in terms of 
economy and culture. The subject of the Thai middle class is not new in academic 
literature. Many studies from various fields have identified the existence of this 
particular social group, which rapidly emerged during the period of accelerated 
economic development after World War II (for example Anderson, 2014; Funatsu & 
Kagoya, 2003; Nidhi, 1993; Shiraishi, 2006, pp. 249−254), even though some of these 
authors used different terms, like ―bourgeoisie‖, for this social group. 
 Benedict Anderson (2014) calls this social group which has emerged since the 
end of World War II, ―bourgeoisie‖, which can be translated in Thai as kradumphi. My 
understanding of Anderson‘s usage of the term ―bourgeoisie‖ is that he tries to illustrate 
the exceptional characteristic of this social group. Even though many members of this 
―bourgeois‖ social group have a different socio-economic background from the 
members of the establishment, they were in alliance with and were willing to provide 
support and give legitimacy to the Thai state. As Anderson puts, ―[I]t is these strata that 
provide the social base for quasi-popular right-wing movements clearly different from 
the aristocratic bureaucratic rightism of an earlier age‖ (Anderson, 2014, p. 49). 
 Other scholars (for example May Adadol, 2006; Nidhi, 1993; Paritta, 2002) 
prefer to use the term ―middle class‖ (chon chan-klang) for this social group. My 
understanding for the preference in these works for the term ―middle class‖ is that their 
authors attempt to differentiate the social group‘s quasi-economic independence from 
the aristocratic and bureaucratic social groups, and the nature of the professions of the 
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members of the class, which is not manual labour but rather administrative, middle-man 
type work in the private sector. Moreover, the use of the term ―middle class‖ in some of 
these works also provides these scholars more flexibility to look at the diversity of the 
political ideology and culture of the members of the class, phenomena which tend to 
change as new generations of the group emerge. Tsuruyo Funatsu and Kazuhiro Kagoya 
(2003) provide a detailed account of the implications of the two terms, ―bourgeoisie‖ 
and ―middle class‖, adopted in the two groups of the studies. In this thesis, I use the 
term ―middle class‖ for the agents, their social group, and their cultural norms, involved 
in mainstream cinema productions. My use of ―bourgeoisie‖ is reserved to describe the 
sensibility of the members of the class that is supportive of the power of the old 
establishment in order to secure their own socio-economic privilege and interests. 
 Similar to the studies of the Thai middle class noted above, the expression of the 
term ―Thai middle class‖ in this thesis refers mostly to the Sino-Thai families, 
merchants, white-collar workers, and mid- to high-ranking bureaucrats, who, as Nidhi 
Eoseewong argues, have their own way of promoting their social status and interests 
(Nidhi, 1993, p. 36), but who also have to rely on the power of the establishment to 
obtain political and economic opportunities (Nidhi 1993, p. 38). Given this 
characteristic of the Thai middle class, their political ideology and support can be varied 
(Englehart, 2003, p. 253). In the context of the democratisation process in particular, 
Aim Sinpeng and Aries Arugay argue that the Thai middle class, ―only supports 
democracy when its interests are not threatened‖ (Aim and Aries, 2015, p. 108). Aim 
and Arugay‘s representation of this peculiar ―democratic‖ political ideology of the Thai 
middle class can best be seen from the 2006 uprising of many members of the urban 
middle class against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, under the banner of the 
movement called The People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD). Many who joined this 
protest were Sino-Thais living in Bangkok, who felt that Thaksin‘s political regime had 
 11 
become a threat to their socio-economic interests and privileges. This particular anxiety 
had also led many of the urban middle class to be in opposition to democratic values. 
As Kasian Tejapira (2009) has observed,  
 the rise of these self-conscious ‗patriotic lookjins‘ is made possible by an 
 amalgam of changing class politics and alliances in the aftermath of economic 
 globalisation and crisis in the 1990s, and a consolidated, if increasingly 
 challenged, regime of royal-nationalist hegemony following the transition from 
 military dictatorship to parliamentary democracy in the 1970s (Kasian, 2009, p. 
 266). 
 
A number of studies of Thai cinema have also shown that the middle class, with 
this class‘s particular characteristics of being docile to and supportive of the 
establishment, has played a pivotal role in the advancement of Thai film culture 
(Harrison, 2005, 2010; Lewis, 2003; May Adadol, 2006). Notably, in the early period of 
post-Cold War globalisation, many filmmakers who are members of this class were very 
enthusiastic in finding new ways to maintain the popularity of the film industry‘s 
economy. As Rachel Harrison notes about the recent changes, in the era of globalisation 
many filmmakers face, ―the complex challenge of marrying their own cultural agendas 
to the preconceptions that global audiences possess of the qualities of modern Thai 
film‖ (2005, p. 335). However, as I propose in this thesis, from around the first decade 
of the 21st century, while the forces of globalisation remain prominent, it has also been 
forces from within the country that have begun to gain an equal momentum, affecting 
the way in which many middle-class filmmakers advance their film productions. In 
Arnika Fuhrmann‘s doctoral dissertation, Ghostly Desires (2008), she shows that the 
form of power exercised by the Thaksin government to regulate gender and sexual 
identities has brought about an alternative filmic aesthetic concerning the 
representations of gender and sexuality. As Fuhrmann argues, ―[W]hen national-cultural 
identity became increasingly sexualised and homosexuality attained unprecedented 
publicity in the Thai public sphere of the 1990s and 2000s, artists and filmmakers also 
devised new approaches to representing sexual minorities‖ (Fuhrmann, 2008, p. 142).  
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Having described the broad political characteristics of the Thai middle class, it is 
by no means the case that this thesis suggests that all members of the Thai middle class 
would individually share or have a unified ideological view. There are, of course, 
groups of middle-class individuals who are supportive of Thaksin‘s power, or groups 
who perceive their political ideolgies are not being endorsed by these binary political 
beliefs—between pro-Thaksin and anti-Thaksin—or groups who claim they are ―not 
interested in politics‖. Nevertheless, from a broader perspective, this variety of political 
views of other groups of the Thai middle class has historically been rare in emerging in 
the public sphere, and thus dominating the identity of the Thai middle class. More 
particularly, in the period of the post-2006 on-going political crisis, the other political 
voices of the Thai middle class have even been more harshly suppressed by the state.  
The film analyses in this thesis are built upon the previous studies of the 
conservative ideology of Thai middle class and cinematic expressions as mentioned 
above. It aims to show the complexity of the ―conservative-ness‖ of the Thai middle 
class and how the class can still maintain its social privilege and power in society today 
through representations in and through the filmic medium. Most essentially, this thesis 
aims to illustrate that a combination of the forces, including globalisation and domestic 
socio-political changes, is, indeed, the genesis of contemporary Thai middle-class 
filmmaking culture. 
 
I.IV   Why Sakdina and the Thai Establishment and Who are They? 
As mentioned to some extent above, a discussion on the Thai middle class and 
their culture would not be complete without also considering the power of the Thai 
establishment and the norms and values of what is called sakdina, or ―Thai feudalism‖. 
Sakdina was a traditional social ranking system used in Thai society to define the place 
and position of each individual. Sakdina was and still is a social norm used to control 
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social order (see Translators‘ Note in Nidhi, 2005, p. 2) and to maintain the ruling 
power of the establishment elites. 
 In Western scholarship (for example, see Earle, 1989; Forti, 2012; Marx & 
Engels, 2007), the emergence of European middle classes and their capitalistic societies 
have been explained as occurring in opposition to the feudalistic social structure, when 
the social group which would become the middle class no longer saw it necessary to 
cling to feudal power. Historian Peter Earle gives an example from the early 
development of English middle-class society, 
[T]he growth of towns, and especially of London, the expansion of inland and 
foreign trade, of industry and the professions, had rapidly increased the numbers 
of those belonging to the urban middle station and made a nonsense of systems 
of social classification based on a purely rural and agricultural society (Earle, 
1989, p. 4). 
 
The most iconic achievements of the development of the Western middle classes 
could be seen as being symbolised by the important historical events of the French 
Revolution in 1789 and the American Revolution in 1776, when the middle-class 
members of these two countries revolted against the feudalistic French and British 
powers, respectively, and themselves became the rulers of society. From this kind of 
historical development of the Western middle classes, many cultural practices that have 
been developed along with middle-class society have become freed from the ideological 
constraints of the values and norms of feudal society. In some societies, like America, 
the entire middle-class culture has become a national culture, which is entirely in 
opposition to the structure of lordship and kingship of its former ruling society of Great 
Britain, from which it seceded by revolution. However, this is not to suggest that there 
is no oppression or exploitation in the social systems now dominated by the Western 
middle classes. As Karl Marx and Frederick Engels have asserted in their study of the 
class struggle and the capitalist social system of the European bourgeoisie, 
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[T]he modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal 
society, has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new 
classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old 
ones (Marx & Engels, 2007, p. 9). 
 
The kind of formation of the middle class that happened in the West was not the 
case for Thai society. In general, the traditional social system of Thai feudalism or 
sakdina is similar to that of many Western societies; it is an agriculture-based and 
pyramid-like social hierarchy, with kings and lords having the highest power, followed 
by aristocrats, other lower-ranked officers, and, then, farmers and labourers. However, 
the emergence of the middle class in Siam/Thailand was in stark contrast to the West, 
where the farmers and other individuals set up their own separate community in 
distinction from the feudal power, as noted above. The findings of previous studies on 
the development of the Thai middle class (Anderson, 2014; Jit, 1987; Nidhi, 2005) have 
postulated that, in fact, the formation of this class occurred through the coalition and 
amalgamation of Chinese immigrants, a social group who were not part of the 
traditional sakdina system, and the establishment sub-groups within the system, whose 
members included lords (jao), aristocrats (khun-nang), bureaucrats (kharatchakan), and 
military officers (thahan). These groups of Siam‘s establishment elites depended on one 
another‘s powers and privileges, with the monarchy, the highest institution of the 
society, being the core social value and the source of power and legitimacy. In his 
analytical study of the Thai sakdina system, Jit Poumisak (1987) shows that Chinese 
immigrants were included in the feudal power structure in various ways, such as by 
being appointed to serve the Siamese court, or by being given a share of the power and 
privilege of sakdina. As Jit describes,  
[B]oth in the Ayudhaya and Rattanakosin [Bangkok] periods, those 
monopolizing the taxes were, as a rule, Chinese. Once they had acquired the 
monopolies, [ranks of] mun and khun with sakdina of 400 were conferred on 
them so they would have the privilege… (1987, p. 140).  
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As the sakdina and the Thai middle class have developed in coalition, it has 
eventually made it hard to distinguish the cultures and social norms of these two social 
groups. As Nidhi asserts, in fact, the Thai sakdina system and the Thai middle class are 
―part and parcel‖ (2005, p. 100) of each other, and have to rely on each other to acquire 
benefits from economic production. The culture of the country‘s middle class will be 
discussed further in the following section on Thai bourgeois individuality. 
In the modern period, even though the sakdina laws, which used to force people 
to follow the feudal system, have been abolished since the reign of King Chulalongkorn 
(r. 1868−1910),4 sakdina social hierarchies still exist and remain socially, economically 
and culturally powerful. The establishment of an elites‘ network, which in the past was 
socially maintained by the sakdina laws, continues in a form of social formation, which 
Duncan McCargo (2005) has called the ―network monarchy‖. According to McCargo, 
this modern-day network of the country‘s establishment elites is a loosely formed social 
group, which comprises the royal members and the stakeholders of the institution. The 
members of this political network have no readily specific political belief. Rather, they 
tend to advocate any pragmatic decisions and actions that provide security to the throne 
and secure their social privilege (McCargo, 2005, p. 502). In this thesis, I approach the 
middle class—the general populace, largely consisting of merchants, white-collar 
workers, and bureaucrats, who are the social groups that have access to, or opportunity 
to gain social privilege from the power of the network-monarchy establishment—and 
their culture and sensibility as expressed in mainstream cinema from this historical 
perspective of the social development of the Thai class system. The aesthetics, 
ideologies, and cultural values that are presented in commercial cinema do not benefit 
                                                     
4
 Under pressure to reform the country to look ―civilised‖ in Western eyes in 1897 King 
Chulalongkorn abolished the corvée system, which had been used since the Ayutthaya period 
(see further Baker & Pasuk, 2009, p. 61). 
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the middle class alone, but also the establishment of the sakdina social order and their 
constructed feudal social norms and cultural values. 
 
I.V  Why Study Film Genre? 
This thesis approaches the study of Thai middle-class culture and Thai cinema 
from a film genre studies perspective. While the notion of film genre may be thought to 
relate to a commercial purpose or an audience‘s reception and classification towards the 
film‘s aesthetic, film genre can be used as a ―textual device capable of conveying 
meaning‖ (Chan and Karpovich, 2011, p. 1) and studied with regard to how the 
represented meaning allows us to understand society. This thesis views film genre 
particularly as a cultural site that represents the collective change in ideas or worldview 
of the populace in Thai society. Two main reasons that warrant the use of this approach 
are, first, the empirical evidence that shows that the past few decades of film-making in 
Thailand have seen the rise of new film genres. The other is that the current research on 
Thai cinema noted above has shown a significant connection between the rise of these 
various film genres and changing middle-class culture and ideology. 
Since 1997, the Thai film industry has seen an increase in the variety of film 
genres and filmmaking styles. Some prominent film genres that have emerged after this 
year, and have continued to dominate the Thai film industry are the ghost horror film 
genre, the one which is characterised by the romantic or sexually attractive or 
―Sadako‖-like (wet long hair and pale skin) projections of ghost bodies; the action film 
genre, as especially popularised by the stardoms of martial art celebrities; and, as 
mentioned above, the heritage film genre, or the films that celebrate and commodify the 
images of a glorious past or a patrician national history.   
According to Anchalee Chaiworaporn (2002, p. 457), the diversification was 
largely due to the arrival of a new group of filmmakers who had had extensive 
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experience in other entertainment industries, such as Nonzee Nimitbutr and Yuthlert 
Sippapak, who both previously worked in the commercial television business. The 
previous experiences of these new filmmakers in working with mass audiences and 
popular content contributed significantly to the advancement of commercial Thai film-
making when they started making feature films to the film market in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. For example, Nonzee‘s Nang Nak (1999), an adaptation of the Thai ghost 
legend ―Mae Nak‖, revitalises the concept of Thai ghost stories with touches of 
romance, drama, and tragedy, making the story of ―Mae Nak‖ a major box-office hit in 
that year (Anchalee, 2002, p. 458). 
A number of film scholars have been attentive to the rise of new film genres. In 
the last decade, there has been an increase of interest in studying film genres. To give 
some examples, the ghost-horror film genre has been studied by Arnika Fuhrmann 
(2008), Ji Eun Lee (2010), and Mary Ainslie (2014). These film scholars argue that the 
subject of ghosts in Thai cinema is, in one way or another, related to certain socio-
political aspects of, and changes in, Thai society. While Lee (2010) and Ainslie (2014) 
view the films as representing the socio-political and ―traumatic‖ experiences (Ainslie, 
2014, p. 166) of people in Thai society in general, Fuhrmann (2008) views the ghost 
film genre as more specifically related to the sexual subjectivities in contemporary Thai 
society. 
Other film genres have also been studied to show their connections with critical 
issues in Thai society, especially the rise of the Thai middle class. May Adadol 
Ingawanij‘s dissertation, Hyperbolic Heritage (2006), examines the newly emerging 
national heritage film genre, and argues that the rise of this genre is a result of the 
middle class‘s subjection to the discourse of globalisation. Following the study of May 
Adadol, Natawan Wongchalard (2015) has recently published her thesis that examines 
Thai action films in relation to the rise of middle-class spectatorship. Natawan argues 
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that, ―[T]he establishment of middle-class spectatorship ... inevitably modifies the 
action genre in both content and form to cater to the middle-class aesthetic taste‖ 
(Natawan, 2015, pp. 10−11). The historical epic and biographical film genres, of which 
the latter genre is the one that I am focusing on in this thesis, have been studied by 
Kamjohn Louiyapong (2009) in his article published in Thai, ―Phlik Na Prawattisat Nai 
Phapphayon Thai‖ (Decoding Thai Historical Film), in which he also views the 
emergence of the two genres as relating to a particular mindset of the Thai middle class. 
As Kamjohn asserts, the rise of historical films reflects the increasing desire of many 
members of the Thai middle class to travel back to a romanticised past, to chase dreams 
and to find happiness.
5
 Kamjohn‘s argument will be discussed further in the next 
section, as his scope of study also overlaps with the study of the biographical film genre 
in this thesis. 
 This thesis adopts a similar approach to these previous studies, which is to show 
that film genres can serve as a form of culture that can be studied to understand the 
transformation of Thai society and Thai middle-class culture through the meanings the 
film articulated through its narrative structures. In particular, it regards film genre as a 
kind of discursive practice deriving from the knowledge constructed by other forms of 
articulation and cultural practice. As film scholar Brett Farmer contends, ―film genres 
are effectively hierarchical ‗regimes of truth‘ governed by sets of common norms and 
limits and constraints‖ (Farmer, 2011, p. 89). Specifically building from May Adadol‘s 
study (2006), which, as I believe, is the most analytically thorough conceptualisation of 
the Thai middle-class culture in the context of Thai film culture in the contemporary 
period, this thesis aims to show how the complexity of the ideology of the Thai middle 
class has been integral to the emergence of new film genres in recent decades. 
                                                     
5
 ―จึงทาํให้บรรดาคนชั้นกลางเหล่านั้นอยากยอ้นเวลากลบัไปสู่อดีตเพ่ือตามหาความฝันและความสุขในอดีตท่ีหาไม่ไดอี้กต่อไปใน
ปัจจุบนั ภาพยนตร์จึงเป็นเสมือน ‗เคร่ืองยอ้นเวลาคืนสู่อดีตไดอ้ยา่งดียิ่ง‘‖ (Kamjohn, 2009, p. 213). 
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I.VI  Why Biographical Films? 
Despite the increase of interest in studying Thai film genres, biographical films 
have remained overlooked and comparatively under-theorised. This thesis attempts to 
fill this gap by presenting a theoretical view of the film genre, which is also related to 
the culture of the Thai middle class in the present time. 
By biographical cinema, I refer to the films that depict the lives of real persons, 
or persons who are believed to have once lived in Thai society. The essence of the 
biographical film‘s narrative is, as film scholar Dennis Bingham argues, an ―attempt to 
discover biographical truth‖ of that person for the audience (Bingham, 2010, p. 7). By 
this definition, biographical film is a kind of film whose aesthetic value lies in the 
audience‘s acknowledgement that the life of the protagonist projected on screen is that 
of an actual person in society, regardless of whether or not that person is still alive, and 
also emphasises that that person‘s life story is worth knowing and/or learning from. 
From an empirical perspective, the biographical film genre—or films that are 
made to show the presumed ―truth‖ of someone‘s life—is relatively new to Thai film 
culture. The unpopularity of biographical film in Thai film culture until recent years has 
been due to many factors. One factor has been the disapproval by the person, or the 
family members of the person, whose life is to be portrayed in film. Another factor is 
the social pressure which might arise from making a film about a person whom many 
people respect, but which perhaps turns out to create a bad image of that person (Kong, 
2011). However, these restrictive conditions seem to have changed at around the same 
time that the Thai film industry began to be transformed by the film culture of the late 
1990s. From the late 1990s on, filmmakers and the market have become more interested 
in the biographical film genre. Within the 10-year period from 1997 to 2007, more 
biographical films were released to the Thai film market than in the preceding 30 years 
of Thai film history from 1960 to 1996 (see Table 1 in Appendix). This rise began with 
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the success in the box office of Daeng Bireley and Young Gangsters (2499 Anthaphan 
Khrorng Meuang, dir. Nonzee Nimitbutr), which was released in 1997. The film depicts 
a group of actual gangsters in 1950s Thailand who caused many problems for the 
authorities in Bangkok. The success of Nonzee‘s film, which depicts the lives of these 
real people in Thai society, was followed by many films including the famous The 
Legend of King Naresuan (Naresuan, dir. Chatri Chalerm Yukol, 2007). Even though 
The Legend of King Naresuan was promoted as a national historical film, the film, and 
its many sequels (The Legend of King Naresuan II, 2007; The Legend of King Naresuan 
III, 2011; The Legend of King Naresuan IV, 2011; The Legend of King Naresuan V 
2014; The Legend of King Naresuan VI, 2015, all directed by Chatri Chalerm Yukol) 
are, in essence, the attempt to depict and construct the ―truth‖ about the life of King 
Naresuan, from his infancy to the day he became the great king of Ayutthaya. 
One distinct characteristic of the biographical films made after the late 1990s 
that seems to be different from those made in previous decades is the function of the 
film as a form of didactic manual, providing guidance on how one can succeed or 
should behave in the rapidly transforming Thai society. In the past, the making of 
biographical films seems to have been related to and reinforced by important events or 
social issues in Thai society. 16 Pi Haeng Khwam Lang (―In the past 16 years‖, dir. 
Anumat Bunnag, 1968), a film that depicts the life of legendary singer Suraphon 
Sombatjareon, was produced in the year after he passed away in order to celebrate his 
artistic legacy. The Story of Nam Phu (Nam Phu, dir. Euthana Mukdasanit, 1984), a film 
about a drug addict, and Wanli (dir. ―Ekalak‖, 1986),6 a film about a female student  
who struggles with poverty and taking care of her parents, seem to have been made to 
reflect and raise concern about serious social problems, namely, drug addiction and 
                                                     
6
 The film‘s credits do not provide the last name of the director. I suspect that ―Ekalak‖ could 
also be the pseudonym of the director. Using pseudonyms was quite common in Thai film 
culture before the 1990s. 
 21 
poverty during that period. The issues represented in these two films also fitted very 
well with the then existing market of ―social critique‖ film, a cinematic form influenced 
by the ―art-for-life‖ (sinlapa pheua chiwit) movement which had a major influence on 
cultural production in the 1970s and 1980s (Anchalee, 2002, pp. 449−451). The ―art-
for-life‖ movement will be discussed further in Chapter VI, as the movement is the 
context of the film, Young Bao (dir. Yuthakorn Sukmuktapha, 2013), analysed in that 
chapter. 
Unlike the foregoing films, biographical films made since the late 1990s, when 
Thai society entered the current phase of globalisation, are distinct in that their themes 
and subjects are more diverse and their plots are more related to representing 
appropriate ways for an individual of the middle-class society to advance him or herself. 
The most idiosyncratic feature of biographical films of the contemporary period has 
been the direct involvement of the actual persons portrayed in some of the film 
productions. Beautiful Boxer (dir. Ekachai Uekrongtham, 2003), a film about a 
transgender Thai boxer, Parinya Charoenphol or Norng Tum, not only emphasises the 
willpower that a Thai individual should have despite being treated as an outcast, but 
also casts her to play a minor character who gives the protagonist, who plays her in the 
film, a beauty treatment before an important boxing match. The Billionaire (Top Secret: 
Wai Run Phan Lan, dir. Songyos Sugmakanan, 2011), a film about the struggle of a 
young billionaire, Aithipat Kulapongvanich,
7
 or Top, to become successful, does the 
same, by having the real Aithipat briefly play a minor role as a business investor who 
contacts the same bank as the protagonist for a loan. I examine The Billionaire in detail 
in Chapter V. Even though the involvement of these real figures may not have been 
significant to the overall messages of the films, in which they were played by other 
actors, this close involvement of the actual persons in the productions of films about 
                                                     
7
 In Thai, อิทธิพทัธ์ กุลพงษว์ณิชย.์ 
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their own lives suggests that there has been a change in Thai middle-class filmmaking 
culture, especially in the status and function of biographical films in the film market 
since the late 1990s. 
As mentioned in the preceding section, there has already been an attempt to 
study contemporary Thai biographical films. However, that study was done by 
including these films in the same category as the historical film genre. Kamjohn 
Louiyapong treats the biographical film genre as a kind of historical film, calling the 
films prawattisat bukkhon (history of an individual) (Kamjohn, 2009, p. 206), and 
argues that the emergence of the films is associated with the middle class and their 
ideological attempt to disseminate their worldviews in society.
8
 While I agree with 
Kamjohn that the middle class and their class ideology are integral to the making of 
biographical films, I believe that there are two problematic issues in his work that have 
not been clearly articulated. 
The first problem is the categorisation of the biographical films exclusively 
within the historical film genre. It may be true that biographical films represent 
historical events, especially those that occurred around the lives of the persons 
represented in the films. However, this perspective tends to overlook the two most 
important aspects of the narrative of biography, which are the notion of personhood and 
the notion of individuality, or individualism, constructed about a person in the film,
9
 
                                                     
8
 ―ประวติัศาสตร์จากมิติคนชั้นกลางน้ีไดแ้พร่กระจายสู่คนทุกกลุ่ม ผา่นภาพยนตร์หลากหลายประเภท” (Kamjohn, 2009, pp. 
214−215). Kamjohn makes the same argument in his 2013 study on the representations of 
history in Thai cinema, Phapphayon kap kan prakorp sang sangkhom (Films and Social 
Constructs), in which he categorises biographical film as another type of the historical film 
genre. Kamjohn argues, ―Historical films are the products of the middle-class worldview as seen 
in both the content and ideology of the films. In other words, the histories represented in these 
films are related to the middle-class people, or which middle-class people are interested in‖ (in 
original Thai, ―ภาพยนตร์ประวติัศาสตร์ท่ีไดเ้ห็นจึงอาจเป็นประวติัศาสตร์ตามทศันะของชนชั้นกลาง ทั้งในดา้นเน้ือหาและ
อุดมการณ์ท่ีแฝงอยู ่กล่าวคือเป็นประวติัศาสตร์ท่ีมีความเก่ียวพนักบักลุ่มคนชนชั้นกลางหรือให้ความสนใจ‖) (Kamjohn, 2013, 
p. 325). 
9
 George Custen, who is one of the key scholars in the area of the biographical film genre, has 
argued that, indeed, the notions of personhood and individuality in biography can help scholars 
to understand historical events more critically. As he puts it, ―[S]ince Plutarch, there has been 
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which distinguish biography from other kinds of historical narratives. I will discuss 
these two aspects further below. 
The second problem in Kamjohn‘s study is his view of the middle class. By 
claiming that the films function as disseminators of middle-class ideology without 
providing critical insight to explain what Thai middle-class ideology actually is, his 
study is at risk of generalising the Thai middle class and its class ideology as being the 
same as in other societies, where the middle class is an independent social group, 
distinct from and historically in opposition to, established feudal elites. As I have 
already suggested above, the formation of the Thai middle class and its class ideology 
cannot be viewed as totally separate from the sakdina or traditional feudalistic social 
structure and values. In this respect, the ideology of the Thai middle class that is 
disseminated through contemporary biographical films does not belong only to the 
middle class alone, but also to the sakdina values. 
In the re-assessment of this film genre undertaken in this thesis, I attempt to 
clarify the two problematic issues above. Firstly, this thesis shows that Thai 
biographical films can be treated as constituting a distinct film genre in its own right, 
which has emerged ―from different industrial and national contexts‖ (Vidal, 2014, p. 4), 
and provides a distinctive conceptual explanation for the emerging popularity and 
transformation of this genre that is different from the historical film genre. As Bingham 
argues, ―the biopic is a genre in its own right, one that has evolved dramatically, and 
which continues to change through its long history‖ (Bingham, 2010, p. 22). Secondly, I 
maintain that the middle-class ideological values represented in these biographical films 
do not belong purely to the middle class and, hence, do not work to maintain the society 
of the middle class alone. Rather, these ideological values are a mutually constructed set 
                                                                                                                                                           
an awareness that recorded or written history is a text that freezes the narrative in a particular, 
interested form. Biography, the isolation of a single life from the flow of history, can reduce the 
imputation of motive and the rendering of historical explanation to something even more facile‖ 
(Custen, 1992, p. 9).  
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of ideologies between the middle class and the establishment, which aim to promote the 
respective interests of both social groups. In other words, this thesis argues that 
contemporary Thai biographical films tend to have emerged to ideologically sustain the 
status quo of the current stage of Thai society. 
 
I.VII  Why Study Individuality in Thai Biographical Films? 
This thesis specifically studies individuality in biographical films. Individuality 
or individualism is the most essential narrative element and ideology of the biographical 
film genre (Bingham, 2010, p. 10; Cucca, 2011, p. 173; Custen, 1992, p. 45; Hamilton, 
2007, pp. 2, 9−10, 292). This ideological form may also be present in other film genres. 
However, for the biographical film genre, individuality is the most important factor and 
is the basis for the production of the film, especially in regard to the processes where the 
filmmaker constructs a story from an historical figure‘s life experiences, characterises 
the protagonist, and selects an actor to fit the role. This process transforms the real life 
of an individual to become a ―cultural icon‖ or ―hero‖ on screen. As Valentina Cucca 
argues, ―iconography plays an essential role in biopics for conveying a consistent 
universe of values through the characters staged‖ (Cucca, 2011, p. 173). To examine 
how biographical films construct meanings and how the films are part of the culture that 
makes them, individuality deserves to be given primary attention. 
Individuality is also an essential feature of the forms of ideology that emerged 
together with the middle class and its capitalistic society. As I noted above, the 
formation of many Western middle-class societies emerged outside, and in opposition 
to, the feudal social system. This kind of formation has, therefore, shaped the 
characteristic of the Western middle class as being able to work to undermine feudal 
culture. Individuality in many Western societies, which is also a product of the middle-
class culture, shares the same historical development and characteristic. 
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According to Augusto Forti (2012), in Europe when groups of people set up 
their new social organisations outside the feudalistic social structure, the activities and 
inventions that were developed in the organisations to maintain the economy were 
significant in strengthening the sense of being an individual. These activities and 
inventions were, for example, professional guilds, which were set up to develop 
particular professional skills, and intellectual property rights and law, which were 
implemented to protect individuals‘ ideas (Forti, 2012). When these social organisations 
subsequently developed into a fully functioning capitalistic society, the individualistic 
mentality also set in and became fundamental to the values of the society that came to 
be dominated by the middle class. Nevertheless, as political scientist Michel Girard 
suggests, patterns and forms of individuality in different societies are not identical 
(1999, p. 2). So as in Thailand, the individuality reinforced by the Thai middle class is 
different from many Western societies. In the next section, I clarify what I call in this 
thesis ―Thai bourgeois individuality‖, whose characteristics and dominant cultural logic 
are radically distinct from the form found in most Western societies. 
 
I.VIII  What is Thai Bourgeois Individuality? 
Thai bourgeois individuality is the cultural ideology which is reinforced by the 
members of the Thai middle class in order to maintain the ideological power of the 
establishment and, at the same time, to promote this class‘s own socio-economic 
interests. 
As I have elaborated earlier, the development of the society of the Thai middle 
class occurred within a still-dominant sakdina system. This social formation has, in 
consequence, shaped the class‘s culture to become indistinguishable from traditional 
Thai feudalism, and often becomes supportive of the power of the sakdina elites. As 
Nidhi argues, because the Thai middle class has had to rely on the political and 
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economic power of the sakdina elites for a long time, they have not developed an 
independent cultural form for their own social group.
10
 This includes the expression of 
Thai bourgeois individuality, which emerged and has often become supportive of the 
sakdina establishment‘s power. Most disturbingly, this form of Thai bourgeois 
individuality often serves to prevent other modes of individuality from emerging to 
challenge sakdina cultural values, which many members of the Thai middle class 
cherish. One example of this policing system is the use of the lèse-majesté law, or the 
so-called article 112 of the Thai constitution, which prohibits any forms of 
individualistic expression that criticise or question the power of the monarchy, the 
highest institution of the Thai feudalistic social structure. 
This thesis shows that the forms of individuality represented in Thai 
biographical films are the subject of the peculiar historical formation of the Thai middle 
class and their bourgeois-feudal hybrid culture. The forms of individuality expressed in 
the films do not aim to establish bourgeois cultural values that are separate or apart from 
the sakdina culture. On the contrary, these forms of individuality maintain existing 
cultural values, which have been in favour for a long time, of the coalition between the 
middle class and the establishment. 
The elements of Thai biographical films that show most explicitly the 
hegemonic state of individuality of the Thai middle class are the characterisations of the 
protagonists and their ―life journeys‖.  In her introduction to Joseph Campbell‘s 
celebrated book, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (2004), Clarissa Pinkola Estés writes 
about the significance of the characterisation of the protagonist in story-telling that is a 
microcosm of social reality. As Estés maintains, the ―journeys‖ of the heroes are, 
―considered an object lesson, a window through which one can see the broad continuum 
of how the soul cannot only be known more and more, but how it can also…be grown 
                                                     
10
 ―ไม่ไดพ้ฒันาวฒันธรรมท่ีเป็นอิสระของตนเอง‖ (Nidhi, 1993, p. 38). 
 27 
to greater capacity‖ (Estés, 2004, pp. xlvi−xlvii). In this thesis, I focus on the filmic 
narratives of the lives of ―heroes and heroines‖ in the selected biographical films and 
examine how they represent the individualistic values of the Thai middle-class culture, 
as it is in coalition with the feudal establishment. 
 
I.IX  Why Study Films Released after 2006? 
To illustrate more substantially how Thai bourgeois individuality is expressed to 
support the establishment, this thesis contextualises the representations of Thai middle-
class individuals in biographical films within the period of socio-political crisis since 
2006. Many studies on post-1997 Thai cinema have similarly illustrated that the 
productions and textual features of many films made in this period were influenced 
greatly by the social forces and discourse of globalisation (for instance, Harrison, 2005; 
May Adadol, 2006). While the force of globalisation has remained, the fact that the 
society has increasingly experienced domestic socio-political conflicts and crises has 
also affected Thai film culture, including the biographical film genre, and the ways in 
which the films represent Thai individualities. 
Many scholars (for example Kasian, 2006; Funston, 2009, p. xv; Aim & Arugay, 
2015, p. 110) assert that the rise to power of Thaksin Shinawatra during the first half of 
the 2000s created great anxiety among many members of the middle class. After 
winning a landslide victory in the national election in 2001, Thaksin entered the 
parliament and reformed many things, including the traditional bureaucratic system and 
the national economic policy. Thaksin‘s economic strategy, or then popularly known as 
―Thaksinomics‖, which concentrated on privatising state assets and giving out more 
credit to farmers and other people in provincial areas (see Pasuk & Baker, 2009, 
Chapter IV), especially undermined the power and interest of many members of the 
middle class and of the establishment. In September 2006, Thaksin‘s political power 
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was toppled by a military coup, which was supported by many urban middle-class 
Thais. However, the overthrow of Thaksin in 2006 was not the end of the political 
distress of many middle-class people and establishment elites. Rather, it was the 
beginning of a more serious political anxiety shaped by the rise of a new political force 
in the public sphere, namely the Red Shirt movement. 
The new political force of the Red Shirts became present in the public sphere 
after their political leader, Thaksin, was ousted by the military coup in September in 
2006. However, the politicians of their political side were elected back to the parliament 
in 2008 in the new People‘s Power Party (PPP). The Red Shirt movement did not fade 
from the public view as activism, but rather formed into a more visibly powerful 
political network in their strongholds in the north and north-eastern provinces of the 
country. The growing power of the Red Shirts since 2006 created even more fear among 
many people of the middle class and of the establishment. In particular, the massive 
marches of the Red Shirts to Bangkok in 2009 and 2010, to urge the establishment-
supported government Democrat Party to dissolve the parliament and hold a fair 
election, caused such great concern among many establishment authorities that they had 
to think about how to suppress this new political power. I discuss this further in Chapter 
II, as it is the context of the film analysis in that chapter. 
The other phenomenon that has occurred along with the political conflicts in the 
public arena since 2006, which has also created great anxiety among many Thais, is the 
decrease in the public presence of King Bhumibol in recent years due to his ill health. 
Throughout the 1960s to the early 2000s, the king‘s continual active role in public, 
dealing with various social and political matters, and reproductions of his image as the 
most moral and righteous ruler, have turned him into a core symbolic value of Thai 
bourgeois culture (Morris, 1998, pp. 357−358). However, from around the mid-2000s, 
the king has not been able to perform his public duties because of his ailing health, and 
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the Thais have seen him visiting the hospital more often. Even though open public 
discussion about the future of the monarchy is not permitted because of the operation of 
the lèse majesté law noted above, there is a rising concern among many people, 
especially the establishment elites, about the future of the monarchy (Marshall, 2014, 
pp. 23−24), the most important institution of Thai sakdina feudalism which has 
provided privilege and benefits for the establishment elites and the allied middle class. 
This thesis analyses the forms of bourgeois individuality in selected biographical films 
to outline the conservative coalition of the Thai middle class and feudal establishment in 
the context of the political crises and anxieties noted above.  
 
I.X What Approach and Methodology are Used? 
In showing how the forms of individuality in Thai biographical films released 
since 2006 relate to the post-2006 political context of Thailand, I examine the 
representations of individuality in the films by following the theory of cultural 
representations developed by the representation theorists of the constructionist school of 
thought (for example, Hall, 1997; Orgad, 2012).  
The constructionist approach to representation treats cultural representation as 
deriving from the ―synergetic‖ process in the production of meanings. As Hall contends, 
―It is social actors who use the conceptual systems of their culture and the linguistic and 
other representational systems to construct meaning, to make the world meaningful and 
to communicate about that world meaningfully to others‖ (Hall, 1997, p. 25). This view 
is different from the reflectionist approach, which tends to view cultural representation 
merely as a mirror that reflects truth or meanigs that already exist in static form in 
society. For constructionists, representation not only reflects but also mediates, 
constructing new meanings within the language of the system of represenation. For 
example, the word chat (nation-state) in Thai political context can signify different 
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meanings in different periods and political conditions. For example, during the regime 
of Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (1938−1944 and 1948−1957), his 
governments tried to develop Thailand into a culturally Westernised and civilised 
country, with his fascist and nationalist ideology. In this context, the articulation of chat 
tended to suggest ideas about ―growth and beauty, orderliness, progress and uniformity‖ 
(Baker & Pasuk, 2009, p. 135). However, after World War II, with the popularisation of 
royalism, the meaning of chat has gradually transformed to become associated more 
exclusively with King Bhumibol. I will discuss how such a transformation happened to 
the word chat later in Chapter II. 
 From the above example, we can also see that the (re)constructed meaning of 
cultural representation can also work to empower or maintain the ideology or value of 
the groups of people who have power in society; especially in audio-visual media like 
cinema, where the medium has often served as a propaganda machine not only for 
authorities in Thailand but also elsewhere in the world. As media theorist Sharni Orgad, 
who develops Hall‘s idea of representation to explain the political significance of 
meanings constructed by the visual media, argues, ―media representations work to 
legitimise certain discourses and inscribe them in the mainstream, the acceptable, the 
legitimate‖ (Orgad, 2012, p. 66). She further argues, ―the power of media 
representations lies in the creation of a certain environment of images, narratives and 
sensations that become the resources that shape what we know and get to know about 
the world‖ (Orgad, 2012, p. 90).  
The analysis of post-2006 biographical films in this thesis is done by following 
the tradition of the study of cultural and media representations of the constructionist 
school of thought. Meanings that the films signify come from the process by which the 
filmmakers employ the set of language-signs, both in verbal and visual forms, and 
especially the images of the figures who are popularly known in Thai society, to 
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construct new meanings that maintain a set of ideological values that favours the 
coalition of the middle class and the establishment. 
Another technical aspect of the filmic examination in this thesis requiring 
mention is the methodology used to decode filmic meanings. In this thesis, I follow the 
tradition of analysis of the narrative theorist Seymour Chatman (1980), who places a 
great deal of attention upon verbal forms, such as the written word in a novel, or 
character‘s dialogue spoken on screen, in examining filmic discourse. For Chatman, the 
verbal form of narrative similarly serves as a sign system, working to articulate shared 
conceptual ideas and actualise discourse. As he explains in his book Story and 
Discourse (1980), 
Thus, discourse-space as a general property can be defined as focus of spatial 
attention. It is the framed area to which the implied audience‘s attention is 
directed by the discourse, that portion of the total story-space that is ―remarked‖ 
or closed in upon, according to the requirements of the medium, though a 
narrator or through the camera eye—literally, as in film, or figuratively, as in 
verbal narrative (Chatman, 1980, p. 102). 
 
Despite this political significance of the verbal form of narrative, it does mean that the 
visual language of cinema will be dismissed in the analysis. The visual language of 
cinema, such as camera angle, point of view, or montage, fundamentally plays an 
essential role in constructing meanings. Nevertheless, in this thesis I focus more on the 
verbal part of the film‘s narrative. This is because in the current political context of Thai 
society, verbal political discourses have served as a key element that mobilise not just 
political movements and activites but, to use Raymond Williams‘ phrase, ―the whole 
way of life‖ (Williams, 1960, p. xvii) of Thai people. The word chat again 
philologically became popular and even more of a concern among conservative urban 
middle-class Thais who are against the Thaksin regime. In this thesis, I have chosen to 
focus more on the verbal form and look at how the visual language of the studied films 
can aid the productions of meanings, particularly the middle-class ideological values 
shared by establishment groups, of the verbal narrative, and vice versa. 
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 Lastly, for this part about approach and methodology, to show more clearly how 
the ideological values articulated from individuality in the studied biographical films are 
related to the broader discourse that maintains the legitimacy of the establishment elites 
and the sakdina feudalistic social structure, I will use the film examined in each chapter 
in comparison with other forms of social practices, particularly of the urban middle-
class Thais. In comparing these variables, I will show that the individualistic bourgeois 
values in the films are synonymous with the set of ideological values articulated in 
those hegemonic social practices. Moreover, in many cases, the individualism 
represented in the films can be viewed as linguistically and discursively connected to 
the articulation of these forms in other social prctices , and broadly represent how the 
regime of ―good individual‖ and ―individualism‖ is fostered in the current period of 
social crises and anxiety. 
 
I.XI  What are the Films Studied Here? 
 The biographical films that I have chosen to examine in this thesis contain 
characteristics, subjects, and issues that distinctly represent various important aspects of 
the Thai middle class‘s ideological coalition with the establishment. In general, these 
characteristics of cinematic narrative, which reflect such an ideological coalition, is not 
exclusive to the Thai biographical film genre. In other genres, for instance, the national 
heritage or the action film genres, the middle-class ideologies that favour the power and 
legitimacy of the establishment elites can be seen embedded in the films. For example, 
the narrative of the heritage film The Siam Renaissance (Thawi-phop, dir. Surapong 
Pinijkhar, 2004), the film that tells a story about a young Thai female historian, Manee, 
who slips back in time to the different historical periods of Thai history, can be seen as 
dominated by ―nationalist narratives surrounding the country‘s avoidance of a fully 
fledged colonial past‖ (Harrison, 2010, p. 113). One of most obvious parts of the film 
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that articulates this ideology is when the film highlights Manee‘s discovery that King 
Mongkut (r. 1851–1868) was the one who cleverly created a standard time for Siam, not 
because of the influence of colonial forces. In an action film like Ong-bak (dir. Prachya 
Pinkaew, 2003), we have the archetypal story of a Thai boxer-warrior, Ting, who goes 
away from his village to search for the lost Buddha statue of the village. Once again, a 
similar pro-establishment ideological value can be seen represented in Ting‘s journey 
and his ideological belief in the importance of the Buddha statue. Despite the 
similarities in ideological meanings of other film genres to the biographical film genre, 
the distinctiveness of the narrative form of the biographical film, which largely focuses 
on an individual‘s life journey and individual values, can be seen as offering more 
critical understandings of the hegemonic characteristic of the Thai middle-class culture 
and ideology. 
Since 2006, which parallels the period of the rise of middle-class political 
anxiety, the number of biographical films produced by the Thai film market has 
increased, and the subjects and style have become more diversified (see Table 2 in 
Appendix). In selecting the films to study, I have chosen the films that, I believe, best 
and most interestingly represent the ideologically docile characteristic of the middle 
class in relationship to the power of the establishment groups of post-2006 biographical 
films. On the one hand, these films were made to represent the ―truth‖ of the lives of the 
people whom the Thai middle-class society value in general. On the other hand, in the 
depictions of the supposed ―real-life stories‖ of the individuals, these selected films also 
support different important elements and aspects of the feudalistic values of the 
establishment. The feudalistic values focused on in this thesis are the ones that have 
been significant to the on-going political crises and conflicts in Thai society since 2006, 
such as royal nationalism (ratcha chat niyom), ―Thai-ness‖ (khwam pen Thai), and 
feudalistic patriarchal ideology. The biographical films examined in this thesis embody 
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this set of hybrid bourgeois-feudal cultural values in the depictions of the lives of the 
figures whom many members of the Thai middle-class adore. Moreover, the studied 
films show where the contemporary Thai biographical film genre fits within the larger 
picture of the hegemonic aspect of Thai filmic culture. 
Most importantly, and specifically relating to the power of the middle class‘ 
hybrid bourgeois-feudal ideology, when observing the form of individuality in the films 
in parallel with the socio-political context of Thailand after 2006, the films can be seen 
to represent various kinds of aspirations and desires of the members of the Thai middle 
class, who wish to maintain the status quo of the country and to suppress the rise of new 
groupings of socio-political power in the time of political crises and conflicts since 
2006.  
In Chapter II, I begin by looking at how post-2006 biographical films relate to 
what Thongchai Winichakul calls ―royal nationalism‖ or ratcha chatniyom (2001; 
2008). Royal nationalism is one of the most important ideologies of many Thai middle-
class people. In the past decade, the ideology has not only provided legitimacy for the 
monarchy, but also has become more extremely and horrifically destructive for the 
people who have been critical of the institution. To examine this ideology represented in 
contemporary biographical films, I analyse The Unsung Hero (Khun Rorng Palat Chu, 
dir. Surasawadee Chuechat, 2011), a biographical film that depicts the life of an 
Ayutthaya villager, Khun Rorng Palat Chu, who is believed by the filmmaker to be a 
forgotten historical hero and a noble ancestor of Thai people today. Although the 
making of the film has been claimed to promote ethical deeds that every good Thai 
citizen should follow—being ready to sacrifice oneself for the country, especially 
during the post-2006 political crisis, The Unsung Hero provides legitimacy for royal 
power by presenting the values of these ethical deeds by containing them within the 
rubric of royal nationalism. Moreover, the ideological docility of the film to the highest 
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institution of the Thai establishment, the monarchy, can be read as relating to the desire 
of many urban middle-class people in Bangkok to protect the capital from the arrival of 
the provincial Red Shirts in 2009 and 2010. 
In Chapter III, I discuss Thai-ness, which is another important element of the 
cultural ideology of the Thai middle class, as reflected in Yamada: The Samurai of 
Ayothaya (Yamada, dir. Nopporn Watin, 2010). This film is vital for gaining a critical 
understanding of the notion of the Thai-ness of the Thai middle-class culture of today. 
As I argue in this chapter, Yamada rejuvenates the ideological notion of Thai-ness, 
transforming it into a supposedly exceptional and prestigious cultural form (more 
powerful than other national or cultural forms), while presenting the life journey of a 
Japanese warrior, Yamada Ngamasa, who once lived and served the Ayutthaya court. In 
the film, ―Thai-ness‖ is narcissistically made to be seen as both appreciated and 
desireable to even non-Thai people. This form of the individuality embodied in the 
film‘s non-Thai protagonist reflects the attempt of many pro-establishment middle-class 
people to empower notions of Thai-ness by co-opting other ethnic-cultural identities to 
justify and empower the official representation of Thai identity, as well as to restrict the 
social space that is available to those who do not conform to the notion of ―Thai-ness‖. 
Chapter IV of the thesis looks at traditional patriarchy,  another form of 
ideological value of Thai middle-class culture, which are rarely considered in more 
politically oriented analyses of the official ideology of the establishment, but which, 
nonetheless, work to justify the power of the establishment elites until the present time. 
In this chapter, I examine the representation of a woman‘s life in a male-dominant 
culture as reflected in The Moon (Pumpuang, dir. Bandit Thongdee, 2011), a film that 
depicts the life of the female musical icon Pumpuang Duangchan. In the analysis, I 
show that although The Moon celebrates the success of a female singer who struggled in 
order to achieve her dream, the film also highlights the fact that her success was 
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achieved through her obedience to the cultural values of the male-dominated society. In 
this regard, The Moon becomes a film that supports the patriarchal values of the 
traditional social structure of the Thai state through the containment of other gender 
ideologies, especially the female construct, within the hierarchy of the ruling power of 
the male authorities of the establishment. Also, by comparing this represented meaning 
of the film with other social and political phenomena of the same period of the film‘s 
release, we can also read this conservative meaning in The Moon to reflect the mentality 
of many middle-class people, who long for the absolute authority of the male-dominated 
state during the on-going political crisis after 2006. 
In Chapter V, I switch to consider family values, another important dimension of 
the ideology of the Thai middle class, which are perhaps less political but have 
nonetheless been crucial to the strength of the coalition of the middle class and the 
establishment. The film that I use to discuss family values is The Billionaire (Top 
Secret: Wairun Phan Lan, dir. Songyos Sukmakanan, 2011), which portrays the journey 
to business success in the life of Aithipat or ―Top‖ Kulapongvanich, the owner of a 
famous fried seaweed snack, Tao Kae Noi. In this chapter, I illustrate how the film 
promotes the idea of the hard working, creative, and non-conformist young generation, 
while also supporting the establishment‘s family values and ideas of filial piety, which 
emphasise gratitude (katanyu) toward and respect for one‘s parents. From these 
characteristics of the film, I argue that The Billionaire represents how the family values 
of the Thai establishment are sustained and replicated through the redefinition of the 
concepts of creativity and non-conformism, by making them meaningful when achieved 
for the sake of family. Reading the film against the backdrop of the socio-political 
context since 2006, the moralistic kind of individuality in the film also represents the 
enthusiasm of the members of Thai middle class who are entrepreneurs to nurture the 
establishment‘s values in order to protect their business and their wealth status. 
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Chapter VI looks at a more indirect way that pro-establishment middle-class 
people have been using to empower their socio-economic coalition, which is the 
commodification of the critique of capitalism. Since Thaksin was ousted by military 
coup in 2006, many middle-class people, particularly those living in Bangkok who 
support the establishment, have managed to find expressing critical opinion toward the 
Thaksin political regime economically beneficial, even helping strengthen their 
coalition with the establishment power. In this chapter, I examine Young Bao (dir. 
Yuthakorn Sukmuktapha, 2013), a biographical film that depicts the early music career 
of Yuenyong Opakul or ―Aed Carabao‖, in this context of the market economy of 
capitalistic Thailand, where even the critique of capitalism represented by Thaksin‘s 
regime, can be commodified. In the film, the life of the protagonist, the young Aed 
Carabao, is shown as being against capitalistic cultural logic. However, at the end, his 
band ironically gains financial and social benefits from this anti-capitalist appeal. From 
this ostensively paradoxical narrative of the film, I argue that the cultural values of anti-
capitalism represented in Young Bao confirm the stage in which the market-economy 
society of the Thai middle class and the establishment has become more complex in that 
it can co-opt critiques of capitalism and transform them into commodities in the market, 
in order to enhance the economy of the country which is dominated by the coalition of 
the middle class and the establishment. This operation in the film where the critique of 
capitalism is commodified represents how the pro-establishment middle-class people 
have enhanced their position by commodifying critiques of Thaksin to lend more 
legitimacy to their own political side. 
In the concluding chapter, I draw on the shared key aspects of the biographical 
films examined in this thesis. In particular, I show that the representations of the forms 
of bourgeois individuality in these films can be categorised in two ways. These are, 
firstly, to promote the ideology directly and, secondly, to maintain the stability of the 
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coalition of the middle class and the establishment by protecting the socio-economic 
privileges and resources that they dominate from being taken over by the new socio-
political force, represented by, namely, Thaksin‘s political network and the Red Shirts. 
These two specific ways of maintaining the stability of the coalition of the middle class 
and the establishment will be discussed in the context of the notion of the Thai middle-
class culture as a whole. Lastly, I also discuss alternative forms of Thai middle-class 
individuality and culture that emerge from different political ideologies. Yet they are 
unable to rise to dominate the public arena, as they are policed and suppressed by the 
members of the coalition of the conservative middle class and the establishment.  
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CHAPTER II 
The Unsung Hero: The Self-Sacrificing Hero 
Who Defends the Land of the King 
 
 
II.I  Introduction 
We begin the discussion of how post-2006 biographical films reflect the 
bourgeois individuality of Thai middle-class culture, and represent their coalition with 
the establishment, by looking at this class‘s most cherished value of what historian 
Thongchai Winichakul calls ―royal nationalism‖ (ratcha chatniyom) (2001; 2008). As 
Thai society has become more divided by polarised politics since 2006—namely, the 
opposition between the Yellow Shirts or the pro-establishment middle-class, and the 
Red Shirts who are mostly from the northern and north-eastern provinces—many 
members of the urban middle class have become worried about the existing socio-
political order that has provided them with many forms of social privilege. The arrival 
of the Red Shirt movements into Bangkok from the provinces and their large protests in 
2009 and 2010 stirred up anxiety among many Bangkok residents about the security of 
life in the capital and the economic development of the country. To maintain the status 
quo, many members of the urban middle class, who have privileged access to the media 
and public spaces, have worked together to promote the values of official national 
institutions through a variety of discursive practices. The values attributed to these 
national institutions—the nation, religion, and the monarchy—are a source of 
ideological power that the members of the coalition of the urban middle class and the 
establishment have exploited in order to legitimate their claim to a leading role, and to 
maintain the socio-economic hierarchy between the city and the countryside in 
Thailand. The analysis of post-2006 Thai biographical films in this chapter directly 
examines the political agenda of urban middle-class people, which is represented in the 
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narrative device of the biographical film. The analysis looks at how the life of an 
individual Thai person adapted in a biographical film can be seen not only as presenting 
the ―truth‖ of the life of that individual, but also as supporting the discursive practice of 
pro-establishment middle-class Thais, who have been trying to defend the official 
values of national institutions, especially the monarchy, from what they perceive as 
threats from the rise of the new socio-political force of the Red Shirts since 2006. 
In this chapter, I study The Unsung Hero (Khun Rorng Palat Chu, dir. 
Surasawadi Chuachat, 2011). This film depicts the life of the historical figure Khun 
Rorng Palat Chu,
11
 who is recorded in Thailand‘s official national history as a leader of 
Wisetchaicharn village in the period of Ayutthaya in the 1760s. Chu led the people of 
his village to join the Ayutthaya soldiers to fight invading Burmese forces in an area 
that is now Prachuap Khiri Khan Province (Damrong, 1999, p. 255). The Unsung Hero 
is different from other historical epic films made before it, like Bang Rajan (dir. Tanit 
Jitnukul, 2000) or The Legend of Suriyothai (Suriyothai, dir. Chatri Chalerm Yukol, 
2001). The production of The Unsung Hero was influenced by the filmmaker‘s 
observation that Thai society is experiencing crisis and social threat coming from within 
the country, not from outside. In previous studies on Thai cinema, many scholars (for 
example Amporn, 2003; Harrison 2005) have viewed outside forces, namely, neoliberal 
globalisation, as having a significant role in inspiring the making of many nationalist 
historical biographical films. In this chapter, I trace the ideological connection of The 
Unsung Hero to political events in the country and show that the force created by the 
perceived ―threat‖ from within the country can also play a similar role to perceived 
external threats in reinforcing the making of biographical films that are about historical 
events and heroes from official Thai history. The analysis of The Unsung Hero in this 
context of domestic politics will help us gain a critical understanding about many 
                                                     
11
 The title Khun Rorng Palat is an official title given to a mid-rank bureaucrat who served the 
Ayutthaya court. 
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members of the urban middle class, who have not only become more firmly allied with 
the establishment during the recent political crises, but have also helped to defend 
establishment values. 
In The Unsung Hero, the director represents the hero, Chu, as an example of a 
noble Thai ancestor who has a spirit of self-sacrifice (jit asa) and who does not think of 
pursuing personal political power or economic self-interest when serving the country. 
These noble characteristics are a mindset that the director indicates all Thais should 
learn from (Maimani, 2012). The film begins when Ayutthaya is going through 
transitions of the throne from King Boromakot (r. 1732−1758) to King Uthumphorn (r. 
1758), and then to King Ekkathat (r. 1758−1767). During these transitions, the 
Ayutthaya state is weakened by rivalries between different groups of competing 
aristocrats. Chu, who is a witness to this political chaos in the capital, becomes highly 
anxious about the future of Ayutthaya. Chu then goes back to his hometown, 
Wisetchaicharn village, and recruits male villagers to form a self-defence force. One 
day, Chu is told about the approach of attacking Burmese forces from the southern 
direction of Ayutthaya, and is asked by an aristocrat to go help fight against the 
invaders. Given that the Ayutthaya state has been weakened by political rivalry, Chu 
immediately realises that the capital would not be able to resist the Burmese forces. 
Eventually, Chu decides to help Ayutthaya by taking his village defence force to join 
Ayutthaya‘s forces. The courage of Chu and other village warriors is highly admirable 
in that they go to the front line to battle with the Burmese, even before the arrival of the 
main force from the capital, knowing that they have very little chance to survive and 
return home. The Unsung Hero ends when Chu and his village warriors fight until their 
last breaths, as they all are killed by the Burmese, whose army is many times larger than 
Chu‘s. 
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The film was sponsored by a well-known Thai entrepreneur Boonchai 
Bencharongkul, a former CEO of the telecommunication company, Total Access 
Communication, or commonly known as DTAC, and the owner of the private Thai 
Museum of Contemporary Art (MoCA) in Bangkok. The director of the film is 
Surasawadi Chuachat, a colleague of Boonchai, who previously produced a patriotic 
television commercial series for DTAC, when Boonchai was still CEO.
12
 From the 
subject and the theme of the film about self-sacrifice, and the production profile of the 
film, in this chapter I examine how The Unsung Hero engages in the reproduction of 
royal nationalism to reinforce the power structure in feudal-dominated Thai society. 
Furthermore, I expand my analysis of the film by using it to gain a critical 
understanding of the anxiety and political agenda of the members of the urban middle 
class, particularly in Bangkok, in the period of on-going political crises and conflicts 
after 2006. 
Previous studies on Thai historical epic films (Anchalee, 2002; Harrison, 2005; 
Pasuk & Baker, 2002, p. 443) have tended to view the making of the historical epic as 
relating to anti-globalisation sentiment. While I do not deny the element of nationalism 
and globalism in The Unsung Hero, my analysis aims to reveal another important layer 
in this film, which is equally significant to the understanding of domestic political 
conflicts in contemporary Thailand. The Unsung Hero was made in 2010 and released 
in July 2011. This period is crucial to recent Thai political history, in that it saw the rise 
of the new political power, the Red Shirts, in the public space in the capital of the 
country, and the suppression of this force by the coalition of the middle class and the 
establishment which occurred in 2009 and 2010. The release of the film was 
intentionally made to take place after the Red Shirts‘ political party, the Pheu Thai Party 
(PTP), also the proxy party of the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, won the 
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 The commercial was produced in a series under the title Samneuk Rak Ban Kert (Realise Love 
for Your Homeland). 
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election in July 2011 and rose to power in parliament. I show in this chapter that the 
making of The Unsung Hero was informed less by the perceived threats from outside 
the country, but more by these events of political contestation between the coalition of 
the urban middle class and the establishment, on the one hand, and the new political 
force, on the other hand, which occurred in the streets of Bangkok and at the ballot box 
in this period. 
As I argue, while the film explores the life of a noble hero of Thai history, The 
Unsung Hero is also a form of discursive practice articulated to engender prejudice 
against the politicians of Thaksin‘s political faction as supposedly being corrupt. The 
film‘s ideological construction of such a prejudice contributes to the promotion of royal 
nationalism and the legitimacy of the monarchy, and also reflects the collective desire 
of many urban middle-class people to preserve their privileged lifestyle gained from 
Bangkok city life. The film does this mainly through three film techniques. One is to 
use the representation of the chaotic situation in the Ayutthaya court as a metaphor to 
remind audiences of today‘s social damage caused by corrupt politicians. Second is the 
promotion of the theme of self-sacrifice through the noble individualism of Chu, who is 
the film‘s protagonist. The third technique to promote royal nationalism is through the 
signifying practice of the discourse of phaen-din or ―land‖, a deeply emotive term in 
official discourse that many Thais already believe to be important and valuable, and 
also to be related to royal power. Moreover, when examining the meaning of the film in 
relation to the specific political crisis caused by the polarised politics after 2006, The 
Unsung Hero can be read as representing the wish of many members of the urban 
middle class to prevent the arrival of the provincial political force of the Red Shirts into 
the geo-politically central area of Bangkok, a situation which these urban middle-class 
people saw as a threat to the peace and order of their lives in the capital and to the 
development of the country that has so benefited them. In the body of this chapter, to 
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show how the film serves such a political role, I begin by discussing the promotion of 
royal nationalism by the conservative middle class through the discourse of critiquing 
supposedly corrupt politicians. Then, I explain in detail how The Unsung Hero 
empowers the royal-nationalist discourse through its seemingly politically neutral film 
language. Finally, I show how this ideological theme reflects the specific kind of 
middle-class political anxiety which has grown after 2006. 
 
II.II  Royal Nationalism and the Critique of Corrupt Politicians 
According to Thongchai (2001), who critically analysed and labelled the 
ideology, royal nationalism has been one of the most important ideological discourses 
and practices in preserving the existing feudal-dominated social structure and order, and 
the worldviews of many people in Thai society, and in justifying the authoritative power 
of the monarchy.
13
 The ideology of royal nationalism is an integral part of the official 
national history, which, as Thongchai argues, can be reproduced in many forms of 
―modern narrative prose,‖14 as long as they appear logically fitted with other forms of 
the historical narrative of official Thai history. In the modern period, as many scholars 
have discussed (for example Chanida, 2011; Jackson, 2010; Prajak, 2013; Stengs, 
2009), this ideology has not only provided legitimacy to the royal institution to lead 
Thai society, it has also been valuable for many royalist members of the middle class 
who have helped promote or utilise it to achieve their own agendas. In particular, when 
Thai society saw the rise of the new political force, represented by Thaksin‘s political 
party in the parliament, the conservative members of the middle class held more firmly 
                                                     
13
 ―มีหนา้ท่ีตอกย ํ้าความรู้แบบฉบบั และสจัจะอนัจริงแทแ้น่นอน เพ่ือค ํ้าจุนระเบียบสงัคมแบบราชาชาตินิยม‖ (Thongchai, 
2001, p. 65). 
14 ―ภาษาของเร่ืองเล่าแบบใหม่ เป็น modern narrative prose กล่าวคือเป็นภาษาของความสมจริง (realism)‖ 
(Thongchai, 2001, p. 58). 
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to the royal institution and used royal-nationalist discourse to undermine the 
enfranchisement of the new political power. 
 
Official National History as the Vehicle of Royal Nationalism 
According to Thongchai (2001), royal nationalism originated in the construction 
and diffusion of the official national history by Siamese elites in the early 20th century. 
As Thongchai explains, what Siamese elites did in the course of writing national history 
was to ―hide‖ (pokpit), ―reject‖ (patiset) or ―twist‖ (biang-ben) unpleasant parts of the 
country‘s history, particularly the fact that the country had lost out in the struggle with 
the colonial powers. One of the historical events that typifies this attempt of the Siamese 
elites to whitewash national history was the Paknam Incident in 1893 (Wikrittakan Ror. 
Sor. 112). According to Thongchai, in the Paknam Incident, Siam and France were 
competing to secure territory and to draw a clear-cut boundary between their competing 
interests in the areas of Cambodia and Laos (Thongchai, 2001, p. 59). The result was 
that Siam lost to France, and therefore, could not secure the national boundary where it 
wanted. ―It was the big wolf (France) and small wolf (Siam) contending for a baby 
sheep,‖ is Thongchai‘s metaphor.15 
However, when Siamese elites recorded these events in the national history and 
diffused it in Thai society, Siam‘s defeat in the face of the colonial power of France has 
been told differently. As Thongchai (2001) explains, the official history of the country 
posits, instead, that Siam, the country which it is claimed had a vast ―territory‖ in the 
past, was threatened by the colonial powers, who wanted to take over the country. This 
version of the history implies that if it was not for the intelligence of the monarch, King 
Chulalongkorn, who helped protect the country from being taken by the colonial 
powers, the Thai people would not have a country of their own, with its territorial 
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 ―หมาป่าตวัใหญ่ (ฝร่ังเศษ) กบัหมาป่าตวัเล็ก (สยาม) แยง่ลูกแกะกนั‖ (Thongchai, 2001, p. 59). 
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boundaries as seen today. Thongchai argues that this interpretation of the royal-national 
history has been well and widely received because it fits well with other self-
aggrandising historical narratives of the country. These narratives similarly posit that 
Siam had always had a ―vast territory‖ from ancient times, and that the succession of 
past Siamese kings were the ones who have helped protect this territory from enemies 
(Thongchai, 2001, p. 59). This version of the country‘s history has created the belief 
that Thailand has always been ―the Siamese lamb‖ (Thongchai, 2001, p. 59) who has 
always been threatened by other national powers, and that Thai people should unite and 
defend the country. It has also given legitimacy to the Thai monarchy today as the 
righteous rulers of the nation. 
 
Royal Nationalism as Reproduced by Thai Middle Class Culture 
In the modern period, the persistence of royal nationalism has also been 
supported through the middle-class culture, with members of the middle class typically 
producing forms of public discourse that highlight the importance of, and claim the 
legitimacy of, the monarchy as the most rightful and righteous ruler of Thailand. 
 Thongchai (2001) also argues that one of the most important events in modern 
Thai history was the student protest against the military dictatorship in the 14 October 
1973 mass mobilisation (het kan sip-si tula), which involved many people from middle-
class backgrounds and which also helped strengthen the legitimacy of the monarchy.
16
 
In this uprising of people power, students challenged the political legitimacy of the then 
military dictatorship government, which was led by Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn 
(office: 1963−1973), by promoting the structures and values of democracy. However, 
the kind of democratic values that these students promoted was the one that emphasised 
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 ―แต่จุดเปล่ียนท่ีสาํคญัท่ีทาํให้ราชาชาตินิยมผกูพนักบัประชาธิปไตยในความทรงจาํของผูค้นในปัจจุบนัคือบทบาทของสถาบนั
กษตัริยใ์นเหตุการณ์ 14 ตุลา‖ (Thongchai, 2001, p. 63) 
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the role of King Prajadhipok (r. 1925−1935), who many students believed ―gave‖ the 
constitution to Thai people in the aftermath of the revolution in 1932. 
According to historian Charnvit Kasetsiri, the history of the beginning of 
democracy in Thailand has been viewed by many people in two ways.
17
 On the one 
hand, it is believed that the People‘s Party was the group of people who helped 
―liberate‖ Siam/Thailand from the absolute ruling power of the monarchy. This kind of 
interpretation emphasises and celebrates the role of the People‘s Party in the 
democratisation of Thailand after the 1932 revolution. It also suggests that the role of 
the monarchy in the period of absolute monarchy was in opposition to democratic 
values. At present, when royal nationalism dominates Thai society, this interpretation 
becomes increasingly unspeakable in the public domain, as those who articulate it could 
potentially face a lèse majesté charge from royalists. For the second view, which is now 
the more popular one, it is believed that the establishment of democracy had been 
planned by King Prajadhipok before the 1932 Revolution. As Charnvit reflects, this 
interpretation would regard the revolution carried out by the People‘s Party as having 
been premature (ching suk korn ham), as the king was already about to give a 
constitution to his people. As Prajak Kongkirati (2013) shows in his study, the student 
uprising on 14 October 1973, as discussed above, was largely mobilised within this 
latter interpretation of the history of Thai democracy, which believes in the leading role 
of the monarchy in national democratisation. In their protests against the military 
government in the days leading up to 14 October 1973, the students promoted the role 
of King Prajadhipok— who was thought to be the ―founder of Thai democracy‖—to 
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 See this explanation of Charnvit further in the film documentary on democratisation in 
Thailand, Paradoxocracy (Prachathippa-Thai, dir. Pen-Ek Ratanaruang, 2013). 
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undermine the political legitimacy of the military dictatorship, which these students 
believed to be unjust.
18
 
Furthermore, the view of students in the 1970s that the monarchy is a righteous 
leader had been strengthened further, when they witnessed King Bhumibol of the 
current reign appear on national television to express his concern for these students who 
were fighting for what they perceived to be the ―righteous kind of democracy‖. As 
Chanida Chitbundid reflects, many people who witnessed the king‘s engagement in 
people‘s politics that day were highly impressed (Chanida, 2011, pp. 208−209), and this 
has contributed significantly to the rise in the status of King Bhumibol as another 
―father of democracy‖, following King Prajadhipok. 
 To relate these political events in 1973 to the essence of royal nationalism as 
argued by Thongchai (2001), what we can see is that the legitimacy of the monarchy as 
supposedly the ultimate righteous leader of the country has been extended and re-
inferred through recourse to notions of ―democracy‖, the form of political ideology 
which has become dominant since the 1970s. What these young intellectuals of the 
1970s called ―democracy‖ became what Thongchai describes as a ―modern narrative‖ 
discourse that has helped strengthen royal nationalism to become integral to popular 
understandings in the contemporary period (Thongchai, 2001, p. 58). And as Thai 
society has changed across the decades, political movements have not been the only 
forms of expression that have bolstered the legitimacy of the monarchy. As other 
scholars (Somsak, 2001; Jackson, 2010; Chanida, 2011) have discussed, cultural forms 
and expressions, such as song, literature, and media representation, have also played 
significant roles in directly and indirectly supporting the dominant role and charismatic 
authority of the king. Nevertheless, as I show in the next section, in the past couple of 
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 See further in the section, ―Wathakam Kasat Prachathippatai‖ (Monarch-Democracy 
Discourse), of Lae Laew Khwam Khleuan-wai Kor Prakot (Thus, the Movement Emerged) 
(Prajak, 2013, pp. 395−444). 
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decades, the kind of discursive practice that has become increasingly influential in 
justifying the king‘s authority, which is related directly to the discussion of The Unsung 
Hero in this chapter, is the conservative middle class-establishment alliance‘s 
representation of the politicians who are associated with Thaksin, as supposedly being 
opponents of the king. 
 
The Conservatives’ Representation of Thaksin as Supposed Opponent of the King 
 In the last couple of decades, another form of practice by the royalist middle-
class Thais which has contributed to the strengthening of royal nationalism and has 
provided more legitimacy to King Bhumibol as a righteous ruler is the representation of 
Thaksin and the politicians in his political network as supposed opponents of the king. 
In general, the politicians of the electoral system in Thailand have largely been seen, 
especially by the establishment elites, as having a potential to undermine the traditional 
values of feudalistic Thai society. Several years after the revolution in 1932 which 
abolished the absolute monarchy, there were many attempts from the members of the 
old establishment to challenge the people‘s elected politicians and constitutional 
monarchy. Pridi Banomyong was criticised by King Prajadhipok (r. 1925−1935), when 
he proposed to the king in 1933 an economic plan (rang khao-khrong setthakit) to 
reform the country, as trying to convert Siam/Thailand to communism (Nattapoll, 2013, 
p. 253). In the same year, Prince Boworadet, the grandson of King Mongkut (r. 
1851−1868), led a group of royalist soldiers to revolt against the People‘s Party (khana 
ratsadorn) government, hoping to return the country to absolute monarchy (Nattapoll, 
2013, pp. 27−32). In the contemporary context, the rise of Thaksin‘s political power, 
which has established a strong pact among politicians in the northern and north-eastern 
regions, the two largest regional constituencies in the parliament, has engendered great 
anxiety among many members of both the establishment and the urban middle class, 
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who are the allies of the establishment. To maintain the legitimacy of the monarchy, the 
establishment and many members of the middle class have worked together to condemn 
the politicians who are associated with Thaksin‘s political faction as a supposed cause 
of the country‘s adversity, and to promote the monarch as a moral icon. 
 The perception that people‘s elected politicians are corrupt has existed in Thai 
society since the overthrow of the military dictatorship in 1973. After 1973, governing 
power has been passed on more to the masses through the electoral system. However, in 
this so-called period of ―blooming democracy‖ (prachathipatai beng ban) from the 
1970s on, ironically, elected politicians have increasingly been viewed as a group of 
people who caused trouble to the country‘s development. Part of what constitutes this 
view is the perceived corruption of many politicians, which is constructed through a 
series of discourses produced by people in society to criticise the role and performance 
of elected politicians. For example, the government of Prime Minster General Chatichai 
Choonhavan (in office: 1988−1991), which adopted a neoliberal economic policy 
(Baker & Pasuk, 2009, pp. 244−245), was criticised through the use of expressions such 
as khorrapchan (―corruption‖) and kin ban kin meuang (―eating from the state‖).19 
Before the economic crisis in 1997, a more polarised discourse based on morality, such 
as nam di / nam lew or nam sia (―good water‖/ ―bad water‖) entered the discursive 
practice of criticising elected politicians. In the business magazine Manager published 
in June 1995, an article expressed concern about the increasingly active role of 
businessman Thaksin Shinawatra, who had then just entered national politics. The 
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 Kin ban kin meuang (―eating from the state‖) is an old term that originally meant earning 
income from the profits of office (Baker & Pasuk, 2009, p. 246). However, in the context of the 
modern parliamentary political system, the term has been re-defined negatively to mean the 
self-seeking interest of politicians. 
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article questioned the morality of Thaksin— whether he would become ―good water‖ or 
―bad water‖—given that he had stakes in telecommunication businesses.20 
 The middle-class prejudice against elected politicians has become highly 
destructive and often has exclusively been directed towards the group of politicians 
from Thaksin‘s political faction, since he first rose to power in 2001 and was 
subsequently re-elected in 2005. During his two terms (2001−2005; 2005−2006), 
Thaksin changed many things in the government and in the country‘s infrastructure, 
especially the old bureaucratic system, which he wanted to become more efficient on 
the model of the private sector. Moreover, because of his populist policies that aimed to 
target the mass population in provincial areas, Thaksin was able to create trust among 
the people in the north and north-east, the largest proportion of Thai citizens, who 
previously had never received substantial interest from the earlier governments or from 
the elites of the state centred in Bangkok. While the rise of Thaksin was seen as 
beneficial by the majority of people in the country, his political regime began to 
challenge the interests of the coalition of the urban middle class and establishment 
elites. 
 The anti-Thaksin mass protest in 2006, The People's Alliance for Democracy 
(PAD), or the so-called Yellow Shirts, which mostly consisted of the urban middle 
class, was the most active group advancing disenchantment with politicians as solely 
refering to Thaksin‘s political group. Moreover, fearing that the social and economic re-
structuring that Thaksin had been promoting would eventually alter the status quo, the 
PAD started to accuse Thaksin of having a secret agenda of toppling the monarchy, or 
lom jao, literally ―toppling the lords‖. Sondhi Limthongkul, the owner of ASTV  
Manager News Company in Bangkok and leader of the PAD, was one of many who 
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 For an online version of the article, see http://info.gotomanager.com/news 
/details.aspx?id=4951. Retrieved 6 August 2015. 
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promoted this allegation.
21
 Thaksin was not the only corrupt politician who was alleged 
to be behind the plan to topple the monarchy. Other politicians or activists who were 
related to Thaksin‘s political power were also accused with the same allegation. One of 
these was Jakrapob Penkair, who worked as a parliamentary spokesman for the Thaksin 
government from 2003 to 2005, and as the Minister of the Office of the Prime Minister 
in 2008. After Jakrapob gave a speech about paternalism in Thailand in 2008, he was 
accused of wanting to overthrow the monarchy. In the following year, he was charged 
under the Thai lèse-majesté law, article 112 of the Thai constitution, and had to escape 
overseas, where he has lived in exile ever since. 
 While the image of Thaksin and politicians associated with his power have 
increasingly been seen as a threat to the country‘s prosperity and to the beloved 
institution of the monarchy, the status of King Bhumibol as ―the one governing the land 
in accord with Buddhist morality‖ (phu pok-khrorng phaendin doi tham) has been even 
more celebrated. An example of such a polarisation by, on the one hand, identifying the 
king as an ultimate moral guide, and on the other hand, identifying the politicians of 
Thaksin‘s political faction as opponents of the Thai state, can be seen represented in 
part of a poem which began to be circulated after the former prime minister Yingluck 
Shinawatra was elected in 2011, with her populist policies. The poem condemns 
Yingluck‘s government and her policies in the following words: 
A Politician hands out fish but the King hands out fishing rods. 
A Politician hands out computer tablets but the King teaches knowledge. 
A Politician worries about power but the King worries about the people. 
A Politician creates problems, but the King creates virtue. 
…22 
                                                     
21
 For instance, on 1 September 2006, a few weeks before the military staged a coup on 19 
September, Sondhi went on the PAD protest stage in Bangkok and explained to the protestors 
that there was a dangerous plot, in which some soldiers sided with Thaksin and were planning 
to challenge the monarchy. See in http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ 
ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9490000111504. Retrieved 6 August 2015. 
22
 In original Thai, “นกัการเมืองยื่นปลา พระราชายืน่เบด็ นกัการเมืองแจกแทบ็เล็ต กษตัริยแ์นะเคล็ดวิชา นกัการเมืองห่วง
อ านาจ มหาราชห่วงประชา นกัการเมืองสร้างสญัญา องคเ์จา้ฟ้าสร้างสรรคธ์รรม…” See in The Chaopraya online news 
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The poem clearly creates a binary opposition between a good leader and a bad leader. 
Populist policies of the government, such as providing free computer tablets to primary 
school students, one of the first projects of the Yingluck government, are represented in 
the poem as being inferior to the wisdom taught by the king. 
This section has discussed royal nationalism, the most treasured ideological 
belief of the Thai establishment and its conservative middle-class allies, which has 
served to provide legitimacy to the Thai monarchy as a righteous ruler of the country. 
What is particularly significant about the persistence of royal nationalism in the last few 
decades is that the discursive practices criticising Thaksin and his political allies have 
played a crucial role in nurturing the ideology and providing legitimacy to the current 
monarch as the righteous ruler of the country. In the next section, I show through the 
analysis of The Unsung Hero that royal nationalism can be reproduced not only through 
rhetoric that openly celebrates the king or criticises the politicians of Thaksin‘s political 
power, but also through the narrative of filmic biography, which traces the life journeys 
of other figures in society. In the analysis, I show that although the life of the 
protagonist in the film is claimed to be an example for Thai people to follow, 
underneath that claim lies the ideological attempt to legitimise the ruling power of the 
monarchy. The demonstration of The Unsung Hero as being a discursive practice that 
promotes royal nationalism will also allow us to understand the anxiety of the Thai 
middle class in the period of on-going political conflicts after 2006, which will be 
discussed after the analysis of the film. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
website also circulated the poem. See http://www.chaoprayanews.com /2011/07/22/พระราชายื่นเบด็/. 
Retrieved 24 March 2015. 
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II.III  Chu: The Self-Sacrificing Hero of the Thai Middle Class 
In the advertising campaign of the film, The Unsung Hero is explained to be a 
film about an historical hero, ―the noble ancestor of the Thai people‖ whose noble deeds 
should be honoured and followed, especially in a time when Thai society has become 
politically polarised and is in the midst of political crises. In an interview, the financial 
backer of the film, Boonchai (Chutima & Tippimol, 2011), explained that the film was 
made to warn people about the consequences of political rivalry initiated by self-
seeking politicians, whom he said do not follow the country‘s rules and regulations. 
Boonchai reflected, 
When the politicians fought with each other, I could not go out from my house 
because all the roads were blocked. My company had to be shut down for 3 to 4 
days. I thought it was not something that we could ignore. I think their 
[politicians‘] conflicts should be fought and resolved in the parliament. You are 
the representatives of the people. You should fight in the parliament. You should 
not use other public spaces to serve your needs and make other people feel 
insecure (Chutima & Tippimol, 2011).
23
 
 
Boonchai further explained that the making of The Unsung Hero was a way to promote 
unity in society. As he explains, ―I think there is a connection there, about loving our 
nation, only if everyone understands the phrase ‗if the nation survives, we survive‘‖.24 
Boonchai also says that the aristocrats represented in the film who compete for power 
are meant to be a metaphor for politicians in the present time. As he asserts, ―The 
aristocrats are like the country‘s leader, comparable to ministers in today‘s context‖.25 
Most importantly, Boonchai claims that when the film was released in 2011, he was 
trying to avoid being part of the political conflicts. He claims that, ―In fact, the release 
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 ―อยา่งเวลาเขาตีกนั เขาทะเลาะกนั ผมออกจากบา้นไม่ได ้เพราะว่าถนนปิด ไปโน่นมาน่ีไม่ได ้วนัน้ีตอ้งถูกบงัคบัให้ปิดบริษทั หยดุ
งานสามส่ีวนั ผมคิดวา่มนัไม่ใช่ส่ิงท่ีควรจะน่ิงดูดาย ผมคิดวา่ ความขดัแยง้ของเขา เขาควรไปอดักนัในสภาซิ คุณเป็นตวัแทน
ประชาชน คุณก็ไปทะเลาะกนัในนั้น แต่ไม่ใช่เอาพ้ืนท่ีอ่ืนมาแลว้ทาํให้ทุกคนมีความรู้สึกไม่มัน่คง‖ (Chutima & Tippimol, 
2011). 
24
 ―คิดวา่มนัมีมิติของการโยงเร่ืองให้เกิดความรักชาติ ถา้เขา้ใจคาํวา่ ‗ชาติอยูไ่ด ้เราอยูไ่ด‘้‖ (Chutima & Tippimol, 
2011). 
25
 ―เสนาบดีก็เหมือนกบัผูบ้ริหารประเทศ เทียบไดก้บัรัฐมนตรีในยคุปัจจุบนัน่ีแหละ‖ (Chutima & Tippimol, 2011). 
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date was scheduled before the 2011 election but I told them to wait. We had enough 
conflicts. We should not be part of them‖.26 
 From his statements, it can be seen that Boonchai, who initiated this film 
project, has tried to present himself and his film as being politically neutral (pen klang 
or mai fakfai fai dai), which is typical for many middle-class entrepreneurs who claim 
to care about Thai society. Moreover, Boonchai‘s statements also clearly suggest that he 
has perceived that the political rivalry in Bangkok‘s streets between politicians and their 
supporters is the cause of the trouble which Thai society has been experiencing in recent 
years. Thus, his film, The Unsung Hero, is supposed to be one that teaches a moral 
lesson to Thai people, especially the politicians who seek power. However, when 
reading the film narrative closely, especially when focusing on a set of verbal 
discourses in the film, it appears that the agenda of the film is not only to encourage the 
audience to unite and be self-sacrificing for the country. In the following analysis of The 
Unsung Hero, I argue that the claim about Chu‘s noble deeds being worth learning from 
in the time of political crisis was only expressed in order to draw the attention of the 
people to see the film. When looking closely into how the film projects the individual 
actions of the protagonist, and at the use of other nationalist discourse in the film, The 
Unsung Hero is, indeed, one of the most propagandist yet innovative masterpieces of 
the pro-establishment Thai middle-class people, reproducing royal nationalism and 
promoting the legitimacy of the monarchy. 
 
The Characterisation of Chu as an Anti-Politician 
 Even though the story of the historical figure of Chu was relatively unknown to 
most Thai people, the promotion of The Unsung Hero when the film was released, and 
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 ―จริงๆแลว้มนัเกือบจะไปฉายก่อนเลือกตั้ง แต่ผมบอกให้เบรกก่อน เขาทะเลาะกนัก็บาดหมางพอแลว้ เราอยา่ไปเติมเช้ือไฟ‖ 
(Chutima & Tippimol, 2011). 
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the characterisation of the protagonist in the film, made Chu into a representation of a 
noble citizen who aims to rescue a society from corrupt politicians, who, as Boonchai 
suggested in his interview noted above, are portrayed in The Unsung Hero through the 
characters of power-hungry Ayutthaya aristocrats (Chutima & Tippimol, 2011). 
However, as I show below, the making of The Unsung Hero did not aim to challenge 
but, rather, to support the power of the modern-day royal institution. 
 According to the producer of the film, Panot Udom (Maimani, 2012), the life of 
Chu was previously not known by many people. Chu was a member of Wisetchaichan 
village in the current area of Ang Thorng Province. When the invading Burmese 
approached Ayutthaya from the southern direction, Chu and his villager men joined the 
Ayutthaya forces to fight against the invaders in what is now the area of Prachuap 
Khirikhan Province. When Boonchai discovered the history of this event and the theme 
about self-sacrifice in the historical account of Chu, he wanted to promote the heroic 
deeds of Chu to be more widely known by the public. As Boonchai explains about his 
impression of Chu, ―I do not think we have ever had this kind of historical hero. The 
active one, the one that goes out to attack. We already have many who stay in to 
defend‖.27 
 Boonchai‘s impression of Chu‘s noble deeds can be seen clearly expressed in 
the promotion of the film. The posters of the film that were released together with the 
film contain slogans that aim to raise a sense of curiosity and eagerness to know the 
character among people who previously might not have known about Chu. One of the 
promotional posters states, putting words in the mouth of Chu reflecting on his 21th 
century fame, ―I cannot believe it, 252 years have passed, that [sacrifice] I did in the 
past would come back to remind people in the present time‖ (see Figure 2.1). For other 
people who did not know about Chu before, this statement provokes curiosity about 
                                                     
27 “ผมคิดวา่เรายงัไม่เคยมีฮีโร่ประเภทน้ี เป็นแบบรุก คือรุกไปเพ่ือปกป้อง แบบรับเรามีหลายคนแลว้” (Chutima & Tippimol, 
2011). 
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who Chu was and what has happened today that has made the filmmaker want to bring 
him back to speak to a contemporary audience. A statement in another poster reflects 
more clearly that the film is related to politicians in Thai society today causing trouble. 
Again, the poster puts words in the mouth of Chu, ―Today, I only see decay resulting 
from desire for power and selfishness, rather than concern about the country‖ (see 
Figure 2.1). These materials, circulated before the film‘s release, constructed a sense of 
heroism in the character, and established the film‘s relevance to the political situation in 
the contemporary period, in which confrontations of politicians and their supporters in 
the streets of Bangkok had caused obstacles to many urban middle-class people. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Posters used to advertise The Unsung Hero 
 
 In the film, the image of Chu as a noble citizen who wants to save the society 
from his corrupt countrymen is even more clearly reinforced. The Unsung Hero is made 
predominantly in black and white. This decision is perhaps to reinforce both the sense 
of the historical past and a critical message of the film in regard to national stability. 
From the start, the film shows that Chu lived in a time of two transitions of the throne 
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after the death of King Boromakot. Chu is summoned by aristocrats and state officers in 
the Ayutthaya royal court to discuss the reconciliation of power among competing noble 
factions. However, the reconciliation is not successful and the Ayutthaya aristocrats and 
officers begin to fight with one another over the throne. Chu is shown having to help 
one of the competing factions, although he doesn‘t want to take sides. He expresses this 
in a voice-over while the film shows him killing other Ayutthaya men who are allied 
with the opponents of his lord: ―Using a sword to kill ones who deserve it is not wrong. 
But in my life, I would have never thought that I would have to kill my fellow 
countrymen, to kill without knowing who they are, kill without having any resentment 
against them‖.28 The emphasis and repetition of the word ―kill‖ or kha in this dialogue 
of Chu could be read as the filmmaker‘s attempt to relate the film to the contemporary 
political conflicts, in which the clashes on the streets of Bangkok often turned out to be 
deadly and violent. Nevertheless, while this sequence shows Chu‘s bitter feeling in 
having to kill his fellow countrymen, the film shows him still following his superior‘s 
request to help fight with other aristocrats. This reflects another noble characteristic of 
Chu, as a good citizen of Ayutthaya sakdina social structure, who knows his ―role‖ (na-
thi) in society and follows the order of his superiors. 
The most intense part in the beginning of the film, which reflects the attempt of 
the filmmaker to deliver messages about contemporary political conflicts through the 
history of Chu, is when Chu witnesses the executions of the noble aristocrats who lost 
in their contest for the throne. After the battle scenes between different aristocratic 
factions, the film cuts to an open field outside the city of Ayutthaya. There, Chu sees 
three detainees covered in sacks, who are the people on the losing side of the political 
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 ―ใชด้าบฆ่าคนท่ีสมควรฆ่าไม่ใช่เร่ืองผิด แต่ในชีวิตจริง กูไม่เคยคิดวา่จะตอ้งมาฆ่าคนบา้นเดียวกนั ฆ่าคนท่ีไม่เคยรู้จกั ฆ่าโดยท่ีไม่มี
เร่ืองแคน้เคืองอาฆาต‖ 
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contest, and who are about to be beaten to death with wooden clubs.
 29
 In this sequence, 
the filmmaker employs the colour red to contrast with the dominant monochrome black 
and white of most of the film to highlight the destruction caused by the greed for power 
(see Figure 2.2). The scene is also accompanied by Chu‘s voice-over, which expresses 
his bitterness toward the competition for power of Ayutthaya politicians. The voice-
over goes, ―On that day, I got to see the truth. Whoever wins is a ruler and whoever 
loses is a robber. Whose sword is quicker and sharper will bring that one power‖. 
 
Figure 2.2. Chu is looking at the three condemned prisoners. The filmmaker highlights the 
condemned characters in red. 
 
The rest of The Unsung Hero shows Chu‘s heroic and moral deeds, paralleling 
what film-financer, Boonchai, states that he wants people in Thai society to do in times 
of political conflict. When Chu learns about the approaching Burmese army, he does not 
wait in his village, but bravely takes his villagers to the front line to confront the 
Burmese troops, even ahead of the armies of other officers and lords from the capital of 
Ayutthaya. This is the characteristic that most impresses Boonchai about Chu. The self-
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 Historically, this particular execution method was only used for members of royalty. In Thai 
history, this way of execution is famously known to be used on King Taksin (r. 1767−1782) of 
Thonburi Kingdom, who in official history is claimed to have been ―insane‖ and unable to rule 
the kingdom properly. 
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sacrificing, heroic, and courageous characteristics highlighted in Chu‘s character in the 
film set his character apart from that of other nobles and high-ranked officers, who, in 
contrast, are shown in the beginning of the film as being greedy for power and not 
caring about the security of the country. This criticism of aristocrats/politicians, which 
is delivered by contrasting it with Chu‘s noble characterisation, resembles what many 
people of the contemporary middle class collectively feel about the role of Thai 
politicians since the end of the military dictatorship regime in the 1970s. That feeling is 
that despite being representatives of the people, these politicians have never been able 
to perform well or live up to the expectations of the middle class, and, moreover, have 
often created problems and conflicts within the society. 
 
The Real Face of Chu: A Royal Nationalist
30 
 While the characterisation of Chu in the film seems to represent the urban 
middle class‘s disenchantment with politicians, and specifically Boonchai‘s 
dissatisfaction in the social chaos created by contemporary politicians, it does not mean 
that The Unsung Hero is a film that is generally against politicians from all sides. 
Rather, it is only against the group that has recently emerged as a growing socio-
political force from the regional areas of Thailand. This ―real face‖ of The Unsung Hero 
is apparent in the film‘s utilisation of royalist-nationalist discourses, which, as 
Thongchai (2001) shows, in the past few decades have been used by the conservative 
middle class to empower the monarchy, and, more recently, to slander the growing 
political power of Thaksin and his allies. However, the way in which The Unsung Hero 
does this is more subtle than the crude, often political, rhetoric of many anti-Thaksin 
public figures, as seen on the street protest stages and in the anti-Thaksin mass media in 
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 The subtitle of this section is adapted from the title of Craig J. Reynolds‘ translation of Chit 
Phumisak‘s study on Thai feudalism, Thai Radical Discourse: the Real Face of Thai Feudalism 
Today (Reynolds, 1987). 
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recent years. As I show below, one example of this subtle reproduction of royal-
nationalism is through the seemingly noble characterisation of Chu as a citizen who is 
willing to fight and die for the notion of phaen-din (land). This term, in the last few 
decades, has been re-signified by the conservative middle class to be associated with 
royalism. Such a strategic feature in the film is reminiscent of what Thongchai regards 
as the core characteristic of the royal-nationalist history, namely, that this discourse can 
be repeatedly re-constructed in ―modern forms of narrative language (phasa khorng 
reuang-lao baep mai)‖ in order to continually adapt it to make sense to present-day 
audiences (Thongchai, 2001, p. 58). 
 In the film, the notion of ―the land‖ or phaen-din is very important in showing 
the self-sacrificing spirit of Chu. It both serves as an ideological belief, which 
subsequently drives Chu to help Ayutthaya fight against the Burmese, and is also 
central to the rhetoric that Chu uses to encourage other villagers to join him in the war. 
The general meaning of the term is related to the concept of nationhood, particularly the 
concrete concept of the national geography and boundary of the nation (for example, 
see Figure 2.3). In the fascist nationalist period of Field Marshal Plaek 
Phibunsongkhram‘s military government (in office: 1938−1944), the notion of phaen-
din was used to support the legitimacy of the government, which was then trying to 
―move Siam finally away from its royalist past‖ (Baker & Pasuk, 2009, p. 132). 
However, after King Bhumibol ascended the throne in 1946, the notion of phaen-din 
began to be re-defined to become more associated with the monarchy and more royally 
sacred, along with the rising charismatic authority (barami) of the Thai monarchy. 
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Figure 2.3. The monument erected in Laem-Ngop District, Trad Province, which indicates the 
end of Thai territory on the border with Cambodia. The Thai inscription can be translated 
literally in English as ―the Eastern End of the Land‖ (phaen-din).31 
 
 
The royal speeches and the reproduction of these speeches through the news and 
entertainment media have been crucial mechanisms that have contributed to the re-
definition of phaen-din to relate more to the monarchy. Thai people heard the present 
king use the term for the first time when he ascended the throne after the death of his 
brother King Ananda (r. 1935−1946). In his coronation speech, the king stated, ―We 
will reign the land (phaen-din) with righteousness‖ (rao ja khrorng phaen-din doi 
tham). This coronation oath is hardly new to King Bhumibol‘s reign. However, because 
of the sacralisation of King Bhumibol in the past several decades, which has been a 
result of the advancing cultural logic of capitalism in Thailand since the end of the Cold 
War and the spectral effects of new media (Jackson, 2010), the notion of phaen-din and 
the king have become even more strongly related. For the royalists of the current reign, 
phaen-din means ―the land of King Bhumibol‖, which has been passed on by the 
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 http://www.oknation.net/blog/home/user_data/file_data/201406/30/23268815.jpg. Retrieved 3 
May 2015. 
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ancestral kings.
32
 Craig Reynolds (2014b, p. 17) has even observed that the king‘s 
name, Bhumibol, already has a meaning associated with the concept of ―land‖. 
―Bhumi,‖ which is from Pali but pronounced phum in Thai, means ―land‖. ―Bol,‖ which 
is derived from the Pali, phala, means ―strength‖. Combined, these two terms mean ―the 
strength of the land‖. The characterisation of Chu in The Unsung Hero as a citizen who 
is prepared to die for the notion of phaen-din, thus, does not just involve ideas of the 
Thai nation. It also confirms and reinforces the legitimacy of the current monarch as an 
authoritative ruling agent. 
From the beginning, phaen-din is used in the film as a main discursive narrative 
element to describe Chu‘s noble intentions for his own country. In the opening scenes, 
the film shows that the royal transition from one king to the next in Ayutthaya will not 
be a smooth one. The filmmaker highlights this situation by referring to the inauspicious 
omen of the appearance of Halley‘s Comet, which in that year happened to come near 
the Earth and appeared in the sky. While Chu is summoned by other aristocrats to 
discuss the matters related to the royal transition, he finds that these aristocrats are 
interested only in the realignment of political power. Chu feels uneasy about this, and 
tries to interrupt the discussions, reminding everyone of their rightful duties. While the 
aristocrats and the officials are discussing which group of lords will secure the ruling 
power, Chu breaks into the conversation saying, ―I really want to know. Is there anyone 
thinking about phaen-din at all?‖33 
The interruption of Chu in this sequence is quite ideologically significant to his 
characterisation as a noble hero who is concerned about the country, and to the 
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 The statement of Sondhi Limthongkul (the owner of ASTV Manager Channel and a leader of 
the urban middle-class uprising against Thaksin in 2006) made through his own television 
programme in September 2005 was an example of this discursive attempt to reinforce the royal 
meaning of the term, phaen-din (land). In that programme, Sondhi explained that the lives of all 
Thai belong to the king, who, as Sondhi claimed, is ―the father of the land‖ (phor khorng phaen-
din). See http://www.manager.co.th/politics/viewnews.aspx?NewsID=9480000123149. 
Retrieved 7 September 2015.  
33
 ―กระผมอยากรู้นกั มีใครคิดถึงเร่ืองของแผน่ดินกนับา้ง‖ 
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discourse of phaen-din. Indeed, before he interrupts the conversation, the filmmaker 
projects Chu‘s concern by having him look up at a statue of the lord Buddha, which is 
placed behind the men who are attending the meeting (see Figure 2.4). The second of 
these shots, though brief, can trigger the collective religous experience of the audience 
to formulate belief that Chu‘s intention is true and not motivated by any political 
agenda. The lord Buddha statue‘s face is framed in a close-up shot, showing him 
charismatically looking downward to Chu. Chu is also projected in a close-up shot, 
looking up toward the lord Buddha statue, showing his genuine determination in 
wanting to rescue his homeland. I would argue that the visual narrative in this sequence 
represents the filmmaker‘s attempt to co-opt the sacredness of the Buddha image to 
make the discourse of phaen-din, which Chu articulates immediately after this 
sequence, even more sacralised and directly related to the official institutions of 
Thailand, which have the monarchy as a core symbolic component. It is a subtle process 
of filmic signifying practice that confirms the sacred and essential values of the notion 
of phaen-din and royal nationalism. 
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Figure 2.4. The film montage that shows Chu looking up at the Buddha statue before 
articulating the royal nationalist word phaen-din or ―the land‖. 
 
In the film, the repeated invocation of phaen-din serves as a narrative device that 
rationalises not only Chu‘s heroism and generosity, but also the actions of other 
villagers, who decide to join Chu to defend Ayutthaya. When Chu witnesses the chaos 
in the capital where aristocrats and state officers are fighting with one another to gain 
more power, he feels that his Wisetchaicharn village might not be able to rely on 
support from Ayutthaya. Chu goes back to his village and forms a self-defence force. At 
one point in front of his fellow villagers, Chu announces that it is a time for us to ―take 
care of our own hometown‖34 and ―fight for Wisetchaicharn‖.35 However, the situation 
                                                     
34
 ―ดูแลบา้นเกิดของตวัเอง‖ 
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changes when the Burmese troops approach, and Chu is asked by an officer from 
Ayutthaya to help fight the Burmese. At this time Chu is reminded of many things that 
he used to say to others about the rightful duties that a good citizen of Ayutthaya should 
do. One of the statements Chu is reminded of, and which drives him to accept the 
request to fight for Ayutthaya, is the oath he gave to his beloved King Boromakot, who 
had passed away not long before. At this moment, the voice-over of Chu can be heard 
as, ―Whatever King Boromakot thinks, so do I also think.‖36 Then, Chu approaches his 
villagers to convince them to join him to go and help Ayutthaya. In his address to his 
fellow villagers, Chu‘s use of the term of phaen-din can be seen as a vehicle, or a 
realistic form of language, used to convey his loyalty to the throne. He addresses his 
people, saying, 
Our phaen-din must be proud. The decision that you are making today is the 
first step of bravery. It is the task that tests our spirit of self-sacrifice. We are 
just common villagers, who are ready to show our love and pride in our phaen-
din without demanding anything in return. The children of Wisetchaichan will 
remember your courage. You all should appreciate that today we will not only 
fight for Wisetchaichan, but our swords will fight for our mother phaen-din.
37
 
 
After Chu finishes his speech, the film shows that the villagers understand and learn 
their duties to the country. As shown in this sequence, the villagers look at one another 
briefly before they encourage one another, stand up, and pledge loudly to fight for the 
phaen-din of Ayutthaya (Figure 2.5). 
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 ―สู้เพื่อวิเศษไชยชาญ‖ 
36
 ―พระเจา้อยูห่วับรมโกศคิดเช่นไร ผมก็คิดเช่นนั้น‖ 
37
 ―กูปลาบปล้ืมแทนแผ่นดินนกั ส่ิงท่ีพวกมึงตดัสินใจในวนัน้ีคือยา่งกา้วแรกแห่งความกลา้หาญ เป็นบทพิสูจน์ของหัวใจท่ีเสียสละ 
เราเป็นแค่เพียงชาวบา้นธรรมดาท่ีพร้อมจะแสดงความรักและหวงแหนผืนแผน่ดินโดยไม่หวงัลาภสรรเสริญ ลูกหลานวิเศษไชยชาญทุก
คนจะจดจาํความห้าวหาญของพวกมึงไวเ้ป็นเยีย่งอยา่ง พวกมึงจงจาํเอาไว ้วา่วนัน้ีเราจะไม่รบเพ่ือวิเศษไชยชาญ แต่ดาบของเราจะรบ
เพื่อแผ่นดินแม่‖ 
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Figure 2.5. The village warriors of Wisetchaicharn feel inspired by Chu‘s words and agree to 
join him in fighting against the Burmese. 
 
 
 Similarly, the repeated enunciation of the term phaen-din in this scene has a 
double meaning and greater implications than the literal meaning: to protect ―the land‖ 
of Ayutthaya. This is because when we consider the sequences together—from when 
Chu is reminded of the words he used to give in response to King Boromakot, to when 
Chu motivates his fellow village men with the term phaen-din—the overall statement of 
these sequences could mean to fight for the national institutions, which also include the 
monarchy, the core institution of the modern Thai nation. This explains why the film 
shows that the villagers are depicted as being well prepared to fight for phaen-din. It is 
clear that the filmmaker is also subject to royal power, which the term phaen-din 
embodies. 
 The ending of The Unsung Hero creates more bias against the politicians of 
Thaksin‘s political faction and, again, through the reference of phaen-din, emphasises 
the importance of being loyal to the royal institution. Because the main body of troops 
from Ayutthaya is delayed, Chu decides to bring his village warriors to Wa Khao, a 
location in what is now Prachuap Khiri Khan province. This is a strategic location that 
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Chu believes is the only place where they have a chance to win the battle against the 
advancing Burmese. However, when they fight with the Burmese in Wa Khao, Chu‘s 
few troops from Wisetchaichan village cannot resist the invading army. What they do to 
delay the time for the main troops from Ayutthaya to arrive is, instead, to lure the 
Burmese to a nearby beach. At the beach, the film shows that Chu and the villagers are 
trapped, but they still all fight until their last breaths. Before he is killed, Chu sees a 
group of officers from Ayutthaya who have already arrived at the scene, but refuse to 
help him. As his final words, Chu laments, ―In the end, I have been left all alone‖.38 
This bitter sequence reminds the audience of how selfish the officers and aristocrats in 
Ayutthaya are or, by implication, the politicians of Thaksin‘s political group, who have 
already been placed as an enemy of the country within royal nationalist discourses at the 
time when The Unsung Hero was released. When Chu is killed, by the foot of a 
Burmese war elephant, the film goes dark and a phrase that seems to be a new 
ideological attempt by the filmmaker to co-opt other terms to be associated with royal-
nationalism appears on screen. The phrase runs, ―My life has ended …but the prathet-
chat (country) cannot end‖ (see Figure 2.6). This is the first time that the filmmaker 
uses the term prathet-chat (country) to draw attention from audiences after the film has 
used phaen-din, the term which I have discussed above as relating to royal nationalism. 
Historically speaking, the term prathet-chat (country) adopted here is, of course, out of 
context from the film‘s setting of the ancient Ayutthaya Kingdom, which is a pre-
modern state governed by a different set of ideas about nation. And from an interview 
of Panot (Maimani, 2012), one of the film‘s producers, the filmmaking team was also 
aware of this, that the concept of modern ―country‖ cannot be used to describe the 
Kingdom of Ayutthaya. From this information, we can understand that the use of 
prathet-chat at the end of the film reflects the intention of the filmmaker to speak to the 
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 ―ในท่ีสุด กูก็ถูกทอดทิ้งอยา่งโดดเด่ียว‖ 
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audience about the contemporary political context of Thai society, particularly about the 
monarchy, which the film has avoided referring to directly but, instead, through the 
discourse of phaen-din. 
 
 
Figure 2.6. The intertitle in the film that reads, ―My life has ended but the country (prathet-
chat) cannot end.‖ 
 
 As Thongchai (2001) explains, the persistence of royal nationalism is due to the 
fact that the ideology has proliferated through modern forms of narrative prose, which 
make sense to the popular understanding of modern audiences. Compared to the term 
phaen-din, the term prathet-chat (country) is even more familiar to the modern Thai 
audience and is closely related to the modern concept of the Thai nation-state. In this 
regard, I would argue the way in which the use of the term prathet-chat used at the end 
of the film here has a similar intended effect to that the filmmaker has used phaen-din to 
convey the ideas of royal nationalism. In this sequence at the end of the film, prathet-
chat does not simply mean the ―country‖ but also the monarchy, the core and most 
highly respected institution of Thai society. It is the message of the filmmaker, 
delivered through the character of Chu, to motivate the audience to help maintain the 
monarchy in the face of perceived threats. 
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The central issue of this discussion of The Unsung Hero, as emerges from the 
repetitive use of phaen-din in the film, is that the film can be seen as another form of the 
widespread narrative of royal nationalist discourse, whereby this ideology has been 
reproduced, as Thongchai (2001) argues, through kinds of narrative language that make 
sense to many people. This ―adaptation‖ of royal nationalism through the representation 
of the noble deeds of Chu has two functions. One is to confirm the importance of 
national institutions, especially the monarchy. The other is to reinforce the public image 
of politicians, particularly Thaksin and those who are seen as part of his power clique, 
as being corrupt. It is an attempt to (re)construct the enemy of the state in order to 
legitimise the ruling power of the establishment. And this directly benefits the members 
of the middle class who ally and gain privileges from the ruling power of the 
establishment.  
 In the last section of this chapter, I explore further the specific social milieu of 
the film‘s production, which is the political context of Thai society after 2006. Boonchai 
explains that the making of The Unsung Hero was meant to promote the unity of the 
people during political crises since 2006. However, when we consider that the film‘s 
intention is to express and promote royal nationalism, as I have illustrated above, I 
argue that we can read the film‘s significance in the context of political conflicts from a 
different angle. The construction of the royal nationalist discourse in The Unsung 
Hero—through the character of Chu and his seemingly moralistic and heroic action to 
help Ayutthaya from being attacked by the Burmese—parallels the use of royal-
nationalist discourse in the expressions of many urban middle-class people in Bangkok 
that were articulated to suppress the growing power of the new political power of the 
Red Shirts, particularly when the Red Shirts staged protests in Bangkok in 2009 and 
2010. 
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II.IV  Chu as an Allegory of the Defenders of Bangkok 
 The royal nationalistic overtone in The Unsung Hero implies not only the 
ideological attempt of the filmmaker to defend the values of the Thai establishment, but 
also the adherence of many members of the Thai urban middle class to maintain what 
Thongchai calls in another of his studies, ―the levels of civilisation‖ discourse (2000, p. 
52). The idea is derived from the royal-nationalist history, particularly the ethno-cultural 
accounts of people in Siam outside Bangkok in the early 20th century. According to 
Thongchai, these accounts served to construct the idea of the ethno-space of Bangkok as 
being more civilised than the ―others within‖ the nation-state of Thailand. In what 
follows, I show that when reading The Unsung Hero against the backdrop of the on-
going political conflicts and crises since 2006, the film‘s royal nationalistic overtones 
represent the hegemonic beliefs of many Bangkok residents who saw the rise of the Red 
Shirts‘ new political power as an interruption of the ―civilising process‖ of the country 
and the ―civilised cultural space‖ of Bangkok. 
 As explained in Chapter I, the Red Shirt movement was officially formed after 
the 2006 military coup that toppled the Thaksin government, which many Red Shirts 
supported. Ever since, the Red Shirts‘ political force has grown in many provincial 
areas in the country‘s north and north-east. The growing power of the Red Shirts was 
greatly feared by many members of the urban middle class and the establishment, who 
often viewed the Red Shirts as ―naïve yet loyal villagers (chao ban)‖ (Janit, 2014, p. 
122), particularly when the Red Shirts marched to Bangkok in 2009 and 2010 to protest 
the government. In 2009, the Red Shirts entered the capital in protest, and demanded 
that Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (in office: 2008−2011) dissolve parliament and 
hold what the Red Shirts believed would be a fair election. The Red Shirt protest in 
2009 was not successful. The demonstration got out of control and many chaotic and 
destructive events took place. This led the leaders of the Red Shirts to disband the 
 72 
protest. In March 2010, the Red Shirts staged a protest again, this time larger in size and 
in the important areas of Bangkok, such as the Ratchaprasong business district. It was 
around the two months from the middle of March to the middle of May 2010 that many 
Bangkok residents felt uneasy about the occupation of the streets of Bangkok by ―the 
villagers‖ (chao ban). The Prachatai news website reported during the Red Shirt protest 
in 2010 that many Bangkok residents also gathered in the streets, demanding that the 
Red Shirts stop the protest and return the people of Bangkok to peace and happiness. 
However, the way in which many Bangkok residents expressed their disapproval with 
the Red Shirts‘ protest also involved the invocation of royal nationalist discourse. Many 
of the Bangkok residents who came out to protest the Red Shirts claimed that the 
protestors were creating disorder and disunity in society and, thus, were not loyal to the 
national institutions (see Figure 2.7).
39
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 http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2010/03/28524. Retrieved 8 August 2015. 
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Figure 2.7. A member of the Bangkok-based group who demanded the Red Shirts to stop 
protesting in 2010. The green banner reads, ―Stop the mob. We want an ordinary life.‖ The 
man‘s head banner reads, ―Love Nation-King, The People Side‖.40 
 
 
When contextualising the royal nationalist connotation of The Unsung Hero 
specifically within these political conflicts and the anxiety of the urban middle-class 
residents in Bangkok, the film represents the desire of these Bangkok residents to 
suppress the Red Shirts, whose expanding socio-political power in the protests in 2009 
and 2010 was seen as destroying peace and order in the capital. In the section above, I 
have shown that it was Boonchai‘s intention to use the power-hungry aristocrats in the 
film as a metaphor for corrupt politicians, especially those associated with Thaksin‘s 
political regime. From this perspective, we can read the film further, with Ayutthaya as 
a metaphor for Bangkok, where the establishment and many members of the urban 
middle class have long enjoyed social privilege and advanced economic opportunity and 
development. What Boonchai has never mentioned when interviewed about the film is 
who the invading Burmese troops are intended to represent. In the film, the Burmese 
soldiers are portrayed as barbarous and vulgar. As one moment near end of the film 
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 The picture is taken from Prachatai website. More pictures of the anti-Red Shirt group of 
Bangkok residents can be found at http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2010/03/28524. Retrieved 
8 August 2015. 
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shows, after the Burmese troops have destroyed one of Ayutthaya‘s defending fortresses 
and killed the soilders who are stationed there, the chief commander of the Burmese 
troops is shown walking through and staring at the dead bodies of the Ayutthaya 
soilders, admiring the destructive power of his troops. At the same moment, he also 
takes out a piece of bone-in meat (which is unclear what kind of meat it is) to eat 
ravenously like a hungry beast. This is typical of many visual projections of the 
Burmese in Thai film and television, in which they are portrayed as containing the 
characteristics of a villian. However, within this particular context of political conflicts 
and crises, the vulgar portrayal of the Burmese troops, who in the film invade the 
capital, could be seen as reminiscent of the sensibility of many Bangkok residents, in 
which is imagined that the Red Shirts ―invaded‖ Bangkok in 2009 and 2010 and were a 
―threat‖ or ―dangerous germ‖ (cheua rai) (Thongchai, 2013, pp. 149−150).41 
Viewed in this light, the explanation of the film by Boonchai as aiming to 
promote the spirit of self-sacrifice needs to be re-assessed. While the textual features of 
the film seem to promote the spirit of self-sacrifice and noble individualism, The 
Unsung Hero reflects the political agenda of many urban middle-class people, who want 
to stop the political power of the Red Shirts from growing and ―destroying‖ the social 
order and development of the country, particularly the socio-political space of Bangkok, 
where the members of the coalition of the middle class and the establishment have, for a 
long time, enjoyed social privileges and benefits. Behind the moralistic statements of 
these urban middle-class people about acting ―for the nation‖ lies the attempt to 
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 This issue is discussed in Chapter VIII, ―Cheua Rai: Meua Rang Kai Thang Kan-meuang Tit 
Cheua Daeng‖ (―Dangerous Germ: When the Body Politic is Infected with Red Germs‖), of 
Thongchai‘s 2013 book, titled Prachathipatai Thi Mi Kasat Yu Neua Kanmeuang (Democracy 
which has King above Politics). Prior to this publication, Thongchai also elaborated in English 
on this issue in the web blog New Mandala of the Australian National University. See 
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2010/05/03/thongchai-winichakul-on-the-red-germs/. 
Retrieved 24 August 2015. 
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preserve the socio-economic structure and hierarchy within the country, between chao 
ban (villagers) and chao meuang (city people), or the ―uncivilised‖ and the ―civilised‖. 
 
II.V  Conclusion 
The analysis of post-2006 biographical film presented in this chapter has shown 
that what looks like individualistic values of the Thai middle-class people, as reflected 
in The Unsung Hero, is never merely individualistic at all. Rather, it uses the figure of 
an individual as a symbol of the establishment‘s values. In The Unsung Hero, the 
promotion by the filmmaker of a self-sacrificing spirit, which may perhaps be seen to 
represent a universal ethical value, is in fact a one-sided ideological expression of 
support for the legitimacy of the monarchy over the political structure and order of Thai 
society. The film does this through a modern form of cinematic narrative language, 
which incorporates the discourses of phaen-din and prathet-chat, two ideological 
notions which many modern Thai audiences are familiar with. Furthermore, when 
taking this royal-nationalist narrative of the film as a conceptual lens through which to 
view the middle-class sensibility during the on-going political crises since 2006, The 
Unsung Hero can be read as representing the desire of many residents of Bangkok for 
the new political force be controlled and prevented from creating chaos and disrupting 
the existing geo-political order of the country.  
In the next chapter, I study another biographical film, Yamada: The Samurai of 
Ayothaya (Samurai Ayothaya, dir. Nopporn Watin, 2010), which also depicts the life 
journey of an historical hero in official Thai history. But in this next film, the link to the 
political situation is less direct than in The Unsung Hero. However, I will show that 
even though Yamada was not made to directly engage the political situation, the 
political anxiety among middle-class Thais since 2006 can nonetheless be seen as 
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having been influential in the making of this biographical film and in reinforcing 
establishment values. 
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CHAPTER III 
Yamada: The Foreigner Who Advocates 
The Exceptionalism of Official Thai Cultural Identity 
 
III.I  Introduction 
 Normative ideas of what constitutes Thai identity or ―Thai-ness‖ (khwam pen 
Thai) are another important element of the cultural ideology of the ruling coalition of 
the Thai middle class and establishment elites. During the intense socio-political 
transformations in the contemporary period, the articulation of Thai-ness can become 
even more strongly expressed and defended. This tendency is reflected in a statement 
given by a Chulalongkorn University lecturer from the Faculty of Education, Sompong 
Jitradap, who reported his research findings on the role of the Thai language in the 
forthcoming economic integration of ASEAN countries, or ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC). As Matichon Online reports the news about his research findings, 
Sompong maintains that after the AEC officially starts in 2015, the Thai language will 
become more essential and may become a standard language among Southeast-Asian 
countries, like English.
42
 The report of the study‘s findings provoked many responses, 
both from the academic community and society in general. Historian Charnvit Kasetsiri 
is one of many who disapproved of the findings and believed that it is impossible that 
the Thai language would become a standard language of Southeast Asia.
43
 While the 
finding of Sompong‘s study may continue to be a subject of debate, what we can see 
reflected from the act of disseminating the research results in public is a desire to 
promote the exceptionalism of ideas of Thai-ness, similar to Thai hyper-nationalism, 
which emerged in the period of Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram‘s government 
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 http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1325565595. Retrieved 17 June 2015. 
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 http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2012/01/38808. Retrieved 16 July 2015. 
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(in office: 1938−1944) to promote the unity of the country and pride in the national 
identity (Barmé, 1993, Chapter VI). 
This chapter examines the Thai middle-class culture in the context of this desire 
to reflect the exceptional status of Thai-ness in Thai biographical films. In this chapter, I 
study Yamada: The Samurai of Ayothaya (Samurai Ayothaya, dir. Nopporn Watin, 
2010), a biographical film about Yamada Nagamasa (1588−1611), a Japanese warrior 
who lived in the kingdom of Ayutthaya. In particular, I look at how the form of 
individuality, which is embodied in Yamada and his life journey in the film, reveals a 
middle-class perception of Thai-ness, particularly that which has been shaped by 
political anxieties that emerged during the on-going political conflicts of the present 
time. 
My analysis of the film is built on a large number of previous studies, which 
have asserted that Thai-ness is an ideological construct of state authorities (for example 
Baker & Pasuk, 2009, pp. 112−113; Connors, 2005; Stithorn, 2011) and of people in 
society (for example Jory, 1999; Kasian, 2002). In the literature on Thai cinema, many 
film scholars have already examined the construct of Thai-ness, and revealed the 
political role of the film medium in the process of the construction of the concept (see 
for example Harrison, 2005; May Adadol, 2006; Veluree, 2014). One film scholar, May 
Adadol, in particular explains that, ―the symptom of the yearning for Thai-ness among 
the culturally uprooted middle class in the current period of globalisation‖ (2006, p. 9) 
is the aspect of Thai middle-class culture that has most influenced the filmic tradition 
that embraces Thai-ness. This line of argument also echoes the argument about Thai-
ness in the period of neoliberal globalisation presented by political scientist Kasian 
Tejapira (2002). Kasian argues that, ―the manifold freedom from the barriers imposed 
by national or ethnic self-identity simultaneously allows Thai consumers the possibility 
to consume commodities as identity commodities‖ (2002, p. 208). The examination of 
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the cinematic construction of Thai-ness in Yamada in this chapter is built on these 
previous studies, particularly of Kasian (2002), who emphasises the change in the 
characteristic of the form of the identity in the neoliberal globalising period of Thai 
society. 
Indeed, Thai-ness is a dominant ideology in many biographical films made by 
middle-class filmmakers. Bang Rajan (dir. Tanit Jitnukul, 2000) depicts the lives of 
historical figures who are commoners who risk their lives to protect the Ayutthaya 
Kingdom. This loyalty to the monarchy also reflects the idea of Thai-ness. Another 
example is The Overture (Hom Rong, dir. Ittisoontorn Vichailak, 2004). This film 
depicts the life of court musician Luang Pradit Phairor (1881−1954) called in the film 
―Sorn‖, who struggles to prove his distinctive skills of playing the Thai xylophone, or 
ranat, to conservative listeners. Despite the fact that The Overture emphasises the 
individual musical skills of the main character, the film overall promotes the perceived 
―unique-ness‖ and beauty of ―Thai-ness‖ through the main character Sorn‘s playing of 
ranat. However, in this chapter I have chosen to study Yamada because the film 
projects Thai-ness in a different way from the films mentioned above, namely, by 
having a protagonist who is a foreigner or a ―non-Thai‖ (mai chai khon Thai). 
Yamada traces the life journey of Yamada Nagamasa, a Japanese samurai living 
in a Japanese village in Ayutthaya between the 1610s and 1630s. Despite being a 
foreigner, Yamada shows that the Japanese protagonist engages in many cultural forms 
and expressions of Thai-ness. The film begins when Yamada learns that there is a group 
of Japanese men who plan to rob people in Ayutthaya. One night, on his way home, 
Yamada is ambushed by this group of Japanese men who want to kill him to keep the 
secret about the plan. Luckily, Yamada is rescued by a group of Ayutthaya warriors and 
is taken to the nearby Ayutthaya town, Sorng Khwae, to recover from his injuries. In 
Sorng Khwae, Yamada is exposed to many Ayutthaya/Thai cultural practices, such as 
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food, art, and most importantly, Thai boxing, the form of martial art that he becomes 
impressed with. One day, Yamada asks Phra Khru, a Buddhist abbot of the town‘s 
temple, to teach him Thai boxing. After going through several rituals that show his 
devotion, including the master honouring ceremony (phithi wai khru), Yamada quickly 
masters Thai boxing. Yamada also participates in a try-out to become a personal guard 
(thanai leuak) of King Naresuan. With his hybrid Japanese-Thai martial-art style, 
Yamada overcomes many opponents in the competition and qualifies to become the 
king‘s personal guard. The most important part of the film is when Yamada goes back 
to the Japanese village in Ayutthaya to take revenge on his Japanese enemies. In the 
fight, Yamada uses his new hybrid martial art to kill his enemies and protect Ayutthaya 
from the corrupt plan of the Japanese men. 
In her recent analysis of this film, Veluree Metaveevinij (2014) argues that the 
making of Yamada with an emphasis on the protagonist adopting the cultural practices 
that represent Thai-ness was an attempt by the filmmaker to promote the film in the 
international market and to gain financial benefit from the promotion. As she puts it, the 
film, ―serves as an example of the commoditisation of Thai-ness through Otherness‖ 
(Veluree, 2014, p. 7). In the re-examination of the film in this chapter, I agree with 
Veluree, particularly on the hegemonic practice of the filmmaker, who promotes Thai-
ness in the film to serve an economic agenda. However, what Veluree‘s study has not 
covered and which I aim to discuss further in this chapter, is the political dimension of 
the form of Thai-ness, in which this identity is promoted to support the power of the 
Thai establishment. In this chapter, I argue that Yamada does not simply construct, or 
commodify Thai-ness. From examining closely the kind of individuality embedded in 
the representation of the protagonist, who is a foreigner, Yamada reflects what Kasian 
calls the ―manifold freedom‖ (2002, p. 208) of the consumption of Thai-ness in the age 
of the neoliberal economy and globalisation of Thailand. In light of Kasian‘s argument, 
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while Yamada shows that Thai-ness is still a revered and exceptional cultural form and 
identity, it is also accessible to and can accommodate other ethnic-cultural identities, 
but only if one follows the norms and traditions of becoming Thai. This de-
essentialisation of Thai-ness in the film also represents the way in which many members 
of the middle class in the modern period attempt to promote the official Thai identity by 
co-opting other cultural-ethnic identities, such as Sino-Thai or Caucasian westerners 
(farang), to be part of, and to justify the ―exceptional‖ quality of Thai-ness. This 
particular way of empowering the official identity of the country benefits directly the 
legitimacy and power of the establishment, the dominant social group to which many 
members of the urban middle class are now allied. 
  Moreover, when reading this particular meaning about Thai-ness in the film 
against the background of political developments in Thai society since 2006, Yamada 
becomes an allegory for the attempts of the pro-establishment middle-class to extend 
the territorial definition and power of Thai-ness. The film also reflects, in a dialectical 
way, the attempt to decrease the social space available to those who do not conform to 
the official values of Thai identity or the conservative ideology of Thai-ness, which has 
the monarchy as a core symbolic power and value. In the chapter body, I clarify my 
argument by first explaining how Thai-ness, which in the past was exclusively defined 
by a monolithic idea of ethnic-cultural identity, has become an identity that anyone can 
perform and be included within. Then, I show how Yamada is an example of this 
ideological practice that reproduces this new form of the exceptionalism of Thai-ness. 
Lastly, I will discuss how this particular meaning is related to the political context of the 
contemporary period, in which the coalition of the conservative middle class and the 
establishment has attempted to silence those who do not conform to the official 
ideology of Thai-ness.  
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III.II  Middle-Class Culture and the De-essentialisation of Thai-ness 
In this section I provide a theoretical background of Thai-ness that is necessary 
for the discussion of Yamada in the rest of this chapter. Thai-ness is a cultural ideology, 
which was constructed and has been maintained by the establishment and reproductions 
of the ideology by the people in society, mostly the members of the middle class who 
find conforming to the ideology has enhanced their social status and privileges. What is 
particularly significant about the reproduction of Thai-ness by Thai middle-class culture 
is that in the past couple of decades the de-essentialised form of Thai-ness, which has 
been a result of ―the liberation of consumption‖ (Kasian, 2002, p. 208) of identity 
commodities, has been promoted to become even more ―exceptional‖. This process has 
been achieved not through the promotion of the traditional ideas of Thai-ness, which 
ascribed that only certain ethnic-cultural groups or practices could be regarded as 
―Thai‖. Rather, it is because the normative ideas which now construct Thai-ness have 
become more easily consumable and performable by anyone, regardless of their ethnic-
cultural backgrounds, while still maintaining its supposed ―exceptionalism‖. As Kasian 
argues, ―Thai-ness, as the all-purpose free-floating signifier, has recently had its 
residual nationalist signifieds and referents renewed‖ (Kasian, 2002, p. 221). 
 
Thai-ness of Siamese/Thai Authorities 
The ideological formation of Thai-ness originated from the authorities of the 
state, who invented the concept of the modern Thai nation. The most critical time in the 
construction of the ideology by the state was in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
when Siam was being pressured by Western powers to modernise the country (Baker & 
Pasuk, 2009, p. 62). To prevent being seen as an uncivilised country, Siamese 
authorities created and passed on in society an official version of the history of the 
country—royal-nationalist history as I have discussed in Chapter II—which contains the 
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ideas that Siam had had a rich culture and long historical and political development 
(Baker & Pasuk, 2009, pp. 71−74). School textbooks and history classes have played 
major roles in disseminating these ideas of Thai-ness. In the reign of King Vajiravudh 
(r. 1910−1925), the concept of the modern Thai nation was developed further. This king 
created a new national flag in 1917 with three iconic colours, red, white, and blue, as 
used today, and also proclaimed that Siam would be represented by three official 
symbols, nation (chat), religion (sart), and king (kasat) (Stithorn, 2011, p. 258). From 
these examples, it can be seen that the ideas of Thai-ness were largely constructed by 
static and concrete ideas and symbols, such as an official national history, the flag, or 
national symbols, which were all also integral to the reinforcement of the idea of the 
modern state nation. To put it in simple terms, the ideas of Thai-ness during the 
modernisation period were identical and intrinsic to the ideas of the modern nation.  
The essentialisation of Thai-ness by state authorities continued after the 
revolution in 1932 which overthrew the absolute monarchy. In his conceptualisation of 
the ideology of royal nationalism, as I have discussed in Chapter II, Thongchai 
Winichakul (2001) contends that despite the abolition of the absolute monarchy by the 
People‘s Party in 1932, the royal-nationalist cultural legacy, especially the national 
history, still remained. As Thongchai puts it, 
...the historiography of the country invented by the People‘s Party after 1932 
 should have been the one that contested the royal-nationalist history previously 
 written by the Siamese royal members, but it did not. What the members of the 
 People‘s Party did was repeatedly promote the nation-state as an ultimate 
 ideological value, as the royal members of Siam had done in the past.
44
 
One of the forms of cultural tradition that the People‘s Party inherited from the 
royal members of Siam was the fixed idea of what represents Thai identity. Under the 
ruling power of the People‘s Party, the ideas of Thai-ness became a form of cultural 
domination and ideological apparatus used to unify Thai society and discipline people 
                                                     
44
 ―ประวติัศาสตร์แบบชาตินิยมหลงั 2475 น่าจะทา้ทายประวติัศาสตร์แบบราชาชาตินิยมอยา่งถึงราก แต่กลบัไม่เป็นเช่นนั้น พวก
เขาทาํไดดี้ท่ีสุดเพียงพยายามเสนอให้ ‗ชาติ‘ เป็นจุดหมายของประวติัศาสตร์ซ่ึงกษตัริยใ์นอดีตก็ทรงเชิดชูรับใช‖้ (Thongchai, 
2001, p. 62). 
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into following the same, state-preferred cultural practices. Prime Minister Field Marshal 
Plaek Phibunsongkhram (in office: 1938−1944), also a member of the People‘s Party, 
was one of the most active leaders to implement many cultural reforms that were aimed 
to transform the image of the country into a more modern and civilised one. Some of the 
most significant reforms that directly affected the concept of Thai-ness were: changing 
the name of the country from Siam to Thailand in 1941; standardising the national 
language in 1942 (Stithorn, 2011, p. 259); and issuing many cultural mandates and 
guidelines, which represented the supposed ―modern life‖ of Thai people, for everyone 
to follow (Connors, 2005, p. 528). Plaek‘s cultural reforms, which are characterised by 
a monolithic set of ideas about Thai-ness, could be viewed as being influenced by his 
military background, in which unity, order, and discipline are the core values. 
Another important phase of the state authority‘s essentialisation of Thai-ness 
happened when Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat rose to power (in office: 1958−1963). 
According to Paul Handley (2006), the rise of communism in the Southeast Asian 
region in that period became a great concern for Sarit, and that led him to find ways to 
protect the country from being turned into a communist state. Amidst this socio-
political anxiety, Sarit and the newly crowned King Bhumibol (r. 1946-present) allied 
and worked together to increase legitimacy for both parties. During this time, the king 
became more visible in public, as he increasingly travelled to visit his people in regional 
areas and soldiers at various military bases (Handley, 2006, pp. 142−144). The close 
interaction of the king and his people was significant to the reconstruction of the 
essentialised ideas of Thai-ness, which had been continuously built since the 
modernisation period in the early 20th century. King Bhumibol, who has a ―European-
bred modernist persona‖ (Handley, 2006, p. 5), has been turned into the most respected 
symbol of Thai-ness. 
Thai-ness and Middle Class Culture 
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 Kasian Tejapira (2002) explains that after the end of the Cold War period, the 
power to control the definition of Thai-ness was challenged by the cultural logic of 
consumerism, which has grown and advanced rapidly as Thailand has entered the period 
of neoliberal globalisation. The rapid expansion of the Thai middle class after this 
period has become the main force that has de-essentialised Thai-ness from its strictly 
defined parameters, as had previously been monitored by the state authorities. As 
Kasian argues, ―Thai-ness becomes unanchored, uprooted, liberated or freed from the 
regime of reference to national or ethnic Thai commodities‖ (2002, p. 205). 
 According to Kasian (2002), two main socio-political factors were integral to 
this neoliberal liberation of the notion of Thai-ness. One has been the neutralisation of 
the radical nationalist regimes—both radical leftist and hyper right-wing nationalist 
authoritarian regimes—after the 1970s. The other factor has been the liberalisation of 
the country‘s economy by the economic policies of many governments since the 1980s, 
to follow the logic of the marketplace. The latter factor can be seen clearly in the 
policies of the government of former Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan (in office: 
1988−1991), who announced a desire to turn the ―battlefields (of Indochina) into 
marketplaces‖ (plian sanam rop hai pen sanam kankha), a politico-economic policy that 
aimed to draw investors into Thailand and use the country as a hub to trade with 
Vietnam (Pasuk & Baker, 2002, pp. 370−371), which had just opened up its market 
after the Cold War. The result of this politico-economic development of Thailand 
significantly extended the market economy in the country, the consumption of 
commodities, and, most importantly, the ideas that define Thai-ness, which have 
changed along with the constantly emerging new demands in the marketplace. 
Examples of the result of economic liberalisation since the 1980s, which have 
affected the representation of Thai-ness as now being de-essentialised, can be seen in 
the commercial sector. Advertising is one of the major areas that shows how Thai-ness 
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could become de-centred from its original ethno-centric conception. In his examination 
of Thai identity in advertising culture, Patrick Jory (1999) shows that in the advertising 
market, any products that are aimed to attract Thai customers can now become ―Thai‖, 
regardless of their original appearance or references. In one of his examples, Jory shows 
that in 1998, McDonald‘s, the fast-food franchise from America, sought to attract more 
Thai customers by presenting its menus as being ―Thai‖. Jory recounts that in that year 
McDonald‘s released the ―Thai burger‖, a hamburger that included the flavour of Thai 
basil stir-fry (phat kraphao), and which used the slogan, ―McBasil Pork Burger—like 
real Thai food‖ (Jory, 1999, p. 466). The form of Thai-ness represented in this 
McDonald‘s ―Thai burger‖ is obviously different from the traditional idea of Thai-ness 
put forward by Thai state authorities in the past. 
A similar situation, where Thai-ness is constructed through diverse phenomena 
in order to meet the demand of consumers, occurred in the entertainment industry. In 
1984, Carabao, a famous music-for-life (phleng pheua chiwit) band, released an album 
titled Made in Thailand (1984) and, in the following year 1985 held a large concert 
called Tham Doi Khon Thai (Made by Thai People). Although Carabao‘s songs and 
concert were promoted as representing Thai-ness, if one looks at the production of 
Carabao‘s music on this album, the de-essentialisation of Thai-ness is evident. In this 
particular album, the band composed the songs with both Thai and modern Western 
musical instruments. Most importantly, the main sponsor of Carabao in this album was 
Coca Cola, the international beverage brand. Kasian recounts vividly the slogan that 
Carabao in partnership with Coca Cola used to promote ―Thai-ness‖ in the album: 
―Coke and Carabao jointly promote the value of Thainess‖ (Kasian, 2002, p. 245). In 
Chapter VI of this thesis, I discuss Carabao in more detail, including the band‘s market 
strategy and the bourgeois Thai ideology of its cultural product, as Carabao is also the 
main subject of the film, Young Bao, examined in that chapter. 
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The De-essentialisation of Thai-ness as a Promotion of Official Thai-ness 
The fact that Thai-ness has become de-essentialised by the logic of the 
neoliberal market economy does not mean that the establishment institutions, which 
previously promoted the ideas that constitute official representation of Thai identity, 
have lost their authority or that the value of the official form of Thai-ness has been 
completely lost. In fact, the reproduction of Thai-ness in commercial products still 
serves to nurture conservative ideas about Thai identity. This is because when 
commercial products are represented in various guises of Thai-ness, they still share a 
certain set of common ideas. As Michael Connors argues, 
[W]hile Thai-ness had sufficient plasticity to speak to different, and sometimes 
competing, interests, its capacity to simultaneously shape and limit public 
discourse ensured that a divided social whole shared a broadly common 
ideological language of nationhood (2005, p. 531). 
 
 
This ―common ideological language of nationhood‖, as Connors (2005, p. 531) 
has put it, on the one hand, helps these commercial products to be identified as ―Thai‖. 
For example, in Carabao‘s 1984 album, Made in Thailand as discussed above, banana 
leaf (bai torng), a cultural sign that in this setting represents traditional ideas of Thai 
identity, is used as an artwork pattern on the cassette tape cover to signify the idea of 
Thai-ness in the album. On the other hand, this common language of Thai-ness could 
also support the political legitimacy of the traditional establishment group, whose 
institutions maintain so much control over the ideas and public discourses of national 
identity. The use of images that are related to the Thai monarchy is the most common 
practice that not only helps a product to be recognised by royalist Thai consumers as 
representing Thai-ness, but also promotes the legitimacy of the king at the same time. 
As Connors argues, ―[T]he monarchy [still] served as the central hinge in this ideology, 
connecting the political form of democracy with identity politics of Thai-ness‖ 
(Connors, 2005, p. 531). 
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Another way in which the de-essentialised form of Thai-ness helps promote the 
official notions of Thai identity could be seen when the signs of this identity are 
constructed together with representations of foreign-ness or other-ness. This is evident, 
especially, in visual media like cinema. In her articles on the filmic representations of 
Thai identity in the period of globalisation, Rachel Harrison (2005; 2010) shows that 
when Thai-ness is represented in the context of filmic signifiers of foreign-ness, be it 
foreign characters or foreign locales, the elements of Thai-ness are often presented as 
being superior to other cultural identities. As Harrison argues in her 2010 article, 
Contemporary filmmakers struggle with a perceived requirement on the one 
 hand to assume a veneer of Westernization/Hollywoodization in their work in 
 order to gain global recognition, while on the other hand often simultaneously 
 countering this move with an alternate expression of cultural insularity, revealed 
 through a somewhat embattled promotion of national values (Harrison, 2010,  
p. 117). 
 
 
 My points about Thai-ness, as elaborated thus far, are that, following Kasian 
(2002), in the period of neoliberal economy globalisation, Thai-ness has been de-linked 
and de-centred from its conservative origins, which in the past were constructed and 
controlled exclusively by state authorities. The rise of the cultural logic of the 
marketplace has been one of the most important factors leading to this change of the 
ideas of Thai identity. However, the de-essentialisation of the Thai identity brought 
about by the rise of the market economy should not be understood as totally 
undermining the values of the conservative notion of Thai-ness. In contrast, the de-
essentialisation of the ideology can often serve to continue to promote the official idea 
of Thai identity, and thus legitimise the ruling power of the Thai establishment, who 
invented these official ideas of Thai-ness. Following Connors‘s argument (2005), when 
the producers of these commercial forms try to present the Thai identity of their 
products, they often adopt a ―common ideological language‖ of the official notion of 
identity by including signifiers such as the national flag or an image of the monarchy. In 
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this way, far from weakening the power of the establishment and the state‘s cultural 
values constructed by it, many forms of the de-essentialised ideas of Thai-ness, 
ironically become forms of promotional discourse of the supposed ―exceptionalism‖ of 
the official ideas of Thai identity. 
 The analysis of Yamada in the next section shows that the production of the film 
is located within this transformation of ideas of Thai-ness. In the analysis, I show that 
while the film was made to show the life of a foreigner—a Japanese warrior living in 
Ayutthaya in the middle ages— the film can be seen as a discursive practice of the 
middle class‘s attempt to reproduce the discourse of Thai exceptionalism by co-opting 
other signifiers of cultural-ethnic identity, which in this case is Japanese-ness. This 
construction of the hybrid form of Thai-ness in Yamada serves to advance Thai-ness, 
the cultural ideology of the coalition of the Thai middle class and the Thai 
establishment to remain exceptionally valuable in a time of rapid globalising influences 
in Thailand. 
 
III.III  Yamada: The Foreign Promoter of Thai Exceptionalism 
 Yamada is a filmic production that engages in the reproduction of Thai-ness, 
both for commercial and ideological purposes, by utilising the attractiveness of the Thai 
boxing martial art form, constructed previously in Thai boxing films. Prior the release 
of Yamada, many Thai boxing films, which came out in quite a substantial number in 
the early 2000s, have played a significant role in helping alter the ideas of Thai-ness and 
gender ideology, particularly Thai masculinity. The films like Ong-Bak (dir. Prachya 
Pinkaew, 2003) or Beautiful Boxer (dir. Ekachai Uekrongtham, 2004) similarly resituate 
the notion of Thai-ness within the global context of cultural intersections. As Pattana 
Kiti-arsa argues in his study of Thai boxing films, the male boxer protagonists in these 
films ―consciously fight hard to earn their honour to represent their masculine Thainess‖ 
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(Pattana, 2007, p.421). The making of Yamada can certainly be seen as being 
determined by this set of ideological notions, particularly the notion of Thai-ness that is 
articulated through the hyper-masculine sport of Thai boxing. The film is directed by 
Nopporn Watin and produced by Nopparat Puttaratanamanee. The two are also 
colleagues who often organise Thai boxing tournaments together.
45
 In making Yamada, 
they secured financial support from the financial scheme of the government of former 
prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (in office: 2008−2011) called Thai Khem Khaeng 
(Strengthening Thailand).
46
 The reason why the film received funding from the 
government can be seen reflected in one of the main agendas of the film, which is 
included in a filmic text screened at the beginning of the film, stating that Yamada was 
produced to ―commemorate the 124th anniversary of Thailand-Japan diplomatic 
relations‖.47 Another agenda of the film‘s commitment to promoting Thai identity, 
especially through its representation of Thai boxing, relates to the commodification of 
Thai-ness. As Veluree argues in her study, the ―film was made primarily to serve as a 
promotional tool for Thai boxing tournaments‖ (2014, p. 7). While Yamada was made 
to promote and commodify ideas that represent the country‘s official identity, what the 
film also represents is the political aspect of this commodification of the ideas of Thai-
ness. In the following analysis, I illustrate that Yamada, indeed, represents the stage in 
which these commodified forms of Thai identity have now been de-essentialised to the 
extent that ethnic non-Thais can also access or consume this identity, and effectively 
―become Thai‖. The result of this transformation promotes, rather than undermines, 
ideas of Thai exceptionalism, and bolsters claims of the superiority of Thai identity over 
other forms of national identity. These agendas are achieved mainly through the 
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 Their company‘s name is Sport Art, who is also the organiser of the famous tournament Thai 
Fight. See http://www.siamsport.co.th/Sport_Boxing/120420_264.html. Retrieved 21 July 2015. 
46
 The scheme was developed to provide financial support to films and other cultural art projects 
that the government saw as helping promote positive images of the country. 
47
 Original statement in English taken from the film. 
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characterisation of the film‘s protagonist, a Japanese warrior who represents non-Thais 
and representing him as being appreciative of and wanting to learn Thai boxing, one of 
the official cultural forms of modern Thai identity.  
 
 Yamada as a Foreigner 
In Yamada, the idea that Thai-ness is an ―exceptional‖ form of cultural identity 
is largely reinforced by the filmmaker exploiting signifiers that in other settings might 
be considered to represent ideas of non-Thai-ness. In her study of the film, Veluree also 
views the significance of the notion of foreign-ness, as she puts it,  
 ... this film articulates various views about ―being a friend‖ or ―being an 
enemy‖. The differentiation between these two concepts is also paralleled with 
―Thai-ness‖ and ―non-Thainess‖, which are portrayed in many forms (Veluree, 
2014, p. 5).  
 
To add to Veluree‘s analysis, I would also say that non-Thai-ness in the film does not 
just occur at the textual level, but also in the filmmaker‘s decision to depict the life of a 
historical person, Yamada Nagamasa, who is known as a former foreign resident in Thai 
society. 
Before the film was released, the figure of Yamada was known generally as a 
member of a Japanese community in the medieval Ayutthaya kingdom. This account 
could be seen reproduced in various cultural texts, such as school textbooks, historical 
tales, and the historical park of the Japanese village (muban yipun) in Ayutthaya 
province. In this historical park in particular, the history of Yamada is depicted to 
support the legitimacy of the Siamese court and nobles, as he is represented as having 
been loyal and devoted himself to serve Ayutthaya after he migrated from Japan.
48
 
                                                     
48
 In February 2015, the Japanese village historical park in Ayutthaya created a new permanent 
exhibition titled Yamada Nagamasa Lae Thao Thorng Kip-Ma (Yamada Nagamasa and Maria 
Guyomar). The exhibition shows the histories of two important historical foreigners. One is 
Yamada who travelled from Japan to Ayutthaya, and became an officer serving the Ayutthaya 
court. The other is Thao Thorng Kip-Ma or in English Maria Guyomar, who was believed to be 
a Portuguese lady who invented famous Western influenced Thai deserts like Thorng Yip, 
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Yamada has also previously been represented in cinema, which similarly represents the 
life of Yamada as a loyalist to Ayutthaya. In The Legend of Naresuan II (Naresuan II, 
dir. Chatri Chalerm-Yukol, 2007), the film shows the time when Ayutthaya went to 
battle with the Burmese. During this period, the Ayutthaya court was helped by many 
groups of foreigners who were living in the kingdom. One sequence in Naresuan II 
shows the historical figure of Yamada—who received the official Thai title of Orkya-
senaphimuk— bringing his Japanese armed forces to help King Naresuan battle the 
Burmese. The diverse accounts of Yamada and the Japanese village in Ayutthaya, 
which were pubished and released prior to the film, Yamada, have also played a 
significant role in constructing the notion of non-Thai-ness in the protagonist. 
When the filmmaker, Nopporn Watin, turns the life of Yamada into a film in 
Yamada, the notion of non-Thai-ness becomes a main ideological concept that 
permeates the entire production and representation of the film. Nopporn cast Seigi 
Ozeki, a Japanese actor who can speak Thai with a Japanese accent, to play the role of 
Yamada. For some audiences, Ozeki has already been represented as a foreigner in 
Thailand, as he used to perform a famous role, Kobori, a Japanese military officer, in 
Sunset at Chao Phraya (Khu Kam, dir. Suwandee Jakravoravudh, 2007),
49
 a stage 
musical adaptation of the novel of the same name. However, apart from the 
characterisation, the dialogue is also an important filmic element that contributes to the 
representation of non-Thai-ness in Yamada. In the film, Yamada is called by several 
names, such as ai na khao, which means ―white face‖, or khon phaen-din eun, which 
means ―a person from another land‖. These expressions used in calling the protagonist 
refer similarly to ideas of other-ness in the notion of non-Thai-ness.  
                                                                                                                                                           
Thorng Yort, Foy Thorng, and Thorng Muan. The exhibition celebrated the 60th birthday 
anniversary of Princess Sirindhorn and was also opened by her. See 
http://www.mots.go.th/mobile_detail.php?cid=56&nid=6464. Retrieved 30 July 2015. 
49
 See information about the performance in http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/ 
2007/09/01/Love-without-borders-30047268.html. Retrieved 19 June 2015. 
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Although the filmmaker highlights the non-Thai-ness of Yamada, his character 
in the film does not remain fixed as ―non-Thai‖. As the film develops, Yamada starts to 
learn the skills of performing Thai-ness, transforming himself from being a Japanese 
samurai to become a hybrid Thai-Japanese warrior, whose martial art skills are more 
powerful than his original purely Japanese ones. 
 
The Hybridity of Yamada 
In Yamada, the integration of the Japanese character with Thai-ness shows the 
changing characteristic of Thai identity that has now become consumable by ethnic 
others. Yamada learns to be Thai and his martial art skill is empowered by the cultural 
form of Thai boxing, and as consequence, Thai-ness becomes even more exceptional. 
In other academic historical studies, the travel of Yamada to Ayutthaya and his 
commitment in serving the Ayutthaya court is explained as being mainly for his own 
survival in a foreign land. Cesare Polenghi, in Samurai of Ayutthaya (2009), contends 
that Yamada decided to stay in Ayutthaya because he was upset that his beloved one in 
Japan was married off to someone else. His disappointment in love was also an 
important factor that drove Yamada to join the Ayutthaya army. As Polenghi puts it, 
―[H]e resolved to put an end to his misery by enrolling in an extremely dangerous 
campaign aimed to curb the Burmese invasions‖ (Polenghi, 2009, p. 2). In the film, 
however, none of these historical events are depicted. What is displayed in Yamada, 
instead, is the exceptional quality of Thai-ness that draws Yamada to want to become 
Thai and to serve the Ayutthaya kingdom. 
The most obvious incident in the film that shows the ―Thai-ification‖ of Yamada 
is when he stays in the town of Sorng Khwae after having been ambushed by Japanese 
samurais. In Sorng Khwae, Yamada is exposed to the kindness of the people and the 
beauty of Ayutthaya culture. After seeing Thai boxing, Yamada also wants to learn this 
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martial art skill. However, as Veluree also asserts, because Yamada is a foreigner, in 
order to become Thai, he has to go through rituals of acculturation, which are symbols 
that represent the heritage of Thai-ness (Veluree, 2014, pp. 5−6). One of these rituals is 
the master honouring ritual (phithi wai khru), in which Yamada, as a foreigner has to 
show his respect and great devotion to Phra Khru, the head monk of Sorng Khwae 
monastery who becomes his Thai boxing instructor (see Figure 3.1). Most theatrically, 
before he starts his boxing lesson, Yamada has to receive spiritually empowered tattoos 
from Phra Khru. Veluree argues that the tattooing ritual in the film, ―invokes a radical 
change of Yamada both physically and mentally. He is no longer ‗the other‘ to the 
Ayothaya‖ (Veluree, 2014, p. 6). However, I would like to add that another scene that 
signals a completion of Yamada‘s process of becoming Thai is the try-out scene, where 
Yamada seeks to become the king‘s personal guard. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Yamada paying respect to the monk, Phra Khru, who is his boxing master. 
In the early section of this chapter, I have shown that since the 1960s, the 
present Thai monarch, King Bhumibol, has increasingly been portrayed as the most 
important part of the official ideology of Thai identity, both through the imposition by 
state authorities and the reproduction in popular culture of the Thai middle class. In 
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Yamada, the try-out scene where Yamada seeks to become the guard of the king of 
Ayutthaya resembles what Connors observes is the most common signifier of 
conservative notions of Thai nationhood, namely, the reference to the monarchy 
(Connors, 2005, p. 531). In this context, in order for Yamada to become ―Thai‖, he has 
to demonstrate his support of the monarchy—the highest and most important cultural 
institution of the coalition of the middle class and the establishment. 
This symbolic royal allegiance scene begins with Phra Khru telling Yamada 
about the importance of a personal guard of the king. The film then shows Yamada 
entering the competition for selecting personal guards, in which King Naresuan is also 
present to see Yamada‘s and other men‘s battle skills. In the competition, Yamada 
shows how he can now use his newly acquired Thai martial skill to defeat other 
contenders. Several times the film shows the king being very impressed with Yamada. 
After the try-out is finished, Yamada receives a compliment from the king, which, I 
would argue, represents the completion of Yamada‘s becoming Thai. The king gives 
him a royal blessing: ―You are not from Ayothaya. Even though you were not born in 
Ayothaya, I ask that your spirit should belong to Ayothaya‖50 (see Figure 3.2). The 
royal blessing given by King Naresuan symbolically confirms that Yamada has 
succeeded in acquiring the important requirements that many conservative members of 
the Thai middle class believe to represent Thai-ness. 
                                                     
50 ―มึงหาใช่คนอโยธยา...เอาเถิด...แมน้มึงไม่ไดเ้กิดในแผน่ดินอโยธยา แต่กขูอให้วิญญาณของมึงเป็นของอโยธยา‖ 
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Figure 3.2. Yamada (centre) and others who have qualified to become the king‘s royal guards 
paying respect and swearing loyalty to King Naresuan. The king also gives Yamada a royal 
blessing for his devotion to serve Ayutthaya. 
 
 
The becoming Thai of the Japanese protagonist in Yamada illustrates the de-
essentialisation of Thai identity. The status of Thai-ness is now different from the past 
when the ideology tended to be fixed by a set of ethno-centric official meanings 
provided by the state. However, this does not mean that Thai-ness has lost its charm. 
The de-essentialisation of Thai-ness shows that the ideology is an efficient cultural form 
that can be accessible and applicable by people from other cultural-ethnic backgrounds. 
This transformed status of Thai-ness has even made the ideology to be seen by many 
Thai people as the best cultural form in the world. 
 
The Exceptionalism of Thai-ness in Yamada 
Not only does Yamada reflect the transformation in the characteristic of Thai-
ness, which has become de-essentialised. The film also reflects the narcissistic view of 
the members of the middle class, that Thai-ness is ―never second to anyone else in the 
world‖, or that whenever persons from other ethnic-cultural backgrounds learn to 
perform Thai-ness, their social status and cultural value within Thai society will be 
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enhanced. Such a narcissistic view is reflected most clearly and specifically through the 
protagonist of Yamada learning Thai martial arts. 
 When Yamada begins to learn Thai boxing, the discourse of Thai 
exceptionalism is projected through a series of filmic sequences that show that his 
Japanese martial art skill is inferior to Thai boxing. This sequence of the film begins 
with an Ayutthaya boxer practising various boxing postures in front of a big statue of 
Buddha, signifying the ideas of beauty and sacredness of Thai boxing (see Figure 3.3). 
The film then cuts to show Yamada, who is also practising his own martial art, but is 
mocked by a girl, Kathi, to suggest the inferiority of Japanese boxing, ―Is this it, your 
Japanese boxing?‖51 Then, the film cuts to show Yamada and the girl standing where 
Ayutthaya boxers practise their boxing. The girl teases Yamada again, ―Can your 
Japanese boxing beat Ayutthaya?‖52 Then, the film shows Yamada asking to duel with 
one of the Ayutthaya boxers, Ai Seua, who is played by a famous Thai kick boxer, 
Buakaw Banchamek. When Ai Suea steps forward, it first appears that the duel between 
the two will turn out to be closely fought (see Figure 3.4). However, when Yamada is 
about to strike his first attack, Ai Suea easily uses his elbow to knock Yamada down 
with his first blow (see Figure 3.5). The scene ends with an embarrassing image of 
Yamada being cared for by Champa, the female caretaker of the home where he is 
staying in Sorng Khwae. Champa also tells Yamada ―Do not try to fight with Ai 
Seua...you cannot beat him‖. The narrative in this scene clearly reflects the notion about 
the superiority of Thai boxing, or in other words, Thai-ness, which is represented as 
being more powerful than the Japanese cultural form of martial arts. 
                                                     
51
 ―น่ีหรือ มวยญ่ีปุ่ นของเอ็ง เห้อ!‖ 
52 ―มวยญ่ีปุ่ นของเอ็ง จะสู้มวยของอโยธยาไดห้รือ?‖ 
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Figure 3.3. Ai Seua practising Thai boxing moves in front of a Buddha image, a scene that 
reflects the beauty and sacredness of the art of Thai boxing. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. The film shows that the duel between Yamada and Ai Seua will be intense and 
closely fought. 
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Figure 3.5. Yamada easily loses to Ai Seua from the first blow on their first encounter. 
 
  After this embarrassing scene, Yamada tries several times more to win against 
Ai Seua. However, all his efforts prove useless, as the film shows Yamada is defeated 
by Ai Seua every time, until Yamada dedicates himself to learning Thai boxing from 
Phra Khru to improve his skill. This series of embarrassing moments when Yamada 
loses to Ai Seua reflects the belief of the conservative Thai middle class that Thai-ness 
is of exceptionally high cultural value and is superior to other national cultural forms. 
However, Yamada is not always a loser. The film shows that after he has learned 
Thai boxing and entered the service of the king, his martial art skill improves to the 
point that he can easily overcome his Japanese samurai enemies. In the early part of the 
film when Yamada is ambushed by his Japanese enemies, Yamada tries to fight back, 
but the film shows that at that point it is impossible for him to be victorious, as his 
enemies‘ skill is higher. However, towards the end of the film, after Yamada has 
learned Thai boxing skills and travelled back to the Japanese village in Ayutthaya to 
take revenge on his enemies, the film shows that, this time, he can win against them 
easily. In the final fight, the film shows that Yamada, who now possesses a Thai-
Japanese hybrid fighting style, clearly dominates in every strike that his opponents 
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throw at him. Even when ninjas join the fight to help the Japanese samurai boss, 
Yamada is able to kill all of them without trying hard at all. 
 On the one hand, this scene could be interpreted from an optimistic perspective 
to show the power of a diplomatic collaboration between the two cultures, Thailand and 
Japan, through Yamada‘s symbolic hybrid martial art form. On the other hand, 
however, considering Yamada‘s broader character development from being a Japanese 
to becoming Thai, what this fighting scene shows is that Thai-ness is a highly valuable 
and powerful cultural resource that can help empower any individual who learns to 
perform or adopt it. As clearly reflected in Yamada‘s last fight, he would not be able to 
take revenge on his enemy, a Japanese samurai, if he had not learnt Thai boxing, or 
learnt to become Thai. 
 This section has shown that Yamada is a film that reproduces official ideas of 
Thai-ness by co-opting a signifier that represents a cultural-ethnic other. While Yamada 
depicts the life of a foreign figure who came to settle in Thailand, the way in which the 
film projects his individuality on screen is clearly mediated by the contemporary 
middle-class narcissistic worldview about Thai identity. For the Thai middle-class 
culture, Thai-ness is a highly exceptional cultural identity, form, and value, which has 
assumed a quality of plasticity that is now able to incorporate other cultural-ethnic 
identities. In a way, this Thai-ness transformed by middle-class culture also helps 
rejuvenate the Thai identity of the establishment, making it more accessible by other 
cultural ethnicities who now live in Thailand, or others in the world, who may want to 
become Thai or support the Thai establishment. 
In order to understand this move of Thai-ness to a stage of non-essentialism 
more broadly and in relation to the contemporary social context of film production, in 
the next section I extend my analysis of Yamada to read Thai politics since 2006. This 
period is relevant to the film not only because it is the social context of the production 
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of the film, but also because it is the period when many members of the Thai middle 
class have increasingly begun to seek more power to enhance the ideology of Thai 
identity in their coalition with the establishment. My interpretation shows that 
Yamada‘s story about a hybrid Japanese-Thai warrior resembles the situation of the 
Thai middle class, which mostly consists of Sino-Thai, or luk-jin, who have now been 
empowered by overcoming their original ethnic-cultural identity as other to be redefined 
as Thai. 
 
III. IV Yamada and the Changing Meaning of Thai-ness in a Period of Political 
 Anxiety 
 Since 2006, when Thailand has increasingly experienced political divisions, 
many pro-establishment middle-class people have begun to believe that there is a 
conspiracy by a group of people who want to overthrow the monarchy (khabuan kan 
lom jao). The conspiracy is believed to have been driven by Thaksin when he was in the 
position of prime minister before the military coup in 2006. During that time, many 
people believed that the purpose of the political regime which Thaksin tried to 
implement was aimed at helping him change the political structure of the country in 
order to promote himself as a president (prathanathipbodi).
53
 After Thaksin was toppled 
by the military coup in September 2006, belief in this conspiracy has remained. When 
the Red Shirts, who are Thaksin‘s political allies, staged protests in Bangkok in April 
2009 and May 2010, they, too, were widely believed by the conservative middle class 
and the military to be, more or less, part of this supposed anti-monarchy conspiracy. 
About a month before the military‘s crackdown on the Red Shirt protest in May 2010, 
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 For example, the late Luang Ta Maha Bua, one of the most respected Thai Buddhist monks, 
publically criticised Thaksin for trying to re-structure the political institutions of the country in 
the early 21st century in order to endorse a presidency. See 
http://www.manager.co.th/Politics/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000132575. Retrieved 31 
July 2015. 
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they released what was called an ―anti-monarchy movement chart‖ or phang lom jao. 
The chart represented a network of people and social groups believed by the coalition of 
the middle class and the establishment to be planning to topple the monarchy.
54
 
However, in 2011 the military came out subsequently and admitted that this chart had 
been fabricated and that no-one named on the chart could be confirmed as in fact being 
against the monarchy.
55
 
The supposed anti-monarchy conspiracy, which began while Thaksin was still in 
power, has created great concern and worry among many royalist middle-class people 
about the stability of the most valued and influential institution of the country. What 
many of these royalist middle-class Thais did in order to resolve their anxiety and to 
empower their patronage institution was to step out into the public to promote a 
monolithic, singular view of Thai-ness which has the monarchy as the central symbolic 
ideology of Thai identity. However, as I have shown above, Thai-ness in the period of 
neoliberal economy globalisation has been de-essentialised, mainly by the middle-class 
commercial culture. To be Thai no longer requires one to be or to present oneself to be 
―purely Thai‖. As evidently reflected in Yamada, any individual from any ethnic-
cultural background can be ―Thai‖, only if they follow the code of conduct or show 
their gratitude in the official values of the ideology of Thai-ness. In this section, I argue 
that Yamada is an allegory of the royalist middle-class culture, which, during the period 
of high anxiety over the supposed anti-monarchy conspiracy, has attempted to co-opt 
other individuals from other cultural-ethnic backgrounds to be part of the official 
ideology of Thai-ness. However, this co-optation is different from the period when 
Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram was prime minister (in office: 1938−1944 and 
1948−1957), when he adopted fascist methods to empower the ideas of Thai-ness by 
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 See http://www.prachachat.net/news_detail.php?newsid=1272342366. Retrieved 31 July 
2015. 
55
 See http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2011/05/34974. Retrieved 31 July 2015. 
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silencing other cultural-ethnicities and promoting a monolithic ethno-centric view of 
Thai identity. The way in which the contemporary royalist middle-class Thais empower 
Thai-ness and their beloved royal institution is, as the filmmaker, Nopporn Watin, of 
Yamada does in the film, by showing that Thai-ness with the king as a core symbol is 
exceptional and valuable to persons from other cultural-ethnic backgrounds who live in 
Thailand, and that they should dedicate themselves to protect it. 
That the Japanese protagonist in Yamada learns to appreciate and fight for Thai-
ness closely resembles the rise in recent decades of the Sino-Thais or luk-jin to protect 
the monarchy. In the protest against Thaksin by the People's Alliance for Democracy 
(PAD) or Phanthamit in 2006, the leader of the protest, Sondhi Limthongkul who is 
also a luk-jin, accelerated this cultural-ethnic assimilation of Sino-Thais to Thai-ness to 
support his political agenda. Aiming to draw more urban middle class into the protest, 
Sondhi used the slogan luk-jin rak chat (―Sino-Thais love the nation‖) to mobilise his 
demonstration (see Figure 3.6). Although Sondhi was seen promoting his Chinese 
ethnic identity, his assertion of a Chinese ethnic origin was done in a conforming way to 
promote the official ideology of Thai-ness, in support of the nation and the king. The 
result of his efforts was successful, as more and more Bangkok residents, many of 
whom are luk-jin, joined the PAD rally and movement until the military staged a coup 
in September 2006. Kasian (2009), in another of his studies on the political culture of 
the Sino-Thais, explains that the patriotic luk-jin discourse was possible during this 
period because of the ethno-historical development of Chinese immigrants in modern 
Thai history, which has recently given more social space to them. As Kasian argues, 
...the rise of these self-conscious ‗patriotic lookjins‘ is made possible by an 
amalgam of changing class politics and alliance in the aftermath of economic 
globalisation and crisis in the 1990s, and a consolidated, if increasingly 
challenged, regime of royal-nationalist hegemony following the transition from 
military dictatorship to parliamentary democracy in the 1970s (2009, p. 266). 
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Figure 3.6. Sondhi Limthongkul wearing a t-shirt bearing his political slogan luk-jin rak chat 
(―Sino-Thais love the nation‖), used to gain the PAD more support from the urban middle class 
in 2006.
56
 
 
 
This politics behind the hybrid Chinese-Thai ethnic identity of the political 
events in 2006 can be seen as being related in the Japanese-Thai hybrid identity of the 
protagonist in Yamada. If one reads the film from the perspective of the contemporary 
political context, one can detect that underneath the film‘s apparent diplomatic message 
about Thai and Japanese relations—which is largely embedded in the hybrid identity of 
the protagonist—lies the agenda of the Sino-Thai middle class: to include to ―be Thai‖ 
all other cultural-ethnic individuals who seek power from Thai state. This is evident 
especially from the last scene in the film, after Yamada kills his Japanese enemy. In the 
fight, Yamada is also joined by Ai Kham, his Thai/Ayutthaya friend who followed to 
support him from the village of Sorng Khwae. However, Ai Kham is shot when he tries 
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 The figure is retrieved from http://www.mediainsideout.net/local/2013/01/103. Retrieved 25 
August 2015.  
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to protect Yamada from the Japanese samurai‘s gunfire. After the fight, in which 
Yamada is the victor, the film does not show that he goes back to stay in the old 
Japanese village where he originally came from. Rather, it shows him staying in Song 
Khwae, and vowing to serve the Ayutthaya court until his last breath. In one sequence, 
Yamada even says that he ―will use Ai Kham‘s sword to kill the enemies of Ayothaya as 
Ai Kham intended‖.57 The ending of the film also shows Yamada practising Thai boxing 
in front of the big statue of Buddha, the same place where he first encountered the 
Ayutthaya men training in Thai boxing (see figure 3.7). 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Yamada vowing to protect Ayutthaya at the end of the film 
 
 
These symbolic sequences at the end of the film are reminiscent of the political 
movement of the urban Thai middle class that has aimed to protect and empower the 
monarchy by making loyalty to the throne by non-Thais living in Thailand part of the 
political regime of Thai-ness. And this has not only happened to the Sino-Thais but also 
to farang, the westerners of Caucasian ethnic origin. Those farang who have shown 
loyalty to the king have been well accepted by the coalition of the middle class and the 
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 ―จะใชด้าบของเจา้ปราบศตัรูของอโยธยาอยา่งท่ีเจา้ตั้งใจ‖ 
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establishment and have been promoted widely by the mass media. For instance, in 2010 
many royalist people were very proud of the Thai monarchy and highly grateful when 
they learned that an Englishman, Alan Bates, who had lived in Thailand since 2004 and 
who felt gratitude towards King Bhumibol, wanted to ride a bicycle around the world to 
honour the king.
58
 With his true devotion to the Thai monarchy, Bates is, accordingly, 
complimented as having ―a Thai heart‖ (hua jai Thai).59 
 
My last point about the relationship of the supposed exceptional form of Thai-
ness between Yamada and the post-2006 Thai political environment is the increasing 
hostility against un-Thais, or those who are represented, or claim to be against, or do not 
conform to the official ideology of Thai-ness. While the contemporary non-essentialist 
stage of Thai-ness has managed to incorporate non-Thai others to empower itself, the 
new form of identity also creates a greater threat to those who are not included in the 
discourse of Thai-ness and are labelled as un-Thai. These un-Thais can be both 
foreigners who are critical about the national institutions, and actual Thais who are 
regarded as not showing appreciation of official Thai-ness, especially the monarchy. 
Many foreigners, whom the conservative Thais claim do not ―try to understand‖, or do 
not learn to become like Thais, face harsh criticism or legal action by being deported 
and exiled from the country. 
However, I would say that the most interesting example of hostility against un-
Thais is the case of actual Thais who are labelled and stigmatised as being un-Thai. In 
the worst case, if the conservative Thais find any ―un-Thai‖ Thais clearly expressing 
views against the monarchy, they could report this to the state authorities who would 
file a lèse-majesté charge against that person. In a less severe case, these nationalists 
would, as Andrew MacGregor Marshall observes, ―ask aloud whether dissenters are 
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 See http://www.siamsport.co.th/sport_other/100804_163.html. Retrieved 31 July 2015. 
59
 See http://www.manager.co.th/iBizChannel/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9530000127348. 
Retrieved 31 July 2015. 
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really Thai, and suggest they leave the country if they don‘t like Thai ways‖ (Marshall, 
2014, p. 36). What Marshall has found could be seen reflected in a famous speech by a 
royalist celebrity Phongphat Wachirabanjong in 2010. 
At the same time that the Red Shirts were protesting in the streets of Bangkok in 
May 2010, the Natarat Television Awards ceremony was also was held and Phongphat, 
who had also joined the PAD in 2006 and often openly expressed his love for the 
monarchy in public, was awarded a prize. When Phongphat went on stage, in addition to 
the typical formal appreciation speech, he took the opportunity to criticise the Red 
Shirts. The Matichon website reports his speech as follows: 
 Until today, our father has been working hard to take care of everyone in the 
―house‖ (i.e. country)…but there are people who are unhappy with this house 
and who blame it on our father and also want to chase our father away. I want to 
go tell these people that if you do not love our father, please leave this house. It 
is because this land (phaen-din) belongs to our father. I love the king and I 
believe everyone in this place feels the same.
60
 
 
Phongphat‘s sentimental and royalist announcement evidently reflects the desire of 
many members of the Thai middle class during the on-going political conflicts to 
remove those who do not accommodate themselves into the dominant notion of Thai-
ness, which has the king as a central core value, and is denoted by the term ―father‖ in 
Phongphat‘s speech. In connection with Yamada, Phongphat‘s royalist act reminds us of 
the commitment that Yamada made to his dead Ayutthaya friend: that he will devote his 
life to protect Ayutthaya, or in other words, Thai-ness, from enemies. This resentment 
against the people who resist becoming Thai illustrates that the enhancement of Thai-
ness by the Thai middle-class culture also has a cruel side, which can be ready at any 
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 ―จนจนมาถึงวนัน้ี พอ่คนน้ีก็ยงัเหน่ือยท่ีจะดูแลบา้น และก็ดูแลความสุขของทุกคนในบา้น ถา้มีใครสกัคน โกรธใครมาก็ไม่รู้ ไม่ได้
ดัง่ใจเร่ืองอะไรมาก็ไม่รู้ แลว้ก็พาลมาลงท่ีพอ่ เกลียดพอ่ ด่าพอ่ คิดจะไล่พอ่ออกจากบา้น ผมจะเดินไปบอกคนๆ นั้นวา่ ถา้เกลียดพอ่
ไม่รักพอ่แลว้ จงออกไปจากท่ีน่ีซะ เพราะท่ีน่ีคือบา้นของพ่อ เพราะท่ีน่ีคือแผน่ดินของพ่อ ผมรักในหลวงครับ และผมเช่ือวา่ทุกคนท่ี
อยูท่ี่น่ี รักในหลวง เหมือนกนั” See further in http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1274 
024998. Retrieved 22 June 2015. Also note the use of the term phaen-din (land) in this speech, 
underlined above. See the discussion of this term in Chapter II. 
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time to remove those who do not want to be Thai and who are seen as creating a bad 
image of Thai-ness and the country.  
 
III.V Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown another perspective in which the forms of individuality 
in contemporary Thai biographical films reflect the coalition of the Thai middle class 
and the establishment. It is the authorisation of Thai-ness, one of the most important 
cultural ideologies of the Thai establishment and the Thai middle class, which has 
helped maintain and provide social privileges to these two social groups. While Yamada 
depicts the life of a Japanese warrior who encounters problems with his own expatriate 
ethnic community in the foreign land of Ayutthaya, the film nonetheless uses this 
conflict to show the exceptional quality of Thai-ness. Yamada learns that Thai culture is 
welcoming and has many forms of cultural practice that he wants to learn from. 
However, the way in which Yamada reproduces Thai-ness differs quite 
significantly from the past, when this notion of identity was strictly defined by a set of 
official symbols representing the idea of the modern Thai state. Thai-ness in Yamada is 
a cultural product of Thai middle-class culture informed by market economy logic and a 
political agenda, claiming that the Thai identity is more exceptional than others. What 
this means is that Thai-ness is not essentially fixed to a single set of meanings, but is 
flexible, depending on what product the producer may want to assign the idea of 
nationhood to. In part, Yamada was intended to promote Thai boxing to the world and 
endorse the Japan-Thai relationship. Thus the idea of making a hybrid Thai-Japanese 
form to promote Thai-ness is an effective choice both for the filmmaker, who represents 
the Thai middle class, the social group mostly comprises Sino-Thais, and the power of 
the Thai establishment. 
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The de-essentialisation of Thai-ness by middle-class culture does not undermine 
the traditional values and power of the establishment. On the contrary, it has helped 
empower the ideology, by incorporating other cultural-ethnic identities and individuals 
who seek power from the Thai establishment, to be part of the coalition of the Thai 
middle class and the establishment. The most evident example of this social 
phenomenon is the luk-jin or the Sino-Thai middle class, who in the past few decades 
have shown much eagerness to become Thai, as can be seen from the 2006 political 
campaign of the Bangkok middle-class people, luk-jin rak chat (―Sino-Thais love the 
nation‖). The empowerment of Thai-ness through the help of these hybrid cultural-
ethnic individuals, who perform being Thai, has also created an oppositional outcome 
for the group of people who do not identify with these values of Thai-ness to have less 
space in contemporary Thai society. 
This process of the reproduction of Thai-ness as reflected in Yamada may seem 
complicated and quite arbitrary. However, this shift from an essentialist to non-
essentialist stage of Thai-ness has been mostly effective for the Thai establishment and 
the conservative middle class to maintain their power of their sakdina rule in the time of 
deepening political polarisation and conflict from 2006 until the present. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Moon: The Woman Who Achieves Success  
Because of Her Obedience to Men 
 
 
IV.I Introduction 
In Chapters II and III, I have shown that biographical films that depict the lives 
of the persons who are part of official national history are forms of discursive practice 
that reproduce the ideologies of the establishment and work to maintain the coalition of 
the establishment and the Thai middle class. In this chapter, I further illustrate that 
recent biographical films do not only depict the lives of national historical heroes in 
serving such a hegemonic role. Films depicting the lives of people who are cultural 
icons in modern-day society also play a similar role.  
This chapter examines The Moon (Pumpuang, dir. Bandit Thongdee, 2011), a 
biographical film that recounts the life of a legendary country music (phleng luk thung) 
singer, Ramphueng Chithan, who is better known through her stage name, Pumpuang 
Duangjan. Raised in Suphan Buri, a province where many famous country music 
singers come from,
61
 Pumpuang reached the peak of her career in the 1980s but sadly 
started to suffer from an auto-immune disease, systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE), 
and died from this disease in 1992. I look particularly at how The Moon displays the 
struggle and determination of Pumpuang to become ―the queen of Thai country music‖‘ 
(rachini phleng luk thung), while at the same time justifying the ideological power of 
the Thai establishment. The filmmaker achieves the latter through the film‘s 
construction of the virtuous image of the male agents who represent the patriarchal 
ideology of the Thai state. My analysis of The Moon in this context of gender relations 
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 Examples include Waipoj Petchsuphan (1942−present) whose role is also depicted in the 
film; Suraphol Sombatcharoen (1930-1968) who in the film represents the legendary and 
prototype singer of the protagonist; and Paowalee Pornpimon (1992-present) who plays the role 
of the protagonist. 
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will allow us to understand another side of how the ruling legitimacy of the 
establishment, particularly the group of male elites, is achieved by the bourgeois 
individuality of Thai middle-class culture. 
In the literature on Thai cinema, many studies (for instance Fuhrmann, 2008; 
Knee, 2003; May Adadol, 2006; Pattana, 2007) illustrate how cinema has played a 
critical role in constructing and justifying the dominant role of men. As also mentioned 
in Chapter III, in his study, ―Muai Thai Cinema and the Burdens of Thai Men‖, Pattana 
(2007) has argued that the increasing popularity of Thai boxing films after the 1997 
financial crisis signals the idea of ―Thai men‘s contentious desire for a heroic return to 
glory on the national and transnational stages‖ (Pattana, 2007, p. 421). These Thai 
boxing films display meanings that maintain and justify the power of Thai men after the 
crisis through the projections of the power of various ―new models‖ of masculinity, 
which previously remained under-recognised in public discourse. 
However, as Connell and Messerschmidt maintain, the way in which men 
maintain their dominant role can also come from constructions of men‘s power, ―that do 
not correspond closely to the lives of any actual men‖ (Connell and Messerschmidt,  
2005, p. 838). In Thai cinema, this can also be seen in many films, especially in ghost-
horror films, which often display stereotypical images of men, as harmless and 
―normal‖ human characters, and women as exotic-looking spirits or creatures. In her 
analysis of Nang Nak (dir. Nonzee Nimitbutr, 1999), a film about a ghost wife longing 
to be with her human husband, May Adadol contends that the visualisation of the 
female ghost protagonist in the film repeats such a binary opposition of gender 
stereotypes. Through the projection of the female protagonist, the film invokes the 
image of the ―Thai man as a persistent and vital national custom‖ (May Adadol, 2006, 
p. 189). Arnika Fuhrmann extends May Adadol‘s argument about Nang Nak by arguing 
further that it is the ―exhausting‖ power of femininity in female ghost characters that 
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permits the entrenching of the ideology of male dominance (Fuhrmann, 2008, p. 87). 
My analysis of The Moon in this chapter is guided by these studies, which regard the 
ideology of male dominance as also being constructed not only by male characters but 
also female characters, who are used in the film narrative to legitimise men‘s power. 
The Moon is a story about the female protagonist, Pumpuang, who is helped by 
the men in the music industry along the road to become successful. In reality, 
Pumpuang‘s success in her music career came from many factors. Pattraporn 
Chantanasut (2006) describes in her masters thesis Pumpuang Duangjan: Jut phlik phan 
khorng phleng luk thung Thai (Pumpuang Duangjan: The turning point of Thai country 
music) that one of these factors was the ability of Pumpuang and the producers of her 
music to adapt to the changing demand in the market of the country music industry that 
changed dramatically during the 1980s (Pattraporn, 2006, p. 64), which was the time 
when Pumpuang started to become famous.  
However, in the film, it is, instead, her interactions with the male characters who 
represent the patriarchal values of the country music industry that are highlighted. To 
become a professional singer, Pumpuang has to leave her family in rural Suphan Buri 
province and move to stay with Waipoj Petchsupan, Pumpuang‘s first music master 
(khru phleng), who provides her shelter, musical training, and opportunities in the 
music industry. While staying with Waipoj, Pumpuang has to follow the hierarchical 
order and tradition of the house, such as cleaning, preparing performers‘ costumes, and 
obeying the house rules, in order to become a member of the band.  
In Waipoj‘s house in the film, one of the house rules that everyone, particularly 
the female members, are required to follow strictly is the one that prohibits the members 
of the house from engaging in intimate relationships (khwam samphan chu sao), either 
with other members of the house, or people from outside. When Pumpuang arrives in 
the house, she witnesses the power of the house rules. One of the women, who is a 
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leading singer of Waipoj‘s music company, breaks this rule by dating a man from 
outside the company. Waipoj punishes this woman by having her leave the house right 
away. Later on, however, when Pumpuang is about to be promoted to lead singer, she 
falls into the same situation. Pumpuang falls in love with Theerapol Saensuk, the 
saxophonist of Waipoj‘s band, and is found out by Waipoj. Pumpuang and Theerapol 
have to accept the consequences by packing their bags and leaving Waipoj‘s company.  
While looking for a new job, Pumpuang is helped by another male music 
master, Mon Meuang-neua, who gives her another chance to become a country music 
singer. Under Mon‘s supervision, Pumpuang gains more popularity and forms her own 
band. However, Pumpuang‘s road to success is not always easy. During the tour one 
day, Pumpuang‘s band has a road accident. She survives but has to pay a lot of money 
for hospital expenses for herself and other band members, and for buying new musical 
instruments. It is at this time that she meets another important man from the country 
music industry, businessman Prajuap Jampathorng, who offers her financial support and 
a new opportunity to become even more famous. Even though Pumpuang quickly 
becomes famous working with Prajuap, she falls ill with an auto-immune disease and 
has to suspend her concerts many times. While she is recovering, Pumpuang is 
reminded of the gratitude that she owes to her past music teacher, Waipoj. Pumpuang 
goes to pay him a visit and show respect, and, in exchange, receives more moral support 
from him. After visiting her music teacher, she can once again hold her dream concert at 
the five-star Dusit Thani hotel in front of rich people in Bangkok. 
From this highlight of the important roles of male figures in the film, in this 
chapter I argue that The Moon not only represents the struggle of a woman and her 
forbearance, but also the important roles of men and the high value of the traditional 
Thai patriarchal social structure and ideology, which are shown to be integral to her 
success in music. While the actual roles of these men in The Moon may be music 
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teacher and entrepreneur, the way in which they are portrayed in the film is clearly 
shaped by the highly respected concepts of phor (father) and khru (teacher), which are 
the two of the most important gender roles and ideological concepts in the traditional 
Thai patriarchal social structure. Pumpuang‘s conformity to these ideologies, 
particularly when she becomes obedient and places herself in the most submissive 
position in this male-dominated social structure, paradoxically leads to her socio-
economic achievement. As I argue further, this paradox also reflects the sensibility of 
many Thai middle-class people in the contemporary political context, who believe that 
the traditional form of Thai masculine power and social structure may be the kind of 
governance that they could most benefit from. It is this peculiar sensibility of many Thai 
middle-class people that often justifies the traditional ruling power of male 
establishment elites, like the monarchy, which is also symbolically linked with the 
notions of phor and khru, and the military, which is an agent of the power of the 
establishment. To illustrate my arguments clearly, in the body of this chapter, I begin by 
discussing how the male-dominated Thai society has been maintained by the two 
important hegemonic ideological notions of phor (father) and khru (teacher). Then, I 
discuss The Moon to show in more detail how the film reinforces these masculine 
ideologies through the life of a female popular cultural icon, Pumpuang. Lastly, I will 
show that we can use the film as a conceptual lens through which to understand the 
middle-class culture in the period of recent political divisions, to see why the masculine 
governing power of the military is often endorsed by the urban middle class.  
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IV.II Phor and Khru: The Two Most Important Ideological Beliefs of Male-
 Dominated Thai Culture 
 The unbroken legitimacy of the Thai establishment can be understood by 
looking at the way in which their patriarchal values are disseminated and practised by 
people in Thai society. Two of the most important concepts that have served the 
ideological role of fostering the masculine power structure of Thai society and the 
legitimacy of male elites of the establishment are the concepts of phor (father) and khru 
(teacher).  
The analysis of the ideologies of the male-dominated social structure in Thai 
society in this section recognises the plurality of masculine power in Thailand, in which 
scholars from the field of masculinity (khwam pen chai) studies (for example Narupon, 
2013; Pattana, 2005; Reynolds, 2014a) have viewed it as, Narupon puts it, ―being 
unable to be reduced to a fixed formula or unified entity‖62 (Narupon, 2013). The 
intention of this chapter, however, is not to engage directly with this particular issue of 
the plurality of Thai masculinity. Neither do I want to suggest that the male-dominated 
social structure of Thai society is characterised by only one form of masculine power. 
The form of governing power of Thai men can be subjected to change. Craig Reynolds 
(2014a) has recently shown in his study, extending the work of Chanan Yothong 
(2013), that the type of masculine ideology upheld in the governance of the sixth reign, 
King Vajiravudh (r. 1910–1925), was significantly different from that in the reigns of 
previous Siamese kings. Yet it helped this monarch to maintain his power as a 
legitimate ruler of the country. In this chapter, I consider the uses of the two tropes, 
phor and khru, which are central to the Thai ideology of male dominance, to illustrate 
that these notions are two of the most important ideological apparatuses that have 
                                                     
62 ―ไม่ไดมี้สูตรสาํเร็จและมีเอกภาพ.‖ See further in Narupon‘s article titled, ―Reu Sang Mayakhati 
‗Khwam Pen Chai‘ Nai Sangkhom Thai‖ (―Deconstructing ‗Masculinity‘ in Thai Society‖) 
(2013), from http://www.sac.or.th/main/content_detail.php?content_id=735. Retrieved 1 August 
2015. 
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helped Thai men who are the members of the state ruling apparatus to maintain their 
ruling legitimacy. The gendered ideological notions of phor and khru are also integral to 
how Thai middle-class culture supports the establishment, which I will discuss through 
the analysis of The Moon. 
 
Phor (Father) 
The literal English translation of phor is ―father‖, the male leader of a family or 
social group. However, in governance, phor is also an ideological discourse and practice 
that is used to maintain and justify the ruling power of male authority, and to discipline 
people in society to conform to their power. In Thai society, when the male rulers want 
to create a benevolent image of governance, the concept of phor is often invoked, 
together with its binary concept of luk (children), which is a term used for those who are 
ruled. The use of phor in state governance in Thailand is significant, as it signifies the 
hegemonic relations of society where the male leaders of the establishment are given 
approval by their ―children‖, that is, the general populace, to lead society.  
The use of phor in the discourse of governance in Thai society can be dated back 
to the ancient period of the Sukhothai Kingdom (1238–1463). King Ramkhamhaeng (r. 
1279–1298), the third king of that dynasty, presented himself to his people as ―Lord 
Father‖ (phor khun), in order to gain support and trust, and to create an ideal type of 
society in which the people could access the monarchy for social matters easily (Wyatt, 
2003, p. 43). The king is often said to have had a big bell hung in front of his palace, so 
that his people could call him whenever they needed help. In the Ayutthaya period 
(1351–1767), the father-and-child social and political relationship seems to have been 
altered by a more complex and multi-levelled social hierarchy and structure of sakdina 
or Thai feudalism, which was developed in the reign of King Borommatrailokanat (r. 
1448–1488). Under the sakdina system, each person‘s place in society was clearly 
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defined by the number of rice fields that they were presumed to own. The number of 
rice fields owned by most royal family members and nobles would have numbered more 
than 10,000 rai,
63
 while slaves would only have 5 rai (Wyatt, 2003, p. 62).
64
 The 
implementation of the sakdina system transformed the male-dominated social structure 
to become more hierarchal and to have more rigid rules and norms. This social system 
continued until the modernisation period during the reign of King Chulalongkorn 
(r.1868–1910), when the king abolished the system. However, as I have argued in 
Chapter I, despite the fact the sakdina law, which accommodated the discourse of phor 
in state governance, was abolished in the early 20th century, many people in Thai 
society today are still subject to the lasting impact of this ideology, especially the 
establishment elites and many members of the conservative middle class, who tend to 
believe that people in Thai society have different social statuses, and that they should be 
treated differently according to their social status or rank. 
In the modern period, the notion of phor is still used, and has significantly 
shaped the social life of modern Thai people. The current monarch, King Bhumibol, is 
one of the best examples who typifies the power of phor used in the modern-day 
discourse of governance. After his accession to the throne in 1946, King Bhumibol‘s 
cultural status and charismatic power rose rapidly. What has played a significant role in 
the increase of the King‘s charismatic power is the mass and new media (Jackson, 2010; 
Chanida, 2011), which have served to disseminate his image as a ―father King‖. As Paul 
Handley comments on this image of the king, ―[W]hat the public saw in palace-issued 
photographs and movies, however, was a dhammaraja king who, besides all his other 
incredible talents, was a caring, sensitive patriarch of his handsome family‖ (2006, p. 
                                                     
63
 1 rai is equal to 1,600 square meters. 
64
 According David Wyatt, during the early period of the implementation of sakdina system, the 
numbers of rice fields were most likely to be a real representation. However, when Ayutthaya 
expanded and its population increased, the numbers of rice fields became more symbolic, for 
even monks and slaves were also assigned as owners of rice fields (Wyatt, 2003, p. 62). 
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171). At present, even though the king can no longer perform such a duty because of his 
ailing health, the image of the great father (phor luang) of King Bhumibol still remains 
intact for many Thai royalists, who also vow to do anything they can to protect the 
King‘s legitimacy. 
The trope of phor can be applied by a male state authority who wants to conceal 
his authoritarian and corrupt power. According to the political scientist Thak 
Chaloemtiarana (1979), phor was also a political ideology important to the legitimacy 
of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (in office: 1958–1963), who became prime minister in 
1958 after staging a military coup against his own protégé, General Thanom 
Kittikachon. To gain popularity, Sarit acted like King Bhumibol by travelling to many 
areas of the country, especially the northeast region, to meet the people. Whenever he 
saw a problem, he was quick to order someone to solve it, like a caring father. On the 
one hand, this political strategy was aimed to counter the communist insurgency that 
was approaching the north and northeast regions. On the other hand, Sarit‘s close 
interaction with the Thai people, and the way in which he acted like a protector of the 
nation, also transformed his image to become similar to that of both King Bhumibol, 
and King Ramkhamhaeng of Sukhothai. Thak observes that, ―Sarit‘s paternalistic style 
of leadership was modelled mainly on the concept of the father-child (phor–luk) 
relationship‖ (Thak, 1979, p. 172). 
Above are some examples of the ways in which the male establishment elites 
and their political power are maintained and justified by the ideological concept of 
phor. However, the masculine ideological concept of phor should not be understood as 
only defined by the men who represent the traditional ruling power. Phor can also be 
realised in other types of masculine ruling power. The CEO governing style of former 
prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra (Pasuk & Baker, 2009, pp. 184−188), who rose to 
premiership in 2001, can also be seen as another kind of paternal governance, especially 
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among many of his Red Shirt supporters. However, Thaksin‘s phor-style politics has 
not been able to undermine the traditional phor regime of the Thai establishment. The 
military coup which toppled Thaksin from power in September 2006 could be read to 
symbolise the triumph of the traditional form of phor and luk (children) relations in 
modern Thai society. 
 
Khru (Teacher) 
 Another ideological notion, which has been significant in supporting male-
dominated Thai society, is the ideology of khru. Literally, the word means ―teacher‖ 
and the use of the term is not limited to male persons or men‘s power. However, the 
ideological and spiritual belief in khru in many forms of Thai entertainment arts—the 
main subject in The Moon being discussed in this chapter—has also played a crucial 
role in motivating people in Thai society to conform to and to obey male-dominated 
social structure and its hierarchy, which is defined mainly by age. 
In traditional Thai entertainment arts, the concept of khru is highly sacred, and 
every student (luk sit) should be highly respectful of his or her khru. According to music 
scholar Patarawadee Puchadapirom (2006), khru in traditional Thai entertainment arts is 
not only a signifier of the male person who teaches performing art skills, but also of 
gods and spirits, who are believed to have created the performing arts skills, and who 
are embodied in the costumes or musical instruments of performers. In every 
performance of traditional Thai entertainment arts, performers will conduct a teacher 
honouring ceremony (phithi wai khru) for both the human and spiritual khru to show 
their respect and appreciation (Patarawadee, 2006, p. 11).  
For Thai country music (phleng luk thung), which is the main cultural form in 
The Moon, the concept of khru is also significant to the cultural form and how the music 
culture has developed until the present. According to the historian Chakat Ratburi 
(1994), Thai country music was originally developed from the western-influenced 
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phleng Thai sakon (international style Thai music), a form of music that was developed 
by western-educated Thai elites, who wanted to advance Thai musical culture to be like 
other that of countries in the early 20th century (Chakat, 1994, p. 10). It was not until 
after World War II that the form of ―international style‖ Thai music evolved into Thai 
country music. The main agents who were involved in the transformation after World 
War II were the groups of middle-class Thais who were businessmen in the music 
industry, who wanted the music to attract more listeners whose backgrounds are 
associated with the regional upcountry areas of Thailand. As Chakat explains, during 
this period, there was a clear distinction between two genres in making and distributing 
Thai sakon music, one with the lyrics that emphasised the upcountry lifestyle. This 
genre is called phleng luk thung (―upcountry music‖). The other genre is defined by 
lyrics that are more about city lifestyle. The latter is called phleng luk krung (―city 
music‖) (Chakat, 1994, pp. 25–29). 
Despite being a historically western influenced cultural form, the cultural norms 
of Thai country music bear the same cultural norms and social hierarchy of khru as in 
other traditional Thai entertainment arts. According to Chakat, in Thai country music, 
the khru phleng (music teacher) is the ―heart‖ of the country music singer. They are the 
one who coaches and writes songs for the singer to sing (Chakat, 1994, p. 37). If one 
pledges him or herself to be a student of any khru phleng, one has to strictly follow the 
guidance and rules given by that music teacher. As Chakat explains, in order for a 
country music singer to become successful in their career, it is important that that singer 
is trusted and supported by an established and older singer (Chakat, 1994, p. 46).
65
 This 
tradition of khru−luk sit (teacher−student) relations in Thai country music clearly 
reinforces the social hierarchy between the older or experienced one and the newcomer. 
It also justifies the authority of the elder one and persuades the younger one to be 
                                                     
65 ―ไดรั้บการสนบัสนุนจากนกัดนตรีนกัร้องเก่า...ท่ีมีบทบาทอยูใ่นวงการเพลงและดนตรีมาก่อน‖ (Chakat, 1994, p. 46). 
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obedient to that power, if he or she wants to succeed. Even though the khru ideology 
and practice in Thai country music may not have always been exclusively reserved for 
men, it can still play a part in serving to sustain the male-dominated social structure and 
hierarchy, as I will show in the analysis of The Moon in the following section. 
Up to this point, I have discussed two ideological notions that are pertinent to 
the male-dominated social structure and hierarchy in Thailand. One is the ideological 
concept of phor (father), which is central to the justification of male leaders from the 
establishment. The other concept is khru (teacher), which, despite being relatively less 
significant to the maintenance of male power, is crucial to understanding the obedient 
culture in the male-dominated social structure in Thai performing arts. The analysis of 
The Moon in the next section is situated in the domain in which these two ideological 
concepts intersect. What I show in the analysis of The Moon below is that while the 
production of the film may aim to celebrate the success of ―the queen of Thai country 
music‖, the narrative of the film supports the two ideological concepts of phor and khru, 
constructed historically by the Thai establishment. This makes the film a piece of 
cinematic art that justifies the legitimacy of the masculine ruling power of the Thai 
establishment, especially the current monarch who is often seen as simultaneously being  
both phor and khru. 
 
IV.III  The Moon: Gratitude to Phor and Khru as the Source of Pumpuang’s 
 Achievements  
 The general plot of The Moon can be viewed as celebrating Pumpuang 
Duangjan, who, in real life, triumphed over her underprivileged social background. The 
film begins by depicting Pumpuang‘s life when she is in her youth, living with her poor 
family on a sugarcane farm in Suphan Buri province. After she travels to Bangkok and 
enters the country music industry, the film begins to show her strong determination to 
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do everything she can to overcome her life obstacles and become a star. This particular 
emphasis of the film was also the main intention of the director, Bandit Thongdee, who, 
in an interview given to the press in 2011, stated that he wanted The Moon to be a 
source of inspiration for the people of the new generation.
66
 However, from a close 
reading of the film‘s narrative with its emphasis on Pumpuang‘s individuality, what is 
also explicitly presented in The Moon is not just the lesson to be learnt from 
Pumpuang‘s life, which emphasises endurance and effort. In this analysis, I argue that 
The Moon also shows that Pumpuang‘s success comes from her obedience to the power 
of men who represent the ideological power and values of phor (father) and khru 
(teacher). The film mediates these ideas by exploiting Pumpuang‘s successful profile 
and by romanticising her interactions with the men of the country music industry, who 
are shown in the film as being essential to her career‘s success. This particular meaning 
of the film also reflects broadly the sensibility of the Thai middle class, which cannot be 
detached from the traditional patriarchal values of the Thai establishment, notably in the 
period of challenging political power between the coalition of the urban middle class 
and the establishment, and the new political power from provincial areas. 
 
The Successful Profile of Pumpuang  
In The Moon, the idea that men play essential roles in Pumpuang‘s career is 
constructed through the fact that Pumpuang‘s life has already been known by the public 
as representing success and achievement in the music industry. This success and 
achievement are mainly derived from her musical works, which appeal to many country 
music listeners and the cultural practices related to her stardom.   
                                                     
66 ―สามารถเป็นไอดอลและเป็นแรงบนัดาลใจให้คนรุ่นใหม‖่ See in 
http://www.adintrend.com/scoop/view.php?id=684. Retrieved 28 June 2015. 
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Chakat (1994, p. 150) and Pattraporn (2006, p. 65), two scholars who have 
studied Thai country music history, agree that Pumpuang became extremely popular 
through the song ―Sao Na Sang Faen‖ (―A Girl from the Rice Field Instructs Her 
Boyfriend‖), the single that was released in the middle of her career in 1983. In her 
analysis of the song, Pattraporn explains that the part of the song that helped Pumpuang 
to become famous is the realistic image of upcountry life created by the song‘s lyrics, 
which also match her voice (Pattraporn, 2006, p. 107). After the success of Sao Na Sang 
Faen, many of Pumpuang‘s other songs that were released later also became popular. In 
1986, Eu-heu Lor Jang (Oh My, He‘s So Handsome) was released and quickly became 
a hit through its flirty lyrics and a rhythm that is more associated with pop music. In 
1989, her Nu Mai Ru (I Don‘t Know) repeated the same tradition by playing with a 
flirty theme as in the 1986 single, and also became a hit. The stardom of Pumpuang also 
came from her songs that render nationalist sentiments. In 1988, she released Siam 
Meuang Yim (Siam, the Smiling Country), in which the lyrics clearly reproduce the 
official version of Thai history, as the first line states, ―Be proud of being born as Thai, 
no one else‘s slave, and full of generosity‖.67 Sadly, Pumpuang could not enjoy what 
she had earned from her hard work. In 1992, the auto-immune disease that she had 
suffered from worsened, and she died in that year. 
Although she died when still young, Pumpuang‘s fame has been carried on 
through a variety of cultural productions that celebrate her success. The songs that 
Pumpuang used to sing have been re-made and covered many times by contemporary 
country music singers. Television and filmic productions also celebrate and depict 
Pumpuang‘s career and personal life. One of the most widely recognised ones is the 
film Bantheuk Rak Pumpuang (―the love memoir of Pumpuang‖, dir. Dork-Fah, 1992), 
which was released in the same year when Pumpuang died. In 1998, the television 
                                                     
67 ―จงภูมิใจเถิด ท่ีเกิดเป็นไทย มิเป็นทาสใคร และมีนํ้าใจลน้ปร่ิม‖ 
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movie Rachini Luk Thung Pumpuang Duangjan (―The queen of country music, 
Pumpuang Duangjan‖) was also released. The Moon shares many similar characteristics 
with these previous film and television productions, especially the emphasis on her 
effort to become successful. However, as I will show in the following discussion, The 
Moon differs from these productions in that it places high importance on the patriarchal 
values in Thai country music culture.  
Another form of production that has helped maintain her eminent profile, and 
most importantly, that has altered Pumpuang‘s cultural status to become sacred, is the 
installation of her statues and portraits at Thap Kradan temple in Suphanburi province, 
the place where her funeral, which was officiated by Princess Sirindhorn, was held. 
Every year at Thap Kradan temple, a celebration and worshipping ceremony of 
Pumpuang is held. The ritual attracts many fans and tourists to the temple and, as a 
consequence, has made the legacy of Pumpuang known to people of later generations. 
As I illustrate in the following sections, the depiction of Pumpuang‘s life in the 
2011 film, The Moon, is based on her successful historical profile, which has been 
constructed through her own musical works and her fame, which still continues after her 
death. From the plot of the film in general, as I show below, the filmmaker, Bandit, has 
structured the plot narrative of the film in a way that specifically highlights this 
successful profile of Pumpuang, and also traces various obstacles that she had to 
overcome in order to achieve her goal of achieving a successful music career. In the 
production profile of the film, Bandit explains that many parts of the film are also based 
on Pumpuang‘s biography, Duanjan Thi Jak Pai (―the lost moon‖), written by Binla 
Sankalakhiri.
68
 This book recounts many kinds of hardship that Pumpuang encountered 
when she was alive, including the illness that she suffered and from which she 
eventually died. However, when Pumpuang‘s road to success is translated into 
                                                     
68
 http://www.adintrend.com/scoop/view.php?id=684. Retrieved 28 June 2015. 
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cinematic form in The Moon, the filmmaker represents her success through an emphasis 
on the music industry‘s patriarchal values and system. As I show below, Bandit‘s 
interpretation of Pumpuang‘s life not only honours Pumpuang‘s struggle and celebrates 
her success, but also endorses the values of the masculine ideologies of phor and khru, 
as supposedly being essential to Pumpuang‘s becoming successful. This particular way 
of re-telling Pumpuang‘s life reflects the film‘s subjection to the Thai male-dominated 
social structure and norms. 
 
The Men in Pumpuang’s Life 
 The most significant part of the narrative of The Moon is the film‘s explicit 
emphasis on the important roles of men in Pumpuang‘s music career. In the film, there 
are four male figures whom Pumpuang encounters. The way in which each of them is 
portrayed in the film is modelled by the patriarchal notion of phor (father) and khru 
(teacher), even though none of them is her biological father. 
The first important person is Waipoj, an established country music singer, and 
also Pumpuang‘s first music teacher. Even though Waipoj‘s real role in Pumpuang‘s 
career was as her music teacher, in The Moon he is also portrayed as a godparent or 
saviour of Pumpuang‘s life. The part where the film initially highlights Waipoj‘s 
additional role of saviour is when Pumpuang travels to Bangkok with her biological 
father for the first time. In front of Waipoj‘s office, while Pumpuang is waiting to see 
him, she is threatened by a group of male gangsters. However, before she gets in 
trouble, it is Waipoj who finally shows up and rescues her from danger. This sequence, 
which happens early in the film, assigns the new role to Waipoj as a father figure who 
will be taking care of her when she enters the music industry, in the place of her real 
father. Another scene, which clearly represents the father-and-daughter-like bond 
between the two is when Pumpuang enters the recording room for the first time. In the 
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room, Pumpuang feels nervous and cannot concentrate on her singing. The sound 
engineer asks Waipoj who he has recruited to sing the song.  
Sound engineer: Where did you find this girl, khru? She looks quite nervous. 
Waipoj: She is my daughter (luk sao).
69
 
 
Though short, this sequence obviously stresses Waipoj‘s sense of paternal identity 
towards Pumpuang. While the sound engineer still calls Waipoj khru, Waipoj refers to 
Pumpuang as his daughter (luk sao), displaying his viewpoint that Pumpuang is more 
than just a typical student to him. 
Apart from Waipoj, another male figure that Pumpuang encounters and owes her 
success to is Mon Meuang-neua or Khru Mon, a music teacher who is also Waipoj‘s 
colleague. In the film, Pumpuang breaks the rule in Waipoj‘s house that prohibits the 
members of the band from falling in love with one another. Pumpuang falls in love with 
Theerapol, Waipoj‘s musician, and is caught by Waipoj. As a result, Theerapol has to 
leave Waipoj‘s house. While Pumpuang and Theerapol are looking for a new job in an 
entertainment café in Bangkok, it is Mon who notices her talent and helps her to get 
back into the country music industry. Like Waipoj, even though Mon is a teacher, the 
film portrays him as a father who has rescued Pumpuang in her troubled times. The 
scene which shows Mon accepting Pumpuang is displayed through a small teacher-
honouring ceremony (phithi wai khru), where Pumpuang and Theerapol sit on the floor 
and present a flower to Mon, who sits in a higher position on a stool (see Figure 4.1). In 
the ceremony, Mon also gives Pumpuang her new stage name, Pumpuang Duangjan 
(the English title of the film, ―The Moon‖, refers to Pumpuang‘s stage surname, 
Duangjan, which means ―moon‖), which could also be read as a symbol of her new life. 
The emphasis on the phor−khru image of Mon in this scene reflects the ideological 
                                                     
69 วิศวกรเสียง: ครูไปเอาเด็กท่ีไหนมาร้องเน่ีย? ท่าทางดูต่ืนๆยงัไงชอบกล 
   ไวพจน์: ลูกสาวกูเองแหละ 
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worldview of the filmmaker to see men in the Thai country music scene as not just 
music teachers who train a student to sing, but someone who provides shelter as well as 
musical knowledge and skill to his luk-sit. 
 
Figure 4.1. Pumpuang and Theerapol give a flower to Mon in a teacher honouring ceremony 
(phithi wai khru). 
 
 
However, the film also portrays Mon as having another role, which does not 
seem to exist in the earlier form of Waipoj‘s father figure role, and which is crucial to 
Pumpuang‘s rising popularity. When Pumpuang has released a few songs, Mon takes 
her to promote her songs at radio stations in other provinces. In this scene, after 
Pumpuang finishes her interview with the DJ of a radio station, Pumpuang and Mon are 
called outside by a radio station staff member. In front of the station, the two witness 
many fans who have come to give Pumpuang support and to see her in person (see 
Figure 4.2). This sequence in the scene at the radio station is significant in that it vividly 
shows that Pumpuang‘s conformity to the male power within the Thai country music 
culture can be socially rewarded. The image of the Pumpuang‘s fans storming the radio 
station, to the accompaniment of an exciting musical score, ironically constructs a 
positive meaning around the protagonist‘s submission to the power of male music 
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masters, and around the ideological notions of phor and khru, to which Pumpuang has 
conformed, as seen from the beginning of the film. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. A montage showing Pumpuang encountering her many fans for the first time, at a 
radio station where she is interviewed. 
 
The two music masters are not the only male figures who are portrayed in the 
film as being important to Pumpuang‘s life. Two other male figures that are important 
to Pumpuang and represent virtuous images of male power are Nai Hang, Pumpuang‘s 
Sino-Thai financial supporter, and Theerapol, her husband. Nai Hang is a person who 
offers support to Pumpuang when she has trouble with money after having a road 
accident while her band is on tour. With Nai Hang and his business strategy that aims to 
attract a wider audience, not just the listeners from upcountry, Pumpuang‘s career 
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advances. As the film shows, for example, he rejuvenates Pumpuang‘s image, by 
changing her look to become more modern (than samai). Pumpuang‘s music 
incorporates conventions from pop music, which Nai Hang believes can attract a new 
audience sector— urban middle-class residents of Bangkok. As for Theerapol, her 
husband, even though he may not be an important person of the country music industry 
like the first three, he is nonetheless depicted as a guardian angel whose support for 
Pumpuang is integral to the advancement of her music career. As the film shows, in the 
early stage of her career, Pumpuang is illiterate and has a problem reading her music 
masters‘ lyrics. Many times in the film, Theerapol is the one who helps her solve this 
problem, by reading the lyrics of the songs given to her out loud, so that she can 
memorise them. This activity, which is portrayed romantically sometimes, shows the 
filmmaker‘s view of Theerapol as having high paternal value to Pumpuang. 
 
The Hierarchy of Men in the Film 
 The Moon not only shows the importance of these men to Pumpuang‘s success 
through the tropes of father and teacher; the film also displays the hierarchy within this 
male-dominated social structure epitomised by the country music culture in the film.  
 In the film, among the three main male characters, Waipoj is portrayed as the 
most senior and highly respected man, who also has power over the lives of many 
characters, especially Pumpuang and Theerapol. The scene that best illustrates this high 
status of Waipoj, and Thai country music‘s male hierarchy, is when Theerapol goes to 
see Mon, and asks for his help. At Mon‘s house, Theerapol begs him to give Pumpuang 
a job. However, because Mon is a junior (norng) colleague of Waipoj, he cannot accept 
Pumpuang and Theerapol. Mon tells Theerapol that, ―In our country music industry, we 
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live together with reverence and respect‖.70 After hearing this, Theerapol decides to go 
back to Waipoj and express his formal apology. In this apology sequence, we can see 
that the filmmaker intentionally tries to embody the meaning of a spiritual khru in 
Waipoj, as khon masks—the costume of traditional Thai court performance which are 
regarded by Thai traditional art performers as being a god khru—are placed in the 
background (see Figure 4.3). When Waipoj accepts the apology, Mon now feels free to 
recruit the two to become his pupils. These bonds and life constraints between the three 
men illustrate the hierarchical male structure in the country music industry, where the 
younger ones (norng), like Mon and Theerapol, have to respect the authority of the 
older ones (phi), like Waipoj. 
 
Figure 4.3. Theerapol apologising to Waipoj in a filmic composition that shows the sacralised 
and hierarchical social structure of the Thai country music industry. 
Pumpuang’s Conformity to Male Power and Hierarchy in Country Music  
 The Moon does not just emphasise the importance of the men whose roles 
greatly contributed to Pumpuang‘s success, and the hierarchy within their masculine 
culture. As the story develops, the filmmaker also presents Pumpuang as seeing value in 
conforming to and legitimising this masculine power structure. We might be able to say 
                                                     
70 ―วงการลูกทุ่งของเราเคา้อยูก่นัดว้ยความเคารพนบัถือ‖ 
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that, in other words, it is Pumpuang, the female protagonist of the film, whose role in 
the film has been created to help reinforce the patriarchal values of country music‘s 
culture.  
 Pumpuang‘s conformity to masculine power in Thai country music is 
represented early in the film, when Pumpuang moves into Waipoj‘s house. As I have 
mentioned in the synopsis of the film in the introduction, inside Waipoj‘s premises, the 
film shows that all members of the house, from dancers to Waipoj himself, live under a 
rigid social hierarchy and a set of house rules. After she has moved in, Pumpuang does 
not get to sing immediately but has to help take care of household duties, such as 
washing dishes and mopping the floor. These jobs are not reserved specifically for 
women but rather the roles of young ones in the house in general. In one sequence the 
film also shows Theerapol, who is the musician of Waipoj‘s band, helping her wash 
dishes.  
The most obvious moment during Pumpuang‘s early days in Waipoj‘s house 
that exhibits the authority of masculine power is when Pumpuang witnesses the 
punishment being enforced on one of the female members of the house. The film begins 
this sequence by showing an image of the house rules, which are written on a board and 
hung in the most important part of the house, which is behind Waipoj‘s workstation. 
The rule that states that members of the house ―should absolutely not engage in intimate 
relationships‖71 is placed right at the centre of the scene (see Figure 4.4). Then shortly 
after this sequence, the film cuts to show that another female member, who has been 
having a secret relationship with a man from outside, is caught by Waipoj. Waipoj calls 
everyone in, mostly the girls, and including Pumpuang, and shows his rigid authority by 
chasing that female member out of the house in front of everyone (see Figure 4.5). This 
symbolic sequence in The Moon, where the protagonist, who in this scene is new to the 
                                                     
71 “ห้ามมีพฤติกรรมชูส้าวโดยเด็ดขาด” 
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industry, has to obey, clearly represents the male authority in the country music 
industry. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. ―House Rules‖ (Kot Khorng Ban) are written on the blackboard behind Waipoj‘s 
workstation. Above the House Rules board are portraits of famous country music singers, who 
are predominantly men. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 A female singer is forced to leave the house after the she has breached the house 
rules. Pumpuang is on the left, feeling deeply sorry that her colleague has to leave. 
 
However, even though The Moon shows the rigid social order of the male-
dominated Thai country music industry, it also shows that Pumpuang gains benefit by 
conforming to this male-dominated social structure. We can see the film‘s construction 
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of this positive image of the male domination of country music culture in the sequence 
when Pumpuang decides to visit her music masters after she becomes successful. 
During the peak of her career, the film shows that Pumpuang works even harder in 
order to gain more popularity. However, as she becomes more dedicated to country 
music, her health worsens. Pumpuang‘s over-concentration on her work also makes her 
husband, Theerapol, feel ignored, and eventually he decides to leave her. Theerapol‘s 
departure upsets Pumpuang and contributes to her falling ill, forcing her to suspend all 
of her concerts and rest at home. While Pumpuang is resting, she has more time to 
reflect on what she has been through. This is when the audience sees Pumpuang 
remembering how far she has come and to whom she feels she owes gratitude. Despite 
her illness, Pumpuang decides to travel to visit her first music master, Waipoj.  
When Pumpuang visits Waipoj at his house, Pumpuang‘s deep gratitude toward 
the ideological values of the male-dominated country music culture, and the power of 
the male music master, are highlighted. The scene begins by showing Pumpung sit on 
the floor in front of the portraits of male music masters, the same place where Waipoj‘s 
workstation and the board for the house rules used to be. Waipoj also tells her, ―wai 
(pay respect to) these masters, so they know that ‗the queen of country music‘ has come 
to visit them‖.72 Pumpuang listens and slowly pays her respect (krap) to these portraits 
of legendary singers. This sequence also shows Waipoj helping Pumpuang to get up, 
which clearly reflects the hybrid notions of phor-khru (father-teacher) and luk sao–luk 
sit (daughter-student)—the hierarchical social relations which the film has used to 
justify male dominant power since the beginning (see Figure 4.6). All of the sequences, 
from when Pumpuang‘s reaches the highest point in her career to when she returns to 
Waipoj‘s house to pay her respect, show the importance of the senior-junior (phi–
norng) hierarchy within the male-dominated structure of Thai country music. To put it 
                                                     
72 ―ไหวบ้รรดาครูๆเขานะ เขาจะไดรู้้วา่ราชินีลูกทุ่งมาเยีย่ม‖  
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more precisely, the film conveys that Pumpuang‘s becoming ―a queen‖ of Thai country 
music is due to her obeying other older male figures, who represent the hierarchy of 
power within the male-dominated Thai society.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Pumpuang pays respect to the portraits of legendary country singers at Waipoj‘s 
home. The area has now been re-decorated to make it look more sacred. 
 
To sum up the discussion so far, while The Moon celebrates Pumpuang‘s 
untiring efforts, the film reproduces the ideology of Thai men and the traditional gender 
hierarchy in the male-dominated Thai society. The notions of phor and khru are used in 
the film to justify the paternal authority of the male characters and to rationalise the 
obedience of the female protagonist to that authority. Moreover, the film also reflects 
the importance of the senior-junior (phi–norng) hierarchy and shows how it is essential 
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to conform to this vertical social structure. In this respect, Pumpuang‘s success, as 
portrayed in The Moon, is not only defined by her own efforts but just as importantly by 
her obedience to this traditional male-dominated social structure and cultural values.   
The fact that The Moon justifies traditional Thai masculine power, values and 
traditions, reflects one important condition of Thai society from the perspective of 
gender. In his examination of masculinity in Thai boxing films, Pattana (2007) argues 
that in the early period of globalisation, the traditional forms of masculinity—which are 
characterised by the figures such as the gangster, godfather, or Buddhist monk—have 
been challenged by new forms of masculinity (Pattana, 2007, p. 422).While Pattana‘s 
view may be right, we still should not regard the traditional form of masculinity as 
completely defunct. As I have shown in the close reading analysis of The Moon above, 
the traditional form of Thai masculinity, which in the film is represented by the male 
music masters, characterised by the ideological concepts of phor and khru, still remains 
dominant and is legitimate in its ruling power. The individuality performed by the 
female protagonist in the film is the main ideological mechanism that helps legitimise 
the power of the traditional form of Thai masculinity. In this regard, The Moon, with its 
representation of the righteous values of the traditional form of masculinity, becomes a 
competing cinematic production with other representations of the power of ―new 
models‖ of masculinity. In the last section of this chapter, I expand my analysis of The 
Moon further to reflect more substantially on what I mean by the idea of the competition 
of the traditional form of men‘s power, with the legitimacy it receives from agents 
within society. To illustrate, I read this particular meaning as an allegory of a broader 
discursive practice, from the perspective of gender, of the Thai middle-class culture, 
which has helped maintain the power of the establishment during the on-going political 
crises since 2006. The analysis will show that the theme of conformity to the traditional 
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form of male power in the film is closely related to the rise of the military authoritarian 
regime in Thailand in the last decade. 
 
IV.IV  The Moon and the Legitimacy of the Men of the Establishment after 2006 
So far, the discussion of The Moon has focused on how the film is part of the 
two discursive practices that endorse the patriarchal values of phor and khru, two 
concepts which have played important roles in the male-dominated Thai society. In this 
section, I extend my analysis of The Moon by contextualising, particularly, the 
submissive type of individuality of the protagonist to reflect the gender perspective of 
the middle class‘s subjectivity to the ruling patriarchal power of the establishment in the 
period of political crisis after 2006. In the following examination of the film, I argue 
that the form of hybrid bourgeois-feudal individuality, namely, achieving success by 
subscribing to the establishment‘s patriarchal values reflected in the character of 
Pumpuang is a metaphor for the submissive political attitude of many members of the 
urban middle class. Many in this group openly support a form of masculine and 
despotic governing power of the state authority to rule, in order to prevent other new 
forms of socio-political power from emerging and undermining their socio-economic 
interests and their coalition with the establishment. 
As I have mentioned to some extent in Chapter I, and in the light of Nidhi‘s 
(1993) and Kasian‘s (2009) works, because the formation of the Thai middle class 
occurred in alliance with the establishment, many cultural norms and values of the class 
are also intrinsic to those of the establishment. These shared values also include 
political ideology, in which many political scientists (Aim & Arugay, 2015; Englehart; 
2003) have observed that the Thai middle class does not possess a distinct and self-
governing set of political values and ideology of its own. Rather, the political ideology 
of many middle-class Thais tends to change along with the ideological power of 
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whichever group of the establishment rises to power, and can provide economic security 
and interest to them. This politically docile characteristic of many members of the Thai 
middle class is similar to the individuality reflected in the character of Pumpuang, and 
explains the obedience of many members of the urban middle class to the despotic 
masculine regime of state authority during the period of on-going political conflict after 
2006, as I explain next. 
Even though the former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra could no longer 
directly exercise political power after September 2006, as he escaped to live in exile 
abroad after the military coup, many members of the urban middle class who have been 
in opposition to Thaksin‘s regime still had to contest with Thaksin‘s political allies, who 
were still active after 2006. As Pavin Chachavalpongpun explains,  
Just when the traditional elite thought that they had eliminated Thaksin and his 
political stooges by a military coup, they were proven wrong. The premiership 
of Samak [Sundaravej in 2008] tremendously irritated the royalists  and the 
supporters of the network monarchy (Pavin, 2014, p.6). 
 
The protest of the People‘s Alliance for Democracy (PAD)—the most active group of 
the pro-establishment middle class during the second half of the 2000s—at 
Suvarnabhumi Airport in November 2008, represented another attempt of these middle-
class people to eliminate the remaining forms of Thaksin‘s political power. As I discuss 
in Chapter II, the anxiety of these middle-class people over the political power of 
Thaksin was heightened when they saw the visible expansion of Thaksin‘s political 
supporters, the Red Shirts, in the socio-political area of Bangkok in their protests in 
2009 and 2010 (Askew, 2012, pp. 74–75).  
The continuity and the recurrence of Thaksin‘s political power, both in 
parliament and in the streets, after 2006, became one of the factors that drove many 
middle-class people to want to support an absolute form of governance. James Ockey 
(2004) argues that the nostalgia for authoritarianism in Thai middle-class culture is 
typical, and can be seen expressed in many periods, especially when they feel insecure 
 138 
about the political development and stability of the economy (Ockey, 2004, p. 182). In 
this period of on-going crisis after 2006, the form of authoritarian regime that these 
middle-class people have wanted to legitimise in order to eliminate Thaksin‘s political 
power is rule by the monarchy and the military, which is the agent power of the royal 
institution. An example of this middle-class nostalgia for the authoritarian power of the 
monarchy in the time of on-going political conflicts after 2006 can be seen in Pavin‘s 
(2014) recounting of the public speech of the key political figure of the PAD, Sondi 
Limthongkul, that was delivered during the mass uprising of the Red Shirts in Bangkok 
in May 2010. As Pavin describes the situation and Sondhi‘s words, 
Some hyper-royalists never hide their aspiration to take Thailand back to the old 
days under absolute monarchy, as Sondhi Limthongkul, a core PAD leader, 
famously said, ―Let‘s return power to the King. His Majesty is a Dhammaraja 
King. This is the only way we can prevent Thailand from falling into becoming 
a failed state‖ (Pavin, 2014, p. 8). 
 
The form of bourgeois individuality expressed through the female protagonist in The 
Moon, which is characterised by her obedience to the authoritarian power of the music 
masters, resembles this desire of royalist middle-class people for the absolute governing 
power of the King.  
The most noticeably symbolic part in the film that reflects this docile logic of 
the bourgeois culture of many middle-class Thais is when Pumpuang decides to join 
Prajuap, the entrepreneur who helps her with financial matters. Before meeting Prajuap, 
Pumpuang and Theerapol are in great trouble as they cannot afford to pay their hospital 
fees or to buy new musical instruments after their band has a road accident. We can read 
the trouble that Pumpuang encounters during this time as reflecting the socio-economic 
instability felt by many middle-class Thais during the rise of Thaksin‘s political power. 
In the film, when Prajuap approaches her and offers her help, he says, ―Please do not 
think that I am exploiting you, when you are in trouble. The country music industry is 
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not that evil‖.73 Pumpuang agrees to join Prajuap immediately without asking any 
questions. This quick decision made by the protagonist, indeed, resembles the docility 
of many members of the urban middle class, who often can be seen as being willing to 
give up their political rights, and allow the male authoritarian rule to dominate Thai 
society, hoping that it would help secure their interests from being challenged by other 
undermining political forces. 
This situation where many members of the middle class are willing to support 
the patriarchal rule of the establishment has still remained even after the release of The 
Moon. After General Prayuth Chan-O-Cha led yet another coup to topple former elected 
prime minster Yingluck Shinawatra in May 2014, Prayuth himself became Prime 
Minster (in office: 2014–present). Prayuth‘s ruling regime is quite similar to the 
structure of the male characters in The Moon, with Prayuth presenting himself as a 
powerful father-figure to his ―children‖, who are the Thai people, ordering them what to 
do or what not to do. This image of Prayuth could best be seen in the regular television 
programme, Return Happiness to People in Thailand (Kheun Khwam Suk Hai Khon Nai 
Chat), where Prayuth reports what the government has done in the past that provides 
what he calls ―happiness‖ to Thai people, and where he asks for co-operation from Thai 
people to follow his orders (see Figure 4.7). Even though Prayuth‘s particular masculine 
manner and power, in television and in public, has been criticised by many people as 
being old-fashioned or too despotic, many pro-establishment middle-class people still 
accept his legitimacy, as they believe that Prayuth would really be able to return 
―happiness‖ to Thailand from the on-going political turmoil. Viewed in this light, The 
Moon reflects the disturbing political ideology of many members of the Thai middle 
class in the deepening and divided political crisis. The film is a metaphor of the 
ideological attempt of many members of the middle class to create a virtuous image of 
                                                     
73 ―อยา่คิดวา่ผมจะมาหาผลประโยชน์จากหนู ในเวลาท่ีหนูหมดหนทางนะ วงการลูกทุ่งของเราไม่คิดซบัซอ้นชัว่ร้ายแบบนั้นหรอก‖ 
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the despotic rule of the male members of the state authority, and to support their 
political legitimacy. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. The leader of the current Thai military government, General Prayuth Chan-O-Cha, 
appearing on a television programme, Return Happiness to People in Thailand, which is aired at 
prime time every Friday evening. The programme is a medium for Prayuth to report to the Thai 
people what he has done in the recent past that helps eliminate problems and ―bad people‖ 
(khon lew). 
 
IV.V Conclusion 
This chapter has shed more light on the main issues being investigated and 
developed in this thesis, which is that the Thai middle class needs to conform to the 
power and cultural values historically constructed by the establishment, in order to 
become successful, or move up the socio-economic ladder. This is reflected in the 
gender relations and hierarchy in The Moon. As I have shown, in order to succeed as a 
queen of country music, the female protagonist has to be obedient and conform to the 
social hierarchy of the male-dominated social structure and the ideological values 
constructed by men. Moreover, when expanding the analysis of bourgeois individuality 
in the film as reflecting the political situation in Thailand after 2006, The Moon can be 
seen to represent a disturbing sensibility of many Thai middle-class people, who are 
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prepared to give up their political rights and give political consent to the authoritarian 
regime of the establishment to rule, in order to prevent their own economic interests 
from being destabilised by the new political forces, namely, that of Thaksin and the Red 
Shirts.  
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 CHAPTER V 
The Billionaire: The Creative Non-Conformist Youth  
Who Seeks to Become Rich for the Sake of His Family 
 
 
V.I  Introduction 
 What I have shown in the previous chapters is how post-2006 biographical films 
become discursive practices that seek to promote the ideologies and cultural values of 
the establishment. Each of the films does this by projecting, through the representation 
of a real-life character, forms of hybrid feudal-bourgeois individuality, such as being 
self-sacrificing while supporting royal nationalism (Chapter II); learning to become 
Thai while also promoting Thai identity‘s exceptionalism (Chapter III); and overcoming 
hardships while conforming to patriarchal values (Chapter IV). These filmic narratives 
help legitimise, in one way or another, the dominant role of the establishment. In other 
words, the lives of actual persons are exploited in these biographical films to validate 
the conservative ideologies and values of the state, so that they appear popular to the 
public in the contemporary time. In this chapter, I aim to show another aspect of this 
picture of the middle class‘s attempt to justify the establishment‘s power through 
biographical films, by focusing on the subject of young people, the generation group 
which the coalition of state authority and the middle class regards as an important 
element of society. The focus on this particular subject, the younger generation, in the 
examination of biographical films will shed more light on the main idea that I argue in 
this thesis, namely, that post-2006 biographical films represent the hybrid bourgeois-
feudal ideology of Thai middle-class culture in a time of deepening political crisis. 
To show the hegemonic role of this ideology in post-2006 biographical films in 
the context of youth culture, in this chapter I examine The Billionaire (Thop Sikhret Wai 
Run Phan Lan, dir. Songyos Sugmakanan, 2011), a biographical film that depicts the 
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life of a widely known young businessman, Aithipat or ―Top‖ Kulapongvanich, who 
has become financially successful through his seaweed snack business, Tao Kae Noi,
74
 
a snack brand which is sold in every branch of Thailand‘s biggest convenience store 
chain, 7-Eleven. And because Aithipat is usually known in the media through his 
nickname, Top, I will refer to him in this chapter by his nickname.  
In previous studies of the youth film genre in Thai film culture (Anchalee, 2002, 
p. 454; May Adadol, 2006, Chapter IV), the emergence and popularity of the films has 
been explained as a product of the business strategy of entertainment conglomerates like 
RS and Grammy, the two giant music companies that started to invest in filmic 
productions. These political and economic aspects of the representation of the subject of 
youth and its culture can be seen being played out in the crossover teen films in the 
1990s, in which many singers from giant music studios were often cast as film 
protagonists (Anchalee, 2002, pp. 454–455) after these singers had or were about to 
release their albums. In the analysis of the representation of youth in The Billionaire in 
this chapter, I agree with these previous studies, that the cultural logics of the market 
economy play an important part in the cinematisation of youth culture, or youth 
individualism in the case of the biographical film genre being studied here. The 
Billionaire also features the real Top, playing a minor role, as a bank customer, at the 
end of the film. For the audience who already know Top, this film becomes a clear 
promotional tool for Top and his product, and for the business of 7-Eleven which is also 
a sponsor of the film. However, as I have shown in previous chapters and mentioned in 
the beginning of this chapter, the forms of individualistic pursuit expressed by the 
general Thai middle class not only becomes supportive of its own social group, but also 
promotes its coalition with the establishment, by helping validate the establishment‘s 
ideologies and their ruling power. By focusing on the form of individuality represented 
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 This literally means in Thai ―a young boss‖. The word thao-kae comes from Teochew 
Chinese, a dialect spoken by many Chinese immigrants in Thailand, and means ―boss‖ (頭家).  
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in the character of Top in the film, I argue that The Billionaire primarily reflects two 
critical aspects of the submissiveness of Thai middle-class culture to, and its support of, 
the establishment‘s ideologies and power. 
The first observation is that, while The Billionaire shows and promotes the new 
form of youth culture, which has emerged from the changing socio-economic conditions 
of a Thai society that has become more market-oriented and more competitive, the film 
nonetheless represents the attempt of the coalition of the middle class and the 
establishment to tame this new youth culture and contain it within the conservative 
norms and values of mainstream Thai society. The film achieves this mainly through re-
telling the story of Top‘s success as primarily coming from his creative and non-
conformist characteristics while at the same time expressing filial gratitude (katanyu) 
towards his parents. To put this another way, The Billionaire constructs the idea of an 
―appropriate‖ form of Thai youth cultural expression that is compatible with the 
competitive conditions of Thai society‘s market-economy, and that conforms to and is 
supportive of the conservative ideologies and values of the society. In the film, the 
valuing of filial piety is one of the most dominant themes that is constructed to reinforce 
this new youth cultural form. 
The other argument presented here is that, when expanding this particular 
meaning of The Billionaire to reflect the specific socio-political context of Thai society 
after 2006, the hybrid bourgeois-feudal values in the film reflect a broader tradition of 
many wealthy middle-class people, especially the rich business tycoons, who have 
attempted to build their wealthy and successful business profiles, by being in alliance 
and by being supportive of the official ideologies and values of the Thai state. This 
attempt has been to avoid possible tension or jealousy that may rise from the feeling of 
being taken advantage of, particularly by the elite members of the establishment. 
Especially in the time of politically divided Thailand after 2006, this attempt to create a 
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moralistic image of the business profile has been to also support the ruling power of the 
establishment. To clarify these arguments further, the first section of the body of this 
chapter discusses the theme of this film analysis in this chapter, which is the changing 
cultural logics of Thai social life shaped by the rise of market economy capitalism. In 
this section, I show that capitalism has transformed the dominant form of youth culture, 
now characterised by creativity and non-conformity, to become more acceptable. I will 
also discuss how the coalition of the Thai establishment and the middle class try to 
domesticate this new form of youth culture to be supportive of the state. Then, I discuss 
how The Billionaire can be seen as a cultural product deriving this hegemonic attempt 
to contain the new youth culture within the realm of the ideological power of the 
establishment, particularly through the promotion of the family and filial piety. Finally, 
I expand the analyses of the film to reflect the broader phenomenon of Thai middle-
class culture that is related to this meaning in The Billionaire. 
 
V.II  The Rise of the Market Economy and the New Form of Youth Cultural 
 Expression  
Since Thai society has been transformed through the cultural logics of the 
market economy, the social life of Thai people has changed significantly, especially the 
normative form of youth cultural expression. In a social milieu where financial success 
becomes more possible through freer conditions of economic development, the ways in 
which many young people seek to make society recognise or value them have changed. 
Achieving social and financial success has become a cultural norm, and this has 
changed normative forms of cultural expression of Thai youth culture to be defined by 
ideas of individualism based on qualities such as creativity, non-conformism, or being 
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different from others.
75
 On the one hand, this change in youth culture can be seen as 
benefiting the expanding market-based capitalistic system as whole. More creativity 
means more choices, and thus more competition. On the other hand, however, the 
transformation of Thai youth culture into becoming more individualistic could 
potentially challenge the conservative values of the coalition of the establishment and 
the middle class, in which sakdina (fedual) values and cultural norms continue to 
dominate. What the coalition of the two classes has also attempted to achieve, as Thai 
youth culture changes, is to produce a discourse that works to contain this new youth 
culture within the realm of bourgeois-feudal ideology, in order to maintain the 
legitimacy of the establishment.  
 
The Rise of the Market and Cultural Transformations 
Previous studies on the Thai economy (for example Apichat, 2013, Chapter V; 
Pasuk & Baker, 2002, Chapter V) have discussed how the economy of the country 
began to be liberalised and to expand rapidly from the 1980s. From this decade on, the 
economy of the country has become increasingly defined by the logics of the 
marketplace. This economic expansion has also been supported by successive 
governments since the 1980s, which have aimed to promote Thailand as a new 
emerging market in the Southeast-Asian region (Pasuk & Baker, 2002, p. 166). The 
government of prime minister Chatichai Choonhavan (in office: 1988–1991), which 
announced its economic and political slogan, ―Change the battlefield [of Indo-China] to 
a trading market‖ (Plian sanam rop hai klai pen sanam kan kha), was an example of the 
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 This change in youth culture has not only occured in Thailand, but also in other Asian 
countries, in which the country‘s economy has been rapidly transformed by the cultural logics 
of the market economy and the forces of neoliberal globalisation. For example, cultural studies 
scholar Fran Martin has shown that, ―more and more young, educated urban [Chinese] women 
see themselves as pursuing dreams of wealth, freedom and individual happiness through travel, 
consumption, career and a self-scripted life project‖ (Martin, 2014). 
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attempt of the state to create a more competitive environment for the country‘s economy 
after the 1980s. 
The rise of market economy capitalism in Thailand since the 1980s has affected 
and changed the culture and the social life of Thai people significantly. The rapid 
growth in the economy, mainly fostered by the increase in consumption rates, has 
provided more opportunities for new investors, and has created many new markets, both 
big and small. The change of bank policies, in which loan schemes became more 
relaxed and more accessible, played an important part in this process (Apichat, 2013, p. 
192). The public life and cultural norms and practices of many Thai people have been 
transformed through this skyrocketing economic growth and rise of new markets. As I 
discuss in Chapter III, by considering the studies of Kasian Tejapira (2002) and Patrick 
Jory (1999), the rise of the market economy has transformed many ideas of what 
constitutes Thai-ness (khwam pen Thai) to refashion the identity into a commodity that 
can be consumed by anyone who wants to be ―Thai‖ or to appreciate Thai-ness. Craig 
Reynolds (2002) has described this changing status of Thai culture in the age of the 
neoliberal market economy—which he frames as ―globalisation‖—as follows: ―[Thai 
culture] can be whatever the vendors and the advertising agencies conjure up, provided 
sufficient signifiers of Thainess are present‖ (2002, p. 312). An example of Thai-ness 
being subjected to the cultural logics of market economy capitalism in this period 
symbolises the changing structure of Thai society as a whole. As the marketplace 
society of Thailand expands, the number of opportunities as well as competition for 
people to engage in the marketplace and become financially advanced from the 
engagement, also rises. 
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Youth Cultural Expression in Market-Driven Thai Society 
  As the market economy has become more competitive, it has re-shaped Thai 
youth culture and society‘s expectations of the younger generation. In the age when 
people ―can see the opportunity‖(morng hen okat) to become financially successful, 
many young people have changed the way they express their identity or the way to 
make society accept, or recognise them, to focus primarily on economic success. This 
shift in focus has also modified the cultural norms of Thai youth to match more with the 
cultural logics of market capitalism. 
In earlier decades of Thai society‘s capitalist transformation after World War II, 
the dominant form of youth expression was characterised largely by the concept of jik-
ko, or ―a rebellious teenager who liked dressing well, acting tough and staying out late‖ 
(Jackson, 1995, p. 25). The dominance of jik-ko youth cultural expression in the early 
post-World War II period can be seen from filmic representations, in which the subjects 
of the films are teenagers living in Thai society before the rapid expansion of the Thai 
market economy in the 1980s. Dang Bireley and Young Gangsters (2499 Anthaphan 
Khrorng Meuang, dir. Nonzee Nimitbutr, 1997), a biographical film that depicts the life 
of Bancha or ―Daeng‖ Srisuksai, is one of many films that clearly shows the post-World 
War II popular youth cultural expression of jik-ko. The film follows the life of Daeng, a 
young gang leader in the area called Bireley Lane in 1950s Bangkok, who wants to 
prove himself to his gang members as a strong and honourable gang leader. Another 
filmic representation that also shows the jik-ko cultural expression of Thai youth during 
the early post-war era is Born Blood (Ko Lang Wang, dir. Phipat Phayakna, 2002), a 
fictional film also about a group of young gang members, the Lang Wang (the ―Behind 
the Palace‖76) gang, in Bangkok in the 1960s. Similar to Dang Bireley and Young 
                                                     
76
 The palace denoted here is Burapha Palace or Wang Burapha, an area of the city frequented 
by youth groups in the 1950s. 
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Gangsters, Born Blood shows that the jik-ko was one of the dominant forms of urban 
youth culture in Thai society at that time.  
The dominant form of youth culture expressed by young people changed when 
the social conditions of a more open market economy emerged in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. The result of the changing socio-economic structure has brought about a 
new type of youth cultural expression that supports the new marketised social order 
more effectively, and displaced the jik-ko type in the dominant position. As I have 
suggested, this new form of youth culture is that which is characterised by notions of 
individualism based on, for example, non-conformism and self-confidence. Wisut 
Phonlawarak, the CEO of GTH, a film studio that has produced many teen films in the 
last couple of decades, including The Billionaire, explained this change in Thai youth 
culture in an interview with Kom Chad Leuk online news. Wisut is reported as saying, 
―Today young people use the Sky Train, mobile phones, and computers. What I am 
suggesting is that the form of lifestyle of teenagers has changed through time, so have 
movies and dramas [about them].‖77 The changes that Wisut alludes to here can be seen 
in many youth films released in recent decades. 
For example, the 2006 romantic comedy, Seasons Change (Phror Akat Plian 
Plaeng Boi, dir. Nithiwat Thanathron) represents the idea of success, believed by many 
young people today as defined by individualism and the ability to follow their own 
dreams. The film centres on three protagonists studying in a music preparatory college. 
The teenager protagonist, Pom, decides not to follow the advice of his parents to go to a 
medical preparatory school. Instead, he follows Dao, a girl he has a crush on, to the 
music college where she wants to study to become an international violinist. At the 
music school, Pom meets other students who also dream of succeeding in a music career 
                                                     
77 ―วยัรุ่นเด๋ียวน้ีอาจรถไฟฟ้า ใชโ้ทรศพัทมื์อถือและเล่นคอมพิวเตอร์ ส่ิงท่ีผมอยากบอกคือรูปแบบแฟชัน่และไลฟ์สไตลข์องวยัรุ่นมนั
เปล่ียนไปตามวิวฒันาการ หนงั-ละครก็เหมือนกนั.‖ See http://www.komchadluek.net/detail/ 
20130719/163776/หนงัละครยคุใหม่สะทอ้นความเป็นไปของวยัรุ่น.html. Retrieved 31 August 2015. 
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in their own ways. A similar trait of youth cultural expression as portrayed in Seasons 
Changes, where young Thai characters are portrayed as wanting to achieve their 
individualistic goals, can also be seen in SuckSeed (Huay Khan Thep, dir. Chayanop 
Boonprakob, 2011), a film about a group of high-school students who want to become 
famous in the music industry. Another teen film in this genre is Tang Wong (literally 
means ―taking a dance position‖, dir. Kongdej Jaturanrasmee, 2013), a film about a 
group of  high-school science students who do not believe in worshipping deities at 
shrine but still want to prove whether supernatural beings are in fact powerful. One of 
the main messages presented in Tang Wong is that if one wants to achieve, you have to 
make an effort yourself, not just ask for support from spiritual powers.  
The messages and cultural values articulated in the films above can be viewed as 
being slightly different from many teen movies released in the 1990s, the period when 
the teen film genre dominated Thai film industry. Back then, according to May 
Adadol‘s study (2006), while focusing on the lives of youngsters, the teen films of the 
1990s were meant to speak to and to raise concern over the young generation among 
parents and Thais in general (May Adadol, 2006, p. 134). As she cites as an example, 
Sia Dai (Daughter, dir. Chatri Chalerm Yukol, 1994), the story about four female teens 
who move out from their parents‘ houses to stay together but encounter a drug problem, 
was made to represent ―the malaise of youth culture‖ and ―a domain of social or cultural 
life implied to be hitherto invisible and under threat‖ (May Adadol, 2006, p. 134). 
While the youth films of the contemporary period may still feature this concerned 
attitude towards the young generation, many of them, however, seem to focus on 
projecting the variety of individualistic cultural values of the youth of today‘s 
generation. As many of these contemporary youth films represent, the normative form 
of youth culture has become more dominated by a variety of individualistic ideas, which 
push young people to be more self-reliant and non-conformist in achieving their own 
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dreams. This is rather different from the representations of the form of youth cultural 
expression in the past when the socio-economic structure of Thai society had not been 
shaped strongly by the logic of market-economy capitalism. 
 
The Coalition of the Establishment and Middle Class and the Control of New Youth 
Culture 
 The emergence of new youth cultural expression, which is a result of capitalistic 
social conditions, has also been policed by the state, which is dominated by the coalition 
of the establishment and the pro-establishment middle class. In general, young people 
have always been seen by the state as a crucial element of nation building. According to 
Thanes Wongyannava (2008), the young member of the family is the social group that 
the Thai state has mostly been concerned with, as they are believed to be able to help 
the state police parents in the family to behave in the way that the state authority wants 
(Thanes, 2008, pp. 38–44). When youth culture changes, the state adapts itself in order 
to benefit from and contain the new form of youth culture, so that it does not become a 
force to undermine the state authority‘s power. This characteristic of the ruling authority 
is similar to the concepts of ―incorporation‖ and ―excoporation‖ of the Gramscian 
school of thought, particularly as conceptualised by the media theorist John Fiske 
(2010). Both concepts explain the processes by which the ruling power is able to 
contain, or ―incorporate‖, the oppositional force within its control, and by which the 
subordinates have only access to the resources provided by the ruling power in 
transforming culture (Fiske, 2010, pp. 15-18). Similar to this theoretical view, the Thai 
state, which is dominated by the coalition of the establishment and the middle class, has 
implemented many kinds of ideological apparatus or discourses to regulate and 
―domesticate‖ this new form of youth culture—which is mainly characterised by 
 152 
qualities such as individualism, non-conformity, and creativity—to make it become 
supportive of the state. 
One of the examples of how the state tries to incorporate the new youth culture 
to become part of its regime of power can be seen in the National Children‘s Day 
slogan. National Children‘s Day, held on the second Saturday in January, was 
established in the 1950s, when Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram was prime 
minster for his second term (in office: 1952–1957). Since its inception, National 
Children‘s Day has served to help the state diffuse the kind of ideological characteristics 
in young people that have been emphasised in each historical period. The diffusion of 
state ideology can be seen through the tradition whereby the prime ministers of every 
government release an official slogan which contains key concepts for young people to 
follow on every National Children‘s Day. The official song of National Children‘s Day, 
―Nathi Khorng Dek‖ (―The roles of children‖), in which the lyrics refer to ten 
characteristics that all Thai youths should follow, could also be viewed as another tool 
that helps the state disseminate the state-preferred ideas of being a good young Thai.
78
 
One of these official values, which is also central to the discussion of The Billionaire in 
this chapter, is, ―be obedient to father, mother, teacher, and lecturer (―cheua phor mae 
khru ajan‖). 
When youth culture changes, the state employs these ideological apparatuses to 
appropriate the new youth culture. To use the same example, on National‘s Children 
Day in 2003, prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra gave the slogan for young people to 
follow that reads, ―Life-long learning, think creatively, keep up with technologies‖ 
(Rian ru talort chiwit khit yang sangsan ru than theknoloyi). While this slogan was 
                                                     
78
 The ten ideal characteristics for Thai youths presented in the National Children‘s Day song 
are different from those twelve official Thai values (kha niyom lak sip sorng prakan) recently 
invented by the military government of Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-O-Cha. 
Nevertheless, both forms of state apparatus share a similar purpose in aiming to promote Thai 
people‘s conformity to state ideological power. 
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given to Thai youths in 2003, and would seem to resemble the new form of youth 
culture shaped by market-economy capitalism, it also served to support the legitimacy 
of Thaksin‘s power. Notably, the last part of this slogan, which encourages Thai youth 
to ―keep up with technologies‖, is the ideological notion integral to Thaksin‘s 
government, and it also supported Thaksin‘s interest and belief in the 
telecommunication industry that it would help advance Thailand (Pasuk & Baker, 2009, 
pp. 199–201).   
The state authority is not the only agent that has worked to include the new form 
of youth culture as part of official discourse. Many members of the middle class, who 
are in alliance with the establishment, have also played this role. One example is the use 
of the lèse-majesté law, or Article 112, to create a boundary so the expression of new 
youth culture does not undermine the power of the establishment. Under this particular 
law, the individualistic aspect of new Thai youth culture cannot be expressed in such a 
way that is critical of or makes the monarchy look negative. If anyone does so, royalist 
people would be the ones to help regulate and report it to police authorities and bring a 
charge against the individual.  
An example can be seen in the case of the former Thammasat University 
student, Saran Chuichai, who is popularly known as ―Aum Neko‖. While Aum Neko 
was a student at Thammast University, she had been active in the public space 
attempting to present a critical perspective about the belief that people have in many 
social institutions, such as the worshipping of Thammasat University‘s founding father, 
Pridi Banomyong, or the belief in nationalism. For example, when Aum Neko first 
entered Thammasat University, she took her own photo—in what many saw as an 
inappropriate way—with the widely revered statue of Pridi. The Prachatai news 
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website reported that her intention was to challenge beliefs that Pridi is a sacred being.
79
 
Aum Neko continued to create similar campaigns, mostly on Thammasat University‘s 
campus, which she believes should be a place where liberal thinking thrives. However, 
there are also many people who did not like her non-conformist expressions that often 
undermined the legitimacy of social and national institutions. Aum Neko also became 
the subject of intense middle class self-regulation, which sought to control the 
behaviour of young Thais and to contain them within the ideology of the state. As the 
ASTV Manager website reported, on 16 September 2013, Pornthipha Suphatkul, a 
television producer, brought a lèse-majesté charge against Aum Neko after Pornthipha 
went to Thammasat to interview students there about university life, but found Aum 
Neko‘s opinion too critical of the nation‘s institutions, especially the monarchy. 
Pornthipha stated in the news report that Aum Neko criticised the national institutions 
that are at the centre of conservative establishment ideology as being part of on-going 
political problems and ―she was not respectful towards and failed to honour‖ these 
institutions (mai wai lae mai hai khwam khaorop).
80
 Aum Neko is currently in exile. 
This also reflects what I discuss in Chapter III about the middle class‘s attempt to 
eliminate people who do not conform to the official ideas of Thai-ness. The 
implementation of the lèse-majesté law and the enforcement of the law with the help of 
people in society is one example of how the coalition of the establishment and the 
conservative middle class has worked to limit the youth in modern-day society so they 
are unable to undermine the ideologies of their coalition. Under this lèse-majesté law, 
Thai youths, as well as other people, can only express views about the monarchy in a 
positive and glorifying way. 
                                                     
79
 ―จึงอยากลองทาํอะไรทา้ทายกระแสสงัคมดูบา้ง ตอนถ่ายอยากให้ Cult โดยมีคาํถามวา่ถา้เราเท่ากนั ทาํไมจึงตอ้งทาํให้อาจารย์
ปรีดีกลายเป็นส่ิงศกัด์ิสิทธ์ิ‖ See in http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2012/05/40511. Retrieved 30 
August 2015. 
80
 http://www.manager.co.th/Crime/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9560000116683. Retrieved 8 
August 2015. 
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 The main issue central to the analysis of youth cultural expression above is the 
following: the new normative form of youth cultural expression—which is reinforced 
by the intensifying cultural logics of the market economy—has expanded to shape the 
social life of many young people. At the same time, the coalition of the establishment 
and the middle class has attempted to manage this new youth cultural form by 
containing it within limits so it can still be supportive of both the country‘s coalition- 
dominated marketplace and the establishment‘s ideological power. This attempt has 
increasingly fostered new normative concepts of Thai youth, which is a hybrid cultural 
form that includes the ability to be, for example, individualistic, non-conformist, and 
productively creative, while at the same time having the characteristics that respect and 
support the conservative values of the country. This new concept promoted among 
young people is also integral to the dominance of the establishment, and to the 
strengthening of the coalition of the establishment and the middle class. In the next 
section, I show that The Billionaire, a biographical film that centres on the life journey 
of Top, one of the youngest rich businesspersons in Thai society who many people have 
adored, was produced by subscribing to this hegemonic idea of the coalition-preferred 
youth cultural expression. The analysis of the film will allow us to gain critical 
understanding of how the coalition of the middle class and the establishment tame the 
youth culture of the market-driven Thai society to be supportive of the power of the 
establishment through the biographical film genre. 
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V.III  The Billionaire: Be Creative, Be Non-Conformist, and Get Rich for the 
 Family  
The story of The Billionaire represents the new normative form of youth culture 
that supports the cultural logics of the Thai market-economy society. Top is portrayed 
in the film as a young man who has both non-conformist economic and also creative 
attitudes. He is willing to go against the odds in order to achieve success. Unlike his 
fellow students, Top is not interested in academic achievement, but rather wants to 
become rich by starting his own businesses. At first, Top begins by selling items in 
online games while he is in his last year of school. He makes a lot of money from this 
business, and this has gives him confidence. He moves on to his next business, which is 
selling DVD players. However, this business does not turn out to be as easy a job as he 
expects. He loses quite an amount of money from selling DVD players, but he does not 
give up. Because he has been focusing on his businesses, Top does not do well in the 
national university qualifying exam, and does not get into the university his parents 
want him to attend. He ends up going to a private university where entry does not 
require a high exam score. However, this does not bother Top, as by this time, he has 
started another business, making and selling roasted chestnuts, an idea for a food 
business that he gets from seeing people eating this snack in Chinatown in Bangkok.  
While the film shows Top‘s great determination to become a successful 
businessperson, The Billionaire also portrays him as having great responsibility towards 
his family. While Top is focusing on his roasted chestnut business, he learns that his 
family business is bankrupt and his parents plan to escape bankruptcy court proceedings 
by fleeing to China. Instead of going with his family, Top decides to stay behind in 
Thailand and focuses more on doing business, hoping that it will grow and help him pay 
off his family‘s debt. To achieve this, Top has to expand his business and gain more 
revenue. One day, he gets the idea of starting a fried seaweed snack business and selling 
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the product to 7-Eleven, a convenience store that has branches across the country. To do 
this, Top has to put a lot of effort into, not only making his seaweed snack taste good, 
but also making his products to meet 7-Eleven‘s high standards, which includes having 
long shelf-life, attractive packaging, standard-quality manufacturing, and being able to 
manufacture a large quantity of the product, to be delivered to all branches of 7-Eleven. 
These requirements become the most challenging task for Top, while having the future 
of his family at stake. Eventually, after overcoming a series of obstacles, Top, finally, is 
able to deliver his products to 7-Eleven, help his parents to return home to Thailand, and 
becomes a billionaire.  
The film was directed by Songyos Sukmakanan from GTH, the film studio 
known for making films that attract urban middle-class audiences.
81
 Songyos‘ previous 
film, which many Thai filmgoers would know and which also became successful in the 
box-office, was My Girl (Faen Chan, 2003), a film that portrayed the romantic 
childhood of a group of friends from a provincial town who have moved to Bangkok. 
Songyos received The Billionaire project from Jira Maligool, the managing director of 
GTH, after Jira heard about Top‘s story and believed that the young man‘s life could 
become a source of inspiration for many people.
82
 Songyos explained in an interview 
that he was also very impressed by Top‘s profile and character, especially his creative 
and distinct ideas. The MThai website reports this director‘s words: ―In one situation, 
we might decide to do one thing, while Top would think differently and choose to do 
another‖.83 Top‘s individualistic and creatively productive character, as portrayed in the 
film, has also been felt by the film‘s critics and audiences. The film critic, Kong 
Rithdee, describes Top‘s actions in the film as follows: ―Top decided to take all the 
                                                     
81
 http://www.komchadluek.net/detail/20091230/43246/ปีทองหนงัไทย2009ตลกแชมป์รักเยอะแต่คุณภาพ
ลด.html. Retrieved 9 August 2015. 
82
 http://www.gth.co.th/news/ยง้-ทรงยศ-ภูมิใจหนงั-top-secr-2/. Retrieved 9 August 2015. 
83 ―ในเหตุการณ์ธรรมดาเหตุการณ์หน่ึง เราจะเห็นตดัสินใจอยา่งหน่ึง แต่ตอ๊บคิดไม่เหมือนเรา.‖ See 
http://movie.mthai.com/movie-news/106974.html. Retrieved 19 May 2015. 
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risks when he was basically a boy, an ordinary boy with a not-ordinary attitude‖ (Kong, 
2011). This particular meaning of the film can be seen to resemble the new form of 
youth cultural expression that has emerged and expanded to affect the social life of 
many people in the period of the increasingly competitive Thai marketplace society.  
However, if one looks closely into how the film adapts Top‘s life journey, as I 
have shown in the synopsis of the film above—and if one compares my synopsis with 
those from other sources—one would notice that the representation of the creative and 
non-conformist characteristics in Top‘s character is also fused with conservative ideas 
of the family and filial piety, which are part of the ideology that gives legitimacy to the 
power of the establishment. Given these hybrid bourgeois-feudal values in the film, in 
the following analysis I argue that the production of The Billionaire serves a similar 
ideological role as other practices by the state or the pro-establishment middle class, 
namely, to tame the new form of youth cultural expression to contain it within the limits 
of the state‘s conservative ideologies. The way The Billionaire does this is mainly 
through exploiting the well-known and successful profile of the real person of Top, and 
highlighting the part in the film about his family and the family‘s crisis, as the main 
reason for Top having to struggle to gain more wealth. In other words, the message that 
the film constructs is that in order for one to become financially successful and 
acceptable to the state, one has to also have gratitude (katanyu) towards the persons or 
institution to which one belongs or owes moral debts. 
  
Top: A Billionaire ―Tao Kae Noi‖ (The Little Boss) 
 The notion of success represented in The Billionaire through the character of 
Top, which is played by actor Patchara Jirathiwat, is constructed not only through the 
film itself, but also through the reputation of the real Top, whom many people knew 
prior the film‘s release as a young successful businessperson. Since the mid-2000s, the 
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name Top of the Tao Kae Noi brand of seaweed snack has featured in the press and 
mass media as a ―billionaire-to-be‖ businessperson in the food business, who overcame 
various obstacles in his personal life and business competition before he was able to get 
his seaweed snacks sold in 7-Eleven stores across the country. 
Initially, when Top began manufacturing the product, his name was only 
recognised by the business news media as a potential ―new star‖ of the Thai business 
circle.
84
 It was not until in 2008 that Top and his seaweed snack became widely known 
through the then quite famous television documentary show Kop Nork Kala (meaning 
―the frog outside the coconut shell‖). In the show, the production process of the 
seaweed snack was shown, and that made many audiences, especially those interested in 
the food business, become interested in Top. However, Top‘s Tao Kae Noi brand was 
popularised most widely in the following year when television celebrity Wuthitorn, or 
―Woody‖, Milintajinda—the host of the show Woody Kert Ma Khui (Woody Born to 
Talk)—interviewed Top on his chat show.85  
In that episode of Woody Kert Ma Khui, Top is presented as a cultural hero who 
dared to go against the odds and who has succeeded in overcoming them (see Figure 
5.1). In the show, Top repeatedly tells how he had to overcome many hurdles, 
especially when 7-Eleven wanted him to produce 3,000 packs of fried seaweed snack to 
deliver to all branches in a short time frame. In the episode, Top also tells the audience, 
in a didactic way, his secret for becoming successful. This secret is simple yet 
resembles the ideas of the new normative form of Thai youth culture in the age of the 
intensively competitive Thai market-economy society. Top states, ―The people who 
                                                     
84
 For example, in 2007 the business column of ASTV Manager reported about the plan to 
expand the Tao Kae Noi seaweed business of the real Top. See 
http://www.manager.co.th/iBizChannel/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9500000049386. Retrieved 
25 August 2014. 
85
 See a copy of this particular episode of Woody Kert Ma Khui in 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UZhUwqGNnvk. Retrieved 26 May 2015. 
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succeed have three characteristics, that are, first, ask, second, ask, and third, ask‖,86 and, 
before the show ends, he adds, ―You cannot give up, although you run out of money. 
The most important thing is never run out of spirit because if you do, that means you 
cannot go ahead‖.87  
 
 
Figure 5.1. The popularisation of Top‘s success as coming from his creative non-conformity in 
a television programme shown prior to the film‘s release. 
 
Apart from this episode of Woody Kert Ma Khui, Top also appeared in other 
news and entertainment media, presenting his business ideas and way of life, which 
have contributed to his success. These media representations of Top‘s success 
constructed prior to the release of The Billionaire helped promote the reputation of the 
real Top as a successful young businessman. The Billionaire was made in the context of 
widespread representations of Top‘s success by these media. This can be seen from the 
fact that The Billionaire highlights the path of Top‘s life where he struggles to achieve 
financial success. Most importantly, as I show in the next section, the filmmaker also 
highlights and creates a fictional plot about family values in order to represent Top‘s 
secret of becoming a success in line with the conservative ideological notions of family 
values and filial piety. 
                                                     
86 ―คนท่ีประสบความสาํเร็จตอ้งมีสามอยา่งดว้ยกนั คือ หน่ึง ถาม สอง ถาม และ สาม ถาม‖ 
87 ―คุณตอ้งอยา่ยอมแพ ้ไม่วา่คุณจะพลาด เงินหมด ทรัพยสิ์นหมด แต่ส่ิงสาํคญัท่ีคุณตอ้งไม่หมด คือตอ้งไม่หมดกาํลงัใจ เพราะถา้เรา
หมดกาํลงัใจ เราจะไม่สามารถเดินต่อไปได‖้ 
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Top’s Success and Family and Filial Piety Values in the Film 
 Unlike the previous representations of Top‘s success in other mass and 
entertainment media, The Billionaire clearly shows that Top‘s family and his bond 
towards the members of his family play an important part in his journey to become a 
successful businessperson.  
 In The Billionaire, parents and their authority seem to be the film director‘s 
main focus. From the beginning, the film shows Top as a regular high school teen living 
in a Sino-Thai family, where the father has absolute authority in all household matters. 
Being a single child, Top is portrayed mostly at the beginning of the film as being 
dependent and subordinate to his family‘s authority. For example, when he earns his 
first cash from selling online games, he does not even have a bank account book and has 
to borrow his uncle‘s to receive the money‘s transfer. 
 Yet, later on, the film shows that this context, the setting of the protagonist 
within the Sino-Thai family‘s strict rules, is only used to reinforce Top‘s conflicting 
inner desire, as he keeps looking for ways to prove his independence. Top‘s resistance 
is evident early in the film, in scenes such as when he rejects his parents‘ order to focus 
on his studies. After he earns the first amount of cash from selling items in online 
games, Top buys a new car without letting his parents know. One night, Top comes 
home late and tries to sneak into the house, but is caught by his parents. They have an 
argument about the car, in which he tries hard to explain that he bought it with his 
money earned from playing the online game. Still, his father does not want to listen and 
demands that Top should focus on his studies, saying, ―If you do not finish school, you 
will be hurt‖.88 His father‘s warning is followed by his mother‘s more gentle request, 
asking him to focus on his studies and his university exam: ―I am not asking you 
                                                     
88 ―ถา้ล้ือเรียนไม่จบ ล้ือเจบ็ตวัแน่‖ 
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anything else, but to study hard. Please do not make us worried‖.89 Because Top is 
emotionally more attached to his mother, he is almost convinced by her words, before 
he suddenly changes his mind. In this sequence, the filmmaker portrays Top‘s resistance 
to his parents‘ entreaties very satirically. It begins by Top feeling moved by his 
mother‘s words, and turning to a textbook on the table. Top takes it up, wipes out the 
dust, as if he finally understands his parent‘s words. Then, instead, Top places the 
textbook down next to his computer, and puts a computer mouse on it, using it as a 
mouse pad, and continues playing games. While this emotionally conflicted sequence 
portrays Top as a stubborn child, it provides the audience with the Top‘s general 
character as a non-conformist young man.  
In another scene, Top‘s non-conformist character is also displayed, and this is 
what comes to drive him to another life path. It is the scene when Top, for the first time, 
expresses his disagreement with his father about going to university. Generally in Thai 
society getting into public universities (mahawitthayalai khorng rat), especially in 
Bangkok, is still largely considered important, and represents an achievement in the life 
of young people.
90
 In the film, Top‘s parents share a similar view. They want Top to 
study hard to get into a good university. But in this scene, Top challenges their demand 
and argues that he can still make a living without going to a public university. Top 
comes home one afternoon and is asked by his mother, ―Top, where is the university 
exam result?‖91 Trying to evade the conversation, Top ironically replies, ―I have got 
                                                     
89 ―มา๊ไม่ขออะไรเลยนะ ช่วยตั้งใจเรียน อยา่ทาํให้ป๊าและมา๊ไม่สบายใจ‖ 
90
 From the historical perspective, the reason that the state universities in Bangkok have been 
regarded as having a higher prestige than others may possibly come from the history of the 
foundation of the university: that many universities opened in Bangkok were by the state. 
Moreover, the graduates from these state universities would also get a steady job in the Thai 
bureaucracy, which is regarded generally as a secure social organisation. See further in Chapter 
II of Prajak Kongkirati‘s Thus, The Movement Emerged (Laelaew Khwam Khleuan-wai Kor 
Prakot) (Prajak, 2013, p. 33). 
91 ―ตอ๊บ ผลเอนทรานส์หละ‖ 
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accepted…accepted…into a private‖.92 The answer is ironic because, for the audiences 
who are familiar with the admission system of Thai universities, one would know that 
many private universities do not require high national exam scores to get in. So, the idea 
of taking the national exam to get into a private university, as Top tells his mother in 
this scene, can be viewed as the filmmaker‘s attempt to create a comical effect to 
highlight Top‘s non-conformist attitude against his parent‘s guidance. However, the 
comical moment between Top and his mother is interrupted by his father. Having been 
listening to Top and his mother, the father breaks in with a cold voice, ―Just go to 
‗Ram‘ [Ramkhamhaeng University]…When you were supposed to study, you did not. 
Why are you worrying about it now?‖93 The criticism from the father really provokes 
Top‘s ego this time. He replies to his father in anger and with an arrogant tone, ―I will 
take care of myself. I have money. You do not need to give me any‖.94 If we take The 
Billionaire simply as a film about a rebellious teen, surely Top‘s argument with his 
father in this scene shows his extreme arrogance. However, as the film critic, Kong, 
recounts Songyos‘s words, The Billionaire ―is a film about determination and what you 
have to sacrifice to get to that point‖ (Kong, 2011). In the scenes that follow, Songyos, 
the director of the film, shows us that Top is so determined to become a businessman 
that he can even choose to forgo pursuing a traditional education in the formal 
education institution of Thai universities. The real actions which Top decides to take 
after having an argument with his father reflect the intention of the filmmaker to show 
Top‘s self-determination, apart from being seen by his parents as a stubborn child.  
The most distinctive part in the film that shows the creative and productive side 
of the protagonist‘s non-conformity is when he decides to give up his study to 
                                                     
92 ―ติดมา๊...ติดเอกชน‖ 
93 ―ไปเรียนรามฯ เถอะ ตอนให้เรียนก็ไม่รู้จกัตั้งใจ จะมาเอาอะไรตอนน้ี‖ 
94 ―เด๋ียวตอ๊บจดัการเอง เงินตอ๊บก็มี ไม่ตอ้งให้ก็ได‖้ 
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concentrate on his business. In real life, Top is known as one of the successful people, 
like Steve Jobs or Bill Gates, who dropped out of school and devoted themselves to 
business. As the real Top told the public, he quit the university because his roasted 
chestnut business was growing fast and expanding into many branches.
95
 In The 
Billionaire, the filmmaker also highlights this bravery in giving up school. However, 
the way the filmmaker does this is to show this rebellious moment as coinciding with a 
critical moment in Top‘s roasted chestnut business.  
In the film, after he opens the first roasted chestnuts branch, Top struggles with 
marketing and maintaining the number of sales. While having an exam, Top receives a 
call from his uncle who is helping look after the roasted chestnut shop. This is the 
moment where Songyos does an excellent job in dramatising Top‘s dilemma between 
school and business. While Top is about to pick up the phone from his bag, the exam‘s 
proctor warns him, ―If you pick up the phone, I will take it that you are trying cheat in 
doing an exam‖.96 The scene is also rendered with an adventurous-like soundtrack, 
indicating that time is running out for Top to make a decision. Before replying to the 
proctor, the director uses a close-up shot, focusing on Top looking at his fellow 
students, who represent the conventional life of Thai teens (see Figure 5.2). Eventually, 
Top does not say anything to the proctor but picks up his bag and runs away from the 
exam room, leaving the proctor and other students in surprise and confusion. The way 
in which the film puts these two moments together reflects the filmmaker‘s attempt to 
justify Top‘s non-conformity through the reason that many people who do business or 
view achievement as defined by wealth would  accept and see as necessary. Top‘s non-
                                                     
95
 See a copy of his interview which has been circulated on the Internet in 
http://topicstock.pantip.com/chalermthai/topicstock/2009/02/A7530263/A7530263.html. 
Retrieved 25 May 2015. 
96 “ถา้คุณรับ ครูจะถือวา่คุณทุจริตในการสอบ” 
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conformity, which is for the sake of his business, is expressed as equally important as, 
or even more important than, having a degree from university. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. A montage from The Billionaire showing Top deciding whether to go back to his 
examination or pick up the phone and fail the exam. 
 
The Billionaire does not just present the Top‘s non-conformist character, which 
the filmmaker believes to be important for the young generation of the market-driven 
economy Thailand. The film also shows that Top has his own way of making money. 
The most obvious part of the film that shows him as self-taught is when Top tries to 
find ways to make his chestnuts taste good. The scene in Chinatown, prior to when he 
opens his first roasted chestnut branch, reflects this characteristic. Top walks around 
Chinatown in Bangkok, and peeks at how each roasted chestnut shop makes chestnuts. 
At one stall, Top even picks up a strange looking bottle of water used to spray chestnuts 
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and has a taste to see if it might be a secret ingredient. Later on, when Top moves to 
produce fried seaweed snacks, this characteristic is also valuable and essential as it 
helps him to create a crisp, tasty seaweed snack that can be sold in 7-Eleven stores. This 
particular portrayal of Top building his knowledge from real experience is in contrast 
with the film‘s projection of his life as a university student, where he and his fellow 
students are portrayed rather as passive learners. We can also interpret these contrasting 
images as coming from the intention of the filmmaker to legitimise the new form of 
youth cultural expression and attitude in the contemporary Thai market-economy 
society, in which progressive ideas, such as being individualistic, non-conformist, and 
creatively producing, are becoming more valued by middle-class society. As I have 
shown in the above section, the real Top himself, in one episode of Woody Kert Ma 
Khui emphasised that the key to financial success is to ask and never run out of hope. 
So far, I have illustrated that when Top‘s journey to become a billionaire is 
made into a film, the filmmaker highlights Top‘s non-conformity, which is the 
characteristic that leads him to become successful in his business. However, what 
Songyos does in the film is not just promote the creative and productive side of youth 
non-conformity, which Thai society sees as essential to young Thais if they are to learn 
in capitalistic modern-day Thai society. As the film develops, the filmmaker 
appropriates this form of non-conformity to support the traditional values of the Thai 
establishment. This makes non-conformity for economic purposes morally justified as 
well as accepted by Thai society as a whole. 
 
To Become Rich for the Family 
In showing Top‘s non-conformity as acceptable to the middle class and the 
establishment, The Billionaire correlates Top‘s aspiration to become rich with family 
values and filial piety, a set of ideologies and cultural norms that are integral to the 
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state‘s maintenance of the country‘s status quo and ruling power of the establishment 
(Thanes, 2008). In the following analysis, I show that the family and the notion of filial 
piety are highlighted and newly constructed in some parts of the film, particularly 
through the characters of Top‘s family members who are portrayed as Sino-Thai, in 
order to justify the notion of creative non-conformity in Thai youth. 
The role of the family, as a discourse used to legitimise Top‘s non-conformist 
attitude, becomes more present about one-third of the way into the film, especially when 
Top becomes aware of his family‘s financial crisis. While Top is busy managing his 
chestnut stall in a supermarket, Top‘s mother reveals to him that that he does not have 
to do it anymore, as their family is leaving the country for China. At that moment, Top 
realises right away that they have financial problem. He yells at his mother, ―Are we 
running away from the debt? And no one wanted to tell me about this!‖97 Top refuses to 
leave with his family, as he believes that his chestnut business is going well and may be 
able to help. In real life, Top‘s family was also experiencing enormous debt after the 
crash of the economic crisis in 1997, like thousands of other Thai households. However, 
in the filmic version, the filmmaker intensifies the family‘s crisis by having them escape 
to China, which shows the intention to use the notion of family as a reason for Top‘s 
ambition to become a billionaire. This is dramatically represented in the farewell scene 
at the airport, where the film completely shifts the dynamic of Top‘s pursuit of wealth. 
Before Top‘s parents enter the customs control gate, Top has a man-to-man 
conversation with his father. And before he leaves, Top‘s father says the most 
impressive and sentimental statement to him, ―Top, I am sorry that...‖98 His father‘s 
unfinished apology leaves Top in awe and with the motivation to now find a way to 
rescue his family (see Figure 5.3). 
                                                     
97 ―น่ีบา้นเรากาํลงัจะหนีหน้ีใช่ไหม...ไม่คิดจะบอกตอ๊บเลยเหรอ‖ 
98 ―ตอ็บ ป๊าขอโทษท่ี…‖ 
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Figure 5.3 A montage showing Top‘s father apologising for not telling him about the debt 
before he and his wife board the plane. This is a moment when Top realises the importance of 
the family and decides to help his parents. 
 
In the film, family and the parents‘ gratitude are the main inspirations that drive 
Top to expand his business and to become rich. In real life, the expansion of Top‘s 
seaweed business by distributing through 7-Eleven came from his own aspiration to 
expand the market as the sale of his seaweed was increasing.
99
 However, in the film, the 
filmmaker intentionally uses the family‘s crisis to justify and give a moral motif to the 
expansion of Top‘s business. The justification is done in a dramatic and persuasive way 
as seen in the following scene. After Top manages to make his seaweed crispy and 
                                                     
99
 See his interview on Woody‘s show in https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UZhUwqGNnvk. 
Retrieved 25 May 2015. 
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successfully launch his snack at his stall in the supermarket, Top receives a call from his 
parents. On the phone, his father tells him, ―Top, listen to me. Focus on your study and 
next semester move here to China. I have found a university for you.‖100 Looking at the 
palm of his hand where he has written ―1 million / year‖, Top does not answer his father 
about the university but, instead asks him about the debt, thinking that he is capable of 
helping his family, ―Dad, can you tell me frankly, how many millions?‖101 After a short 
silence, his father simply replies with a cold word that sends a shiver down Top‘s spine, 
―Forty‖. Top cannot believe what he has just heard. He slowly lowers his phone, 
becoming more lost than in the previous moments of the film. Fortunately, as the film 
shows later on, he gets the idea to sell the crispy seaweed snack in 7-Eleven stores, and 
is given a chance to present his product.  
The most obvious moment, which shows the way in which the film subscribes to 
the discourse of family and uses it to justify Top‘s economic success, is at the end. Near 
the end, the film creates another moment of suspense where the audience is mesmerised 
by whether Top will be able to produce the seaweed snacks and deliver them for 7-
Eleven by the given deadline. In particular, this moment also cinematises the 
submissive position of Top to the giant corporate 7-Eleven who has control over his 
destiny. The character of Khun Pu, the head of the 7-Eleven quality control team, is 
especially portrayed as a faultfinder who likes to pick on her subordinates (see Figure 
5.4). When the truck comes to pick up the products, Top jumps on, wanting to make 
sure the first lot of seaweed snacks gets delivered successfully. At the 7-Eleven 
distribution centre, even though he arrives late, the officer sympathises and allows him 
to unload the snack into the storage area at the centre. After Top successfully delivers 
the products, the film shows him with a nose-bleed because of lack of sleep. Then, Top 
                                                     
100 ―ตอ๊บ ฟังป๊าให้ดี ตั้งใจเรียนแลว้เทอมหนา้ยา้ยมาจีน ป๊าไปดูมหาวิทยาลยัมาให้แลว้‖ 
101 ―ถามตรงๆเถอะป๊า ก่ีลา้น?‖ 
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slowly walks to the open field nearby. At this moment, the filmmaker shows that Top‘s 
tireless effort from the beginning is paid off, and his family is safe. Against the 
background, which is the morning light of dawn, Top makes a phone call to his parents 
(see Figure 5.5). In a tired yet triumphant tone, Top simply tells his father, ―You and 
Mom can come home now‖.102 Top receives an emotional reply from his father, which 
clearly reflects the filmmaker‘s attempt to use the notion of filial piety to appropriate 
Top‘s individualism. Top‘s father asks him, ―Top, are you tired, son?‖103 This scene 
symbolises the dominant value of the family, which is portrayed as being above and 
more valuable than Top‘s own determination to become wealthy, as shown in the early 
part of the film.  
 
Figure 5.4. Khun Pu from 7-Eleven checks Top‘s factory to determine whether it meets the 
necessary standards. 
                                                     
102 ―ป๊ากบัมา๊กลบับา้นไดแ้ลว้นะ‖ 
103 ―ตอ็บ เหน่ือยไหมลูก‖ 
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Figure 5.5. Top calls his parents in China, telling them that they can come home now. 
 
Up to this point, I have shown how The Billionaire represents the societal 
attempt, mainly by the pro-establishment middle class, to reinforce the new concept of 
youth cultural ideology that is compatible with the market-driven Thai society and that 
also supports the traditional values of Thai society, historically constructed by the 
establishment. From the film, youth non-conformity is valued provided it conforms, at 
the same time, to the values of making money and of expressing gratitude to the family. 
It is this message that, I would argue, the filmmaker wants to pass on to the young 
audience, so that they do not become grown-ups who are interested only in making 
money and not cherishing the values of the coalesced society of middle class and 
establishment. In the last section of this chapter, I discuss how this meaning of the film 
can be seen more broadly and more specifically connected to the mentality of many 
Thai middle-class people in the period of politically divided Thailand after 2006.  
 
V.IV  The Billionaire and the Creation of a Moral Image of the Wealthy  
In the previous chapter on The Moon, I illustrated that the film could be viewed 
as a kind of didactic statement, which guides one about how to obtain an opportunity to 
advance one‘s socio-economic status. The Billionaire could be seen as serving a similar 
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function, as a modern audio-visual, with entertainment value, version of ―manual 
knowledge‖, which Craig Reynolds describes as ―knowledge that is self-consciously 
organised for preservation, retrieval, transmission, and consumption‖ (2006, p. 214). 
The Billionaire transmits the idea of how to pursue wealth in the way that is still 
acceptable by the coalition of the middle class and the establishment. However, reading 
the film more specifically in the context of middle-class political anxieties after 2006, 
another political function of the film is visible. In the following interpretation of the 
film, I argue that The Billionaire also reflects the broad collective attempt of the middle-
class entrepreneurs to morally rationalise their economic success, so that Thai society, 
especially the group of people in the establishment, would not perceive them purely as 
profit seekers and as such, a potential threat to Thai society. 
The establishment‘s expulsion of Thaksin Shinawatra in the military coup in 
2006 sent out one critical message to many entrepreneurs and politicians: that the ―my 
way‖104 of Thaksin, which he used to run his family business and administration of the 
country, is not approved by the old group of the country‘s elites. When Thaksin rose to 
power in 2001, he was still admired by many middle-class entrepreneurs as a new 
generation politician who had a strong business mind and could apply it to the 
governance of the country. ―A country is a company‖, he announced in 1997 (Pasuk & 
Baker, 2009, p. iii). However, by his second term, it became clear that Thaksin‘s ―my 
way‖ business and political strategy had turned out to be a great threat to the traditional 
group of elites who held political power and dominated many of the country‘s 
resources. The series of corruption and criminal charges that Thaksin faced after the 
military coup in 2006 were also a warning to people in society not to become like 
Thaksin, or engage in any form of socio-economic mobility like him. 
                                                     
104
 ―My Way‖ was a slogan which Thaksin often used to represent his style of state 
administration. Thaksin received this slogan from the press, when they linked the spelling of 
Thaksin‘s last name, ―Shinawatra‖ with that of Frank ―Sinatra‖, a famous American singer who 
sang the song, ―My Way‖ (1969), which also happens to be Thaksin‘s own favourite song. 
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The Billionaire, a filmic form of manual knowledge of how to become rich by 
ethical means, represents the anxiety of many rich entrepreneurs of being challenged, 
and their struggle to maintain a good image for their wealthy status. Since 2006, there 
has been an increasing trend of rich businesspersons to present themselves more visibly 
in the public, as being good people who appreciate the gratitude given to them by the 
community or the country. As I have shown in Chapter II, Boonchai Bencharongkakul, 
the financial backer of The Unsung Hero (Khun Rorng Palat Chu, dir. Surasawadi 
Chuachat, 2011), and the former CEO of DTAC, is one of many who in the last decade 
has been highly active in showing his care toward society and his appreciation of the 
national institutions and the motherland.
105
 Another example is Banthoon Lamsam, the 
CEO of Kasikorn Bank. Born in the mercantile Sino-Thai family of Lamsam, Banthoon 
became widely known and gained much respect in business and economic development 
circles, particularly after the financial crisis in 1997, when he led his bank to survive the 
Asian economic crisis (Suehiro, 2002, p. 11). During Thaksin‘s early premiership, 
Banthoon was also one of a few people who dared to speak in public to criticise 
Thaksin‘s way of dealing with the economy. At the peak of his career in 2012, 
Banthoon spared some time from his business to help revive the history of the Eastern 
Lanna Kingdom by re-building an iconic heritage mansion, titled Phu Kha Nan Fa, in 
Nan Province. The mansion was opened by Princess Sirindhorn who also has a great 
interest in history. In 2013, Banthoon published a historical romantic novel based on 
Eastern Lanna history, Sineha Montra Haeng Lanna (The Beauty and Charm of 
Lanna),
106
 to accompany his endeavour to promote the Lanna culture. Banthoon‘s great 
achievements in business, politics, and culture conservation, have created many good 
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 See a copy of his interview script titled Riak Phom Wa Philanthropist (Call me 
Philanthropist), which he gave to the press in 2011 after the release of Khun Rorng Palat Chu in 
http://www.kritworld.com/2011/07/27-philanthropist.html Retrieved 10 August 2015. 
106 ―สิเนหามนตาแห่งลานนา‖ 
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impressions among many people, especially the businesspersons who are the customers 
of his Kasikorn Bank in Bangkok. The literary scholar Tasanee Nagavajara praises 
Banthoon‘s novel as providing an excellent prototype of a morally and effectively good 
leader of Thai society (Tasanee, 2014, p. 33). 
 Although the subject and the character of the protagonist represented in The 
Billionaire are different from that of these super rich business tycoons, the film 
represents this collective effort of many Thai businesspersons who have tried to 
maintain their ethical, philanthropist, and social-care image, in order to justify their 
wealthy financial status. To put it another way, The Billionaire is a cultural product that 
has emerged from the middle class‘s socio-political anxiety toward being judged by the 
pro-establishment as corrupt or crony capitalists in their pursuit of economic upward 
mobility. The form of individuality based on the qualities of creative non-conformity 
and filial piety, as seen in the characterisation of Top in The Billionaire, is inherent in 
this middle-class businesspersons‘ struggle to make themselves and their businesses 
appear ethical and supportive of the official cultural values and power of the state.  
 
V.V  Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated one of the key issues that is integral to the coalition 
of the middle class and the establishment in Thailand: the pursuit of economic upward 
mobility that both the middle-class society and the establishment see as appropriate, 
acceptable, and productive for both parties. As represented in The Billionaire, the 
pursuit of economic mobility has to conform to the value of money making, which is an 
essential part of the cultural logics of the market-driven society, and to conform to the 
power of the dominant social group by not leaving them behind. The way in which this 
message is delivered in the film is through highlighting Top‘s gratitude to his family, 
and his attempt to achieve his individualistic dream of succeeding in business for his 
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parents. Apart from the textual construction of the moral way to become rich, this 
particular meaning of the film is also related to the collective struggle of many rich 
businesspersons to create a good image to accompany their highly successful economic 
profiles and statuses. Since Thaksin was toppled in 2006 by a military coup and has 
been subjected to many corruption and criminal charges, the kind of wealth pursuit that 
is personal, or limited to their own group, or that becomes a threat for the establishment, 
like Thaksin‘s ―my way‖ or ―a country is a company‖ style, has been regulated more by 
society. To avoid being seen as such, many wealthy entrepreneurs have tended to 
present the ethical side of their career more publicly, in order to respond to possible 
criticism. The making of the biographical film about a young billionaire, who supports 
family values as much as his desire to become rich, is part of the mechanism that helps 
seal the alliance of the Thai middle class and the establishment tightly.  
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CHAPTER VI 
Young Bao: The Anti-Capitalist  
Who Helps Enhance the Thai Market Economy  
 
 
VI.I  Introduction 
 The analyses of the films in this thesis up to Chapter V on The Billionaire have 
revolved around the idea that Thai middle-class cultural expressions, as reflected in 
biographical films, often seek to directly promote the Thai establishment‘s ideologies 
such as royal-nationalism (Chapter II), Thai-ness (Chapter III), traditional patriarchal 
values (Chapter IV), and family values (Chapter V). The forms of individuality 
reflected in these films‘ protagonists are reproductions of the Thai establishment‘s 
values and ideologies, made in forms that appeal to and are easily comprehensive to the 
popular imagination of contemporary Thai audiences. In this chapter, I explore another 
way in which post-2006 biographical films can be seen as serving a similar agenda, but 
through an indirect means of ideological promotion. In this chapter, I look at how the 
film, Young Bao, represents the strategic way in which the coalition of the middle class 
and the establishment maintains their dominance in society through economic means. 
To be more precise, I aim to detail how commodifying practices, the distinct cultural 
logic of the middle class, play an important role in preserving the political and 
economic status quo and preventing new socio-political groups who represent the power 
of people in provincial areas from rising. 
This chapter studies Young Bao (dir.Yutthakorn Sukmuktapha, 2013), a film that 
depicts the life of Yuenyong Opakul, better known as Aed Carabao, who is the lead 
singer of the famous art-for-life music, or phleng pheua chiwit, band, Carabao. In this 
chapter, I will refer to Yuenyong by his nickname as Aed. In Young Bao, the film 
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follows Aed from when he started to form his band, when he had just finished his 
university studies in the late 1970s, until his band became successful in the commercial 
market in the 1980s. The film was designed as a musical, including many of the songs 
by Aed‘s band. Moreover, the film was released during a critical period of Thai political 
development, in May 2013, only a few months before Thai society once again saw an 
uprising of the urban middle class in Bangkok, in October 2013. This time, the middle-
class uprising was organised under a new name, The People‘s Democratic Reform 
Committee (PDRC), with open support from many pro-establishment politicians, public 
figures, and celebrities. 
The specific issue that I examine in this chapter is the theme of the film that 
expresses a critique of capitalism. Capitalism in Young Bao is visualised through the 
metaphor of the competitive music industry of the country in the 1980s. The film shows 
how Aed, in his early career, has to struggle to maintain the anti-capitalist idealism of 
phleng pheua chiwit (art-for-life music) through the logic and practice of market-driven 
capitalism in the music industry. However, rather than showing how the film criticises 
capitalism, in this chapter I embark on a more critical view to look at how the particular 
form of the critique of capitalism in Young Bao serves other agendas, particularly in 
relation to the commodifying practices of the members of the pro-establishment middle 
class under the specific current conditions of the politically divided Thai society. 
Indeed, to be more precise, I focus on how Young Bao reflects the commodification of 
an ostensibly anti-capitalist ideology that, in fact, supports the economy of the coalition 
of the middle class and the establishment, as well as the rule of establishment elites.  
As the analysis of The Billionaire in the previous Chapter V has reflected, one 
of the ways in which the coalition of the middle class and the establishment is 
strengthened, and has managed to remain in the dominant position of society, is through 
forms of individualistic expression articulated by the middle-class agents, especially 
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rich businesspersons, that also benefits the power or cultural values of the 
establishment. This hegemonic pursuit contributes to a strong coalition of the middle 
class and the establishment, preventing the country‘s economic and political structure, 
in which this coalition dominates, from being challenged by any rivals, who in recent 
decades have largely been the political power of former prime minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra and his Red Shirt supporters. In this chapter, I look into this political aspect 
of the expression of the critique of capitalism in Young Bao, which, paradoxically, plays 
such an ideological role in helping the coalition of the middle class and the 
establishment to maintain its dominant role in the market economy of the country. 
Young Bao ostensibly represents a critique of capitalism through the life of Aed, 
who forms a band to play dontri pheua chiwit (art-for-life music), the musical form that 
Aed believes represents his leftist idealism. Even so, the film shows Aed‘s ideological 
pursuit through the music industry in an odd way. The story of Young Bao begins 
around the mid-1970s in the Philippines where Aed forms his band, Carabao, with other 
Thai expatriate students, to play at a pub. After Aed returns from the Philippines to 
Thailand in the late 1970s, he joins the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in the 
jungle to give support to the young radical leftists, many of whom have escaped from 
the government anti-communist crackdown after 6 October 1976, to fight against the 
Thai state authority. With the CPT, Aed finds inspiration in making music. When he 
resumes his normal life in Bangkok later, he reunites with Khiew, a Thai student who 
formed Carabao with Aed in the Philippines. Together, they relaunch Carabao, and try 
to sell their songs and turn professional.  
However, when Aed and Khiew enter the music industry and their band grows 
larger as new members join, Aed feels misplaced and often feels nostalgic about his 
time in the past when he was with the CPT in the jungle. Aed‘s nostalgic recollections 
of his past often come when he encounters a situation where he feels his music and band 
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are treated by the music industry as commercial objects. For example, when his band 
has to travel on tour with another country music singer from the same music company, 
Sirinthra Niyakorn, and plays backup for her, Aed feels that his band lacks a true 
identity and the true spirit of a dontri pheua chiwit (art-for-life music) group. One day, 
he decides to temporarily disband the group and tells everyone to re-think carefully 
about why they want to be part of Carabao. After all members of the band separate and 
get a chance to reflect on their ideological goal as part of Carabao, they reunite. In their 
reunion, Aed takes them to the Philippines to see the place where he started his musical 
career and the first generation of the Carabao band. This is where the film shows a self-
contradiction in Aed‘s pursuit of the leftist idealism. After Aed and the Carabao 
members come back to Bangkok from the Philipines, the film shows that the band re-
debuts with a new album, which is highly well-received by Carabao fans, and makes 
large profits for the band. The film ends with footage taken from a real concert, with 
Carabao performing a well-known song ―Made in Thailand‖ in front of many thousands 
of fans who attended Carabao‘s pheua chiwit concert. The study of the representation of 
Carabao band in Young Bao in this chapter focuses on this conflicted representation of 
the critique of capitalism through the narration of Aed‘s life journey, which shows that 
he eventually conforms to the logic of the market-economy capitalism of the music 
industry in order to give his dontri pheua chiwit band an identity and become known 
and accepted by the public. 
Mark Fisher in his Capitalist Realism (2009) argues that the system of the 
capitalistic society that we all live in today has advanced to become far more complex 
and pervasively integrated into our lives. This complexity of capitalism has made it 
almost impossible to identify any activity or any place that is free from being driven by 
the logic of capital. As he argues, ―It is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is 
to imagine the end of capitalism‖ (2009, p. 2). Fisher‘s argument here appears to be 
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alluding to the surfeit of end-of-the-world disaster movies produced in recent years, in 
which capitalism nonetheless often manages to survive the end of civilisation as we 
know it. Fisher further argues, ―‗[A]lternative‘ and ‗independent‘ don‘t designate 
something outside mainstream culture; rather, they are styles, in fact the dominant 
styles, within the mainstream‖ (2009, p. 9). The same situation can be seen occurring 
with the visual representations of the similar ideological notion of anti-capitalism, 
which can serve as a commodity. Fisher recounts Žižek‘s words, ―anti-capitalism is 
widely disseminated in capitalism‖ (Fisher, 2009, p. 12). 
Given this survival of capitalism through representations of anti-capitalism, 
Fisher further discusses the ideological role of the representation of the critique of 
capitalism, arguing that it serves to provide misguided comfort for people to be able to 
imagine that the ―end of capitalism‖ is still achievable, while in fact, it only includes us 
as an active part of its system. He states,  
[W]hat we have here is a vision of control and communication much as Jean 
Baudrillard understood it, in which subjugation no longer takes the form of a 
subordination to an extrinsic spectacle. But rather invites us to interact and 
participate…[F]ilm performs our anti-capitalism for us, allowing us to continue 
to consume with impunity (2009, p. 12). 
 
In this chapter, I examine the critique of capitalism in Young Bao by applying Fisher‘s 
view on the complex system of capitalism and a mythic vision of the alternatives which 
are constructed by cinema. I look, particularly, at how the cultural references in the film 
that, for many Thai audiences signify the leftist anti-capitalist ideology serve to 
―perform anti-capitalism‖ and, most importantly, at the same time maintain the 
economy of the coalition of the middle class and the establishment. 
 
Apart from the plot narrative, Young Bao is a film that is loaded with cultural 
references that are related to anti-capitalism in Thai political and cultural history. First 
of all, the film refers to the CPT, which fought against the Thai state from the 
underground and the jungle in the regional areas of the country during the Cold War 
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period. Secondly, the film shows Aed as part of the university student movement known 
today as the ―Octobrists‖ (khon deuan tula) (Kanokrat, 2012), who escaped the military 
power and joined the CPT in the jungle after the massacre of student activists in 
October 1976. Thirdly, the film shows that the name of Aed‘s band, Carabao, came 
from the Tagalog word for ―water buffalo‖, which in the Philippines is regarded as a 
symbol of the downtrodden rural peasant. Lastly is the art-for-life or sinlapa pheua 
chiwit songs of Carabao. Originally, sinlapa pheua chiwit was a cultural ideology and 
movement, influenced by the global socialism and realistic art movement, of many 
young generations in Thailand between the 1950s and the 1970s. The term in Thai itself 
was initially popularised by Chit Phumisak‘s 1957 book Sinlaapa Pheua Chiwit (Art for 
Life), which was reprinted many times, especially in the period leading up to the 14 
October 1973 event (hetkan sipsi tula). On this day, many young people rose up against 
the military dictatorship of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn (in office: 1963−1973). 
Particularly during this period, another pheua chiwit band, Caravan, which also 
consisted of college and university students, was set up and travelled around the country 
to play dontri pheua chiwit music, the songs for people who felt oppressed by 
capitalism and the authoritarianism of the Thai state. Despite having formed after the 
student demonstration of the 1970s, Carabao also carried on this ideological tradition in 
their music, and has, until today, been able to provide spiritual nourishment for many 
pheua chiwit music listeners, who still believe in anti-capitalist idealism (Warat, 2007, 
p. 37).  
 Drawing on the critique of the logic of capitalism argued by Fisher (2009), I 
contend that while Young Bao was made to celebrate and promote the pheua chiwit 
legacy of Aed‘s band through the theme of the critique of capitalism, the film in fact 
represents the way in which the market-driven Thai society, which is dominated by the 
coalition of the establishment and the middle class, has been able to co-opt this critique 
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and turn it into a commodity. The film achieves this through exploiting the cultural 
references of anti-capitalist ideologies in Thai society, as I explain above, and re-
narrating them through the life journey of Aed of Carabao. This commodification of the 
critique of capitalism, as represented in the film, reflects a complex strategy of the way 
in which the coalition of the Thai middle class and the establishment maintain their 
dominance and promote their ruling legitimacy through a cynical process of the 
commodification of culture. 
Moreover, when expanding the analysis of Young Bao to analyse Thai middle-
class culture, especially its conservative aspect, during the period of political division 
after 2006, Young Bao reflects the continuing intensification of the conservative middle 
class‘s politicisation, co-optation, and commodification of the cultural forms which in 
the past couple of decades have formed the core of conservative critiques of the political 
power of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Since the mid-2000s, Thaksin has 
been represented by the coalition of the establishment of the middle class as a potent 
symbol of all corrupt forms of capitalism, or which can be heard expressed in Thai as 
thun-niyom saman (vulgar capitalism).
107
 What the members of the coalition of the 
middle class and the establishment have achieved by undermining Thaksin‘s power is 
not only the construction of a series of discourses that criticise his power, but also the 
commodification of this discourse. While the film may not contain obvious references 
to Thaksin, the fact the film‘s anti-capitalistic narrative employs the rhetoric of the anti-
capitalism of the post-2006 coup period, the year that Thaksin was ousted, makes Young 
Bao an object of commodification for the conservatives; a commodity that economically 
helps strengthen the coalition of the middle class and the establishment.  
                                                     
107
 The English translation of thun-niyom saman as ―vulgar capitalism‖ is from Thai political 
scientist Kasian Tejapira‘s article ―The misbehaving jeks: the evolving regime of Thainess and 
Sino-Thai challenges,‖ published in 2009 (Kasian, 2009).  
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In the first section of the analysis below, I discuss how the cultural forms and 
movements in Thai society that the society sees as representing the critique of 
capitalism have paradoxically thrived by the cultural logics of market-economy 
capitalism. Then, I show how the dontri pheua chiwit (art-for-life music) anti-capitalist 
legacy of Aed and his Carabao band in Young Bao is subjected to this process of 
commodification. In the last section, I expand the analysis of the film by using it as a 
metaphor of the commodification of the critique of Thaksin‘s political power by the 
coalition of the middle class and the establishment, particularly since Thaksin was 
ousted by the military coup in September 2006. 
   
VI.II  The Commodification of Critiques of Capitalism in Thailand  
 Several studies (Kanokrat, 2012; Kasian, 2001; Warat, 2007) have shown that 
the cultural forms and movements in Thai society that many people believe are 
associated with the critique of capitalism have a paradoxical relation with the market 
economy of ideological commodities in the country. In this section, I show that the 
cultural references that are associated with the critique of capitalism that are employed 
in the narrative of Young Bao, namely communism, the Thai Octobrists in the 1970s, 
and pheua chiwit (art-for-life) music, have now been co-opted by Thai free market 
capitalism. 
 In his study on Marxism-communism in Thailand, Commodifying Marxism 
(2001), Kasian Tejapira shows that what helped proliferate the ideology before World 
War II and after was not only the philosophical content of the ideology but the market 
for leftist ideology created by the authoritarian social structure, the intellectuals and 
their neophytes. As Kasian argues in the beginning of his book to show how important 
the logic of capitalism is toward the existence of Marxism-communism in Thailand,  
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The only way to see this impact [of Marxism-communism] is to capture 
Marxism-communism and national culture in their actual moments of 
articulation—that is, when they are mutually interacting, interpreting and 
transforming each other in the specific social, political and economic conditions 
of a country (Kasian, 2001, pp. 1–2). 
 
Furthermore, in his study, Kasian illustrates that one aspect that had contributed to the 
widespread acceptance of Marxism-communism in post-war Thailand was the 
particular social condition under the authoritarian regime during and after World War II. 
Under successive military regimes, many activities, especially those associated with 
communism, were prohibited and heavily regulated. However, many Thai leftists of this 
period believed that the only way to resolve the conflicts that they had with the ruling 
authority and the oppressive social structure was to take up Marxism and communism. 
In particular, Kasian has found in his study that in the post-war years when the 
prohibition of these ideologies was briefly lifted, from 1946 to 1957, the market of print 
materials that are related to these leftist ideologies thrived. As he argues, ―Communism, 
once legalized, entered the post-war Thai cultural market with unprecedented freedom 
in the form of considerable numbers of printed commodities‖ (Kasian, 2001, p. 59).  
 Kasian‘s explanation for the proliferation of Marxism-communism in his 
examination of the history of Thai leftist thought is not just limited to the short period in 
the post-war era. Indeed, he makes a prediction in the concluding page of his book 
about the possibility of the rise of the cultural form of critiques of capitalism, through 
the logic of the free market economy in later periods. As Kasian argues, 
…the more broadly Thai radical discourse spread through market channels and 
made its influence felt in the form of cultural commodities, the more difficult it 
was to control its meanings and usages across different literary genres, political 
contexts, and social groups with their separate, independent structures and 
norms, interests and demands (Kasian, 2001, p. 195). 
 
And, elsewhere in his book, he makes a similar argument that  
...as long as the modern ravages of dictatorship and capitalism are still visited 
upon the Thais, there will be enough new radicals to reassemble them into 
powerful cultural weapons in the fight for their own and humanity‘s survival and 
dignity (Kasian, 2001, p. 202). 
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 What Kasian predicted has come true, especially through the agents of what 
Kanokrat Lertchoosakul (2012) calls ―Octobrists‖ (khon deuan tula). During the 1970s, 
there were two significant political events that occurred in Bangkok in the same month 
of October but different years of 1973 and 1976. The first event was a mass uprising 
staged by university students and young people on 14 October 1973 against the military 
dictatorship government, which was then led by Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn (in 
office: 1963−1973). The outcome of this anti-government demonstration was 
successful, as Thanom resigned, partly from the pressure he received from authorising 
the military to attack the demonstration. The other event was a demonstration staged by 
Thammasat University students on 6 October 1976 against the government led by prime 
minister Seni Pramoj, mainly on the grounds that the government had allowed Thanom, 
the prime minister during the 14 October 1973 event, to return to the country from exile. 
However, the outcome of the student demonstration of the 6 October 1976 event was 
different from the student protest in October 1973, as many of the students in 1976 were 
killed by the military and hyper right-wing people, who believed these students were 
communists. The result of this bloody crackdown was that many students and other 
young people decided to join the CPT in the jungle to fight against the Thai state (Baker 
& Pasuk, 2009, p. 195). The CPT never won and in the early 1980s many young people 
who had joined the CPT decided to turn themselves in to the state authorities, after an 
amnesty was offered by then Prime Minster General Prem Tinsulanonda (in office: 
1980−1988). In her study on the (re)emergence of these Octobrists who mostly are the 
ones involved in the student protest in 1973, Kanokrat (2012) shows that many of these 
Octobrists have been able to exploit their own image of being ex-radicals who fought 
against the military dictatorship and called for democracy in 1973, to now gain 
privileges and socio-economic power. Especially, after 1992, the demand of society for 
a ―true democracy‖, which emerged after the middle-class protest against the military 
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government in May 1992, or Black May (phreutsapha thamin), had given an 
opportunity for these Octobrists to be involved as key persons in the democratisation of 
the 1990s. As Kanokrat puts it,  
In parliamentary politics, the increase in demand for human resources in the 
form of youthful politicians, political brokers, facilitators and mediators between 
urban and rural constituencies amidst the expansion of electoral politics enlarged 
the political space for the Octobrists (Kanokrat, 2012, p. 265). 
 
It was the commodification of the representation of these ex-young activists of the 
1970s that has made them more valuable in the market of Thai national politics. 
The commodification of the critique of capitalism in the expanding market 
economy of Thai society after World War II has also occurred in other forms of cultural 
expression, especially in many forms of entertainment media. Carabao, a pheua chiwit 
band, which is also the main subject in Young Bao being discussed in this chapter, is 
one example. Wara Intasara (2007), who has studied the development of Carabao, 
explains that the members of Carabao, especially Aed, the leader of the band, know 
very well how to market their music for people who want to consume the pheua chiwit 
music, which represents leftist anti-capitalist ideology.
108
 Carabao‘s commodification of 
anti-capitalist ideology can be seen in their famous 1989 album and concert tour, Made 
in Thailand. As I have mentioned in Chapter III, this album of Carabao, in fact, received 
sponsorship from Coca Cola, the international beverage company. Even so, the band 
was able to make both the album and the image of their own band represent ―Thai-
ness‖, especially through the nationalistic title, and their ostensible opposition to 
neoliberal-globalising capitalism. Nidhi Eoseewong explains this achievement of 
Carabao as having been managed through the band‘s uses of catchy words and popular 
                                                     
108 ―เขาเก่งเร่ืองการตลาด รู้วา่จะเอาตรงไหนมาเล่น‖ (Warat, 2007, p. 73). 
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musical tunes that convey messages about anti-capitalist idealism that are easy for the 
wide audience to consume (Nidhi, 1995, p. 75).
109
 
In 2002, Aed of Carabao can be seen as having repeated the same thing, co-
opting and commodifying the cultural reference, which is related to the spirit of anti-
capitalism, to gain profit for the Carabao band‘s business. In that year, Carabao released 
an energy drink, Carabao Daeng (Red Carabao) to the market. The drink, which adopts 
Carabao‘s iconic logo of a water buffalo and name of the band, has been promoted to 
target Carabao fans and labourers who like energy drinks, as a product suitable for those 
who are fighting obstacles in life. As one of the drink‘s slogans goes, ―Carabao Daeng 
honours great fighters‖.110 Today Carabao Daeng has been listed on the stock market in 
Thailand. 
What I have shown in this section is the paradoxical aspect of the cultural forms 
and agents which represent the critique of capitalism in the market-driven Thai society. 
In the examples above, the proliferation of the forms of anti-capitalist ideology can be 
seen as being produced from the cultural logics of the capitalist market economy, even 
though the cultural forms themselves are produced as if to reflect an anti-capitalist 
stance. In the case of the mediatised form of the critique of capitalism, like the music of 
Carabao, the way in which consumers can access the anti-capitalist message of the band 
can be done only through buying and consuming the music as a commodity. This 
paradoxical situation raises another question about whether these forms of the critique 
of capitalism have been neutralised by being produced in the form of an ideological 
commodity. In the next section, I study Young Bao in this theoretical context to explore 
further the real implications of the cultural form of critiques of capitalism, especially 
                                                     
109
 In the iconic song of the album, which is titled with the same name, Made in Thailand, catchy lyrics 
that criticise the power of farang (Westerners) and their capitalist power are highly effective in making 
the listeners feel that they are engaging in the critique of capitalism. 
110 ―เชิดชูนกัสู้ผูย้ิง่ใหญ่‖ See further in the website of the product, 
http://www.carabaogroup.com/about/chairman_message.php. Retrieved 12 August 2015. 
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those which are produced by the members of the Thai middle class, the group who 
control Thailand‘s market economy in alliance with the establishment.  
 
VI.III  Young Bao: The Co-optation of Anti-Capitalist Discourses to Advance the 
 Market Economy 
In Warat‘s study (2007), even though he agrees that capitalism has had 
influences on the transformation of the Carabao band, especially in recent years when 
the band has started to invest in other businesses, he defends Carabao and their music as 
being a ―struggle against the transformation of capitalist society‖.111 He also argues that 
the music of the band can still serve as a cultural vehicle that delivers critical ideologies 
to listeners (Warat, 2007, p. 40). In the analysis of Young Bao in this section, I 
demonstrate that the audio-visual aesthetic and music in the film, which is presented as 
a critique of capitalism, serves less to cater to the audience‘s anti-capitalist ideology, but 
more, as Fisher argues, to ―performing anti-capitalism‖ (2009, p. 12), or to serve as the 
anti-capitalist ideological commodity to be consumed by the audience, who are both 
fans of Carabao, and those who wish to learn more about Carabao‘s idealised past. 
 Similar to The Moon, which was studied in Chapter IV, Young Bao was initially 
made to celebrate the cultural legacy of musical artists, except in this case Aed and his 
Carabao band are still alive and continue to produce music. The project to make Young 
Bao began when the director, Yutthakorn, who had never directed a feature film before, 
decided to try making a feature film for the first time. Yutthakorn explained in an 
interview on a television talk show, Scoop Viewfinder, when he had the idea of making 
his first film, he thought that it must be a film about a subject that he was most 
passionate about. The choice he made was the life of Aed of Carabao.
112
 The director‘s 
                                                     
111
 ―การต่อสู้กบัการเปล่ียนแปลงของสงัคมทุนนิยม‖ (Warat, 2007, p. 40). 
112
 See a copy of the show on YouTube in https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1-mx1L5vJe0. 
Retrieved 12 August 2015 
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passion for Carabao‘s music is evident in the production process. Initially, he cast 
Athiwara or ―Toon‖ Khongmalai, who is Aed‘s own nephew and who is a musical rock 
star from the band Bodyslam, to play Aed in the film. However, Toon had to drop out 
because Grammy, the managing company to which Toon is affiliated, could not agree 
with the filmmaking team.
113
 It was, then, Thana or ―Bom‖ Eiamniyom, who took the 
role instead. Despite these obstacles in the production process, Yutthakorn did not give 
up in making Young Bao represent the leftist ideology and dontri pheua chiwit (art-for-
life music) cultural legacy of Carabao. When he contacted Aed about the film‘s script, 
Aed also agreed to help produce the soundtrack of the film for Yutthakorn. This fidelity 
and respect of the filmmaker to the subjects in the film reflects his attempt to make 
Young Bao live up to the legacy of Carabao, especially the legacy of the band‘s profile 
as a cultural icon of the pheua chiwit critique of capitalism. However, from the close 
examination of the narrative in the film, seen in the journey of the young Aed, and 
provided by the larger context of the commodification of anti-capitalist ideology now 
undertaken by Carabao, the message which the film offers the audience could be seen to 
serve other purposes than a critique of capitalism. 
In the following analysis of the film, I show that the critique of capitalism in 
Young Bao has two extra implications. First, the film‘s critique of capitalism, in fact, 
serves as an enhancement of Carabao‘s commodification of this critique, promoting the 
anti-capitalist and leftist ideological value of the band. The way in which the film does 
this is to create a romantic image of Aed‘s involvement with cultural references 
popularly related to anti-capitalist cultural forms and political expression, especially the 
life in the jungle of the members of the CPT. Second, this critical message in Young 
Bao can be expanded to reflect a more substantial phenomenon of the middle-class 
culture in a time of political division after 2006. To put it briefly here, the film reflects 
                                                     
113
 See http://www.manager.co.th/Entertainment/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9550000146358. 
Retrieved 16 May 2015  
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the attempt of many members of the coalition of the middle class and the establishment, 
which dominates the market economy of the country, to maintain their economic 
contrast by commoditising cultural forms that represent critiques of Thaksin, the person 
who many members of the coalition believe is a central threat to the current status quo. 
This commodification of the critique of Thaksin also nurtures the legitimacy of the 
establishment to remain in its ruling position. 
 
Aed Carabao: the Pheua Chiwit Cultural Icon 
Even though Aed and his band were not formed in the time of the emergence of 
the pheua chiwit cultural movement in the 1960s or 1970s, they have nonetheless 
managed to gain recognition as pheua chiwit cultural icons through their songs and the 
popularisation of the band by the mass media. 
The band‘s first three albums in the early 1980s, Khi Mao (Drunkard, 1981), 
Pae Khai Khuat (The Uncle who Sells Bottles, 1982), and Waniphok (Beggar, 1983), 
were well-known for their lyrics that express sympathy for the life of the poor. During 
this time, Aed and his Carabao members also made a film about their own band, Siang 
Phleng Haeng Seri-Phap (The Songs of Freedom, dir. Khamphi Phaksuwan, 1985). The 
film, which also criticises capitalism, shows that the formation of the band was inspired 
by the struggling lives of the poor (see Figure 6.1). Nevertheless, Aed‘s popularity as a 
new generation pheua chiwit musician did not come about until he released his 1984 
album, Made in Thailand. The album brought fame to Aed not only in the domestic but 
also the international market. After 1984, Aed continued to make pheua chiwit music by 
incorporating other musical styles and other popular social and political issues. For 
example, in the song Jao Tak (―King Taksin‖), which is part of the 1986 album 
Prachathipatai (Democracy), Aed uses official national history as a source, and plays 
the song with a heavy-rock music style. In fact, the whole 1986 album was part of the 
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social movement for democracy during the 1980s. Aed is one of the artists who has 
always been quick to catch the political situation. In 1991, he released a single Thale Jai 
(―The Sea of the Heart‖), which is about an individual‘s struggle to maintain their own 
will against countervailing social influences. The song was meant to give a warning to 
the military group who staged the coup against Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan 
in 1991. Generally, as Warat (2007) finds in his study, it is through these issues about 
social problems and politics in the lyrics of the band‘s songs orchestrated by the popular 
styles of music that have made many people respect Carabao as a symbol of pheua 
chitwit ideology. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Aed (also played by himself) in the 1985 film, Siang Phleng Haeng Seriphap (The 
Songs of Freedom). The scene shows Aed at a construction site, after having an argument with 
an engineer about the wages and the dismissal of some labourers. 
 
Reproducing the Critique of Capitalism in the Film 
 When Yutthakorn retells the life journeys of Aed and his Carabao members in 
the 2013 filmic version, Young Bao, he maintains this image of Carabao as representing 
a spirit of anti-capitalism. To underline the message, Yutthakorn highlights the contrast 
between the jungle, which for many people represents a utopia that is free from 
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materialism, and the music industry in Bangkok as a place full of greedy and profit-
oriented people. 
From the beginning, the film shows the jungle where Aed becomes a member of 
CPT as a place full of hope and ideology. After the scene when he returns from the 
Philippines, the film cuts to the forest where it shows Aed engaging with the CPT‘s 
activities. Dressing up in a green communist jacket, Aed is seen on an old truck, which 
is going deep into the jungle. At one point, the truck stops and the film shows Aed 
delivering supplies to other CPT members who have been waiting for him. The film 
also highlights Aed‘s ideological past in this scene by using Carabao‘s song Tham Ha 
Khwam-Rak (―Asking for Love‖), which is about the struggle of young people to find 
love and peace in society.  
 This first ideological and romantic scene in the jungle serves directly as a 
critical discourse against the capitalist system in the music industry in the next scene. 
After the film shows Aed‘s life as a CPT member in the jungle, it cuts to a moment 
some years later when Aed is in a pub in Bangkok, Dicken‘s Pub.114 In this scene, Aed 
is invited by Khiew, his old friend who he plays music with in the Philippines, to play 
live music at the pub. Aed and Khiew‘s reunion on the stage in Dicken‘s Pub is 
portrayed as an enjoyable time. After they finish playing, the manager of the pub calls 
Aed in and offers him a permanent job. It is in this moment in the manager‘s office that 
Aed‘s conflict with a professional music career is revealed. The manager makes a 
comment that Aed‘s clothes look unfashionable, and tells him that if he wants to take 
the job, he has to change his clothes. Instead of accepting the criticism, Aed gets 
annoyed by it and sarcastically replies to the manager, ―Music is heard by ears‖.115 The 
                                                     
114
 Dicken‘s Pub was one of the popular night clubs in Bangkok during the 1980s. The pub was 
located inside the Ambassador Hotel in Bangkok. In reality, Aed, like other famous musicians 
today, used to perform at this pub before he became a studio musician. 
115 ―ดนตรีเคา้ใชหู้ฟัง‖ 
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manager gets angry and chases him out of this room, saying, ―Then take your ears and 
go wait outside‖.116 Even though this conflict between Aed and the pub‘s manager 
would seem only minor, Aed‘s idealistic answer to the manager reflects his belief in the 
ideological aspect of musical art. The narrative style where the film shows the 
protagonist‘s two different worlds of music of can be seen employed again later on, 
when Aed feels alienated in trying to sell his pheua chiwit music.  
In another scene in the film, where the same narrative technique of juxtaposition 
between Aed‘s two different musical worlds is used, the filmmaker does something 
beyond just romantically representing Aed‘s past in the jungle. I should like to call this 
specific practice a ―hyper-romanticisation‖ of the supposedly anti-capitalist ideological 
space. It begins when Aed and Khiew are securing their first album deal with a music 
company. In this moment, again Aed has to struggle with the capitalism of the music 
industry. While the two are waiting, the film shows that the owner of the company will 
not agree to sign the contract easily, but keeps complaining about the land he wants to 
buy next to his office. Suddenly, Aed interrupts, ―It is only material, brother‖.117 Then, 
the manager turns to Aed and takes out a bunch of cash, puts it in an envelope, throws it 
in front of him, and replies ―I am buying them outright for 6,000 baht!‖.118 (see Figure 
6.2). I would argue that the attempt to obviously portray the music company‘s manager 
as a money-minded businessman in this sequence is to create the image of the music 
industry as dominated by money and profit. The justification of my argument can be 
seen from the moment that follows, when the filmmaker flashes back to the time in the 
jungle when Aed is shown having a tranquil time and idealistically enjoying being a 
CPT member. 
                                                     
116 ―งั้นมึงก็เอาหูมึงออกรอขา้งนอก‖ 
117 ―มนัก็แค่วตัถุเฮีย‖ 
118 ―ตกลงขายขาดหกพนั!‖ 
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Figure 6.2. A shot showing how the music industry is dominated by money. 
 
In the jungle, the film shows an open natural landscape with the CPT camp in 
Phu Phan district in Sakon Nakon Province, where the audience can see Aed playing his 
guitar and composing a song on a big rock in a creek. In this scene, Aed meets with a 
female communist friend, Saeng Dao, whose character is played by the beautiful half-
Thai half-English (luk khreung) actress, Sara Legge. As I mentioned earlier, Young Bao 
was intentionally made to contain many cultural references of the critique of capitalism. 
The presence of the female character Saeng Dao here exemplifies this attempt, which 
goes beyond historical fact. In fact, Saeng Dao is a fictional character added into the 
film. Her name is taken from the title of a poem with a similar name, Saeng Dao Haeng 
Sattha (The Star Light of Faith), which was written by a Marxist activist Chit Phumisak 
in the 1960s when he was jailed on the charge of being a communist. However, in this 
scene in Young Bao, we can see that Chit‘s poem has been transformed, under ―the male 
gaze‖,119 into an actual female character. Moreover, Saeng Dao is presented in this 
scene as the main ideological inspiration for Aed to continue making pheua chiwit 
music. This can be seen reflected in the following dialogue and performances of the two 
                                                     
119
 Male gaze is a critical concept used in feminist film criticism, which has been developed by 
Laura Mulvey, a film and media scholar. The concept explains the presentation, in visual art, 
that is constructed through the masculine point of view (see Mulvey, 2009).  
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characters. From his position sitting on a rock, Aed accidentally drops his pencil into 
the water. Saeng Dao, who happens to pass by, picks it up for him. The film shows the 
two getting closer romantically. Saeng Dao picks up the pencil and tells Aed, 
Saeng Dao: This is our weapon. You must make use of it at most as you can, 
Sahai Chiew [Aed‘s name in the CPT]. Even though we can help 
one person, it is worthwhile. I believe that you can do it. 
Aed: [Gives the pencil to her] You found it. You should keep it.
120
 
 
To create the most romantically idealised moment, the film shows Saeng Dao, from a 
quite sentimental and clichéd camera angle, focusing on her face while she uses the 
pencil to roll her hair, revealing her sexual attraction to Aed and, perhaps, the male 
audience. Then, the film cuts to show a close-up shot on the face of the young Aed as he 
is seen briefly stunned upon seeing Saeng Dao (see Figure 6.3). This whole moment is 
also depicted on the screen in a slow-motion movement, highlighting Aed‘s romantic 
memory in the jungle. The scene ends with a flash-forward to the present time in a 
gloomy music studio, showing Aed struggling in the music industry. This hyper-
romanticisation through the body of the female fictional character also occurs in other 
parts of the film. For example, halfway into the film, when Aed develops an intimate 
feeling with Sinrinthra, a female country singer of the same music company for whom 
Aed has to play as a backup in her concert, Aed recalls the time when he loses Saeng 
Dao in the jungle.  In that recollection, the film shows Saeng Dao dying in Aed‘s arms, 
as she is shot by an authority of the Thai state who is cracking down on the communist 
insurgency. This recollection of the past in the jungle inspires Aed to not develop his 
feeling for Sirinthra further, and not to conform to the profit-driven system in the music 
industry which forces him to use his time playing merely as a backup for other bands. 
                                                     
120 แสงดาว: เน่ียแหละ อาวธุของพวกเรา ใชม้นัให้เป็นประโยชน์นะสหายเช่ียว ต่อให้เราช่วยไดแ้ค่คนเดียว มนัก็คุม้แลว้ เรา 
  เช่ือนะ วา่สหายจะตอ้งทาํได ้
     แอด๊ (สหายเช่ียว):สหายเจอ สหายก็เก็บไวเ้หอะ 
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 Above are some of the scenes in the film that show how the filmmaker attempts 
to underline the critical message about capitalism. The jungle scene is shown several 
more times as the film develops further, especially when Aed feels lost in the music 
industry where he tries to make a living from pheua chiwit music. Other moments in the 
film that suggest a similar critique of capitalism are when Aed and Lek, Aed‘s friend 
from his college days who eventually became the guitarist of his band, recall their past 
as college students getting involved with the iconic historical events of 14 October 1973 
(hetkan sipsi tula), which for many Thais symbolise the uprising of young people 
against the military dictatorship who controlled the capital in the country during that 
time. The highlights and romanticisations of cultural references that represent critiques 
of capitalism in Young Bao exemplify the attempt of the filmmaker, Yutthakorn, to 
promote the anti-capitalist and leftist ideological value of the film, as well as his 
beloved music of the Carabao band.   
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Figure 6.3. Two brief shots from the film showing Saeng Dao using Aed‘s pencil to roll her 
hair while Aed is staring and moved by her presence.  
   
Commodifying Anti-Capitalist Idealism in the Film 
As I quoted Mark Fisher above in the introduction, a film that contains a critique 
of capitalism ―performs our anti-capitalism for us, allowing us to continue to consume 
with impunity‖ (Fisher, 2009, p. 12). Through this argument, we can understand the real 
implication of the textual features of Young Bao, which contain many cultural 
references to critiques of capitalism. While Young Bao delivers a critical statement 
about capitalism through the life of young Aed, the fact that film was made to celebrate 
and target Carabao fans has neutralised the radical message in the film, leaving it only 
as an ideological commodity for the audience who are Carabao fans, or for those 
interested to learn more about Aed‘s life, to consume. In this section, I argue that Young 
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Bao is, indeed, a film that was made to commodify the pheua chiwit ideology, and 
makes it a valuable and worthwhile product to consume. 
The intention to make Young Bao as an anti-capitalism commodity could, in 
fact, be seen quite obviously presented in the film. About half way into the film, the 
Carabao band has grown. The band is shown as now having more members and as also 
going on a concert tour in other provinces. However, one day, Lek, the guitarist of 
Carabao, has to leave the tour for a while, as he is asked by his old band, which he left 
to join Carabao, to help play at a concert. Because Carabao has three guitarists, 
including Aed, Lek agrees and asks another guitarist, Terry, to take the lead position. In 
this scene, the filmmaker emphasises the moment by having Lek and Terry contest their 
guitar skills. Lek asks Terry whether he is sure that he can cover for him. Terry does not 
answer directly but tells Lek, ―If you talk like that, I think you should grab your 
guitar‖.121 Lek grabs his guitar, and they begin to duel their guitar skills. However, later 
on, this musical duel is turned into the whole band playing together in harmony, when 
the rest of the band members see Lek and Terry playing together and having a good 
time, and want to join both of them. Broadly speaking, this scene seems to be made to 
provide for audiences a similar experience of watching Carabao‘s band playing live on 
stage (see Figure 6.4). And obviously, there is no critique of capitalism being presented 
in this scene either. What is displayed here, instead, is the exceptional musical skills of 
Carabao‘s band members, which the filmmaker exhibits through the audio and visual 
languages of cinema. This representation of Carabao‘s band members showing their 
musical skills reflects the aspect of Young Bao of music as a commodity. The film was 
made to feed the demands of the audience who are Carabao fans and who love the 
band‘s music. 
                                                     
121 ―พ่ีพดูแบบน้ี พ่ีหยบิกีตา้ร์มาเลยดีกวา่‖ 
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Figure 6.4. The guitar duel between Lek (top right) and Terry (top left) that turns into the whole 
Carabao band improvising a song. 
 
 
The part where the film reveals its own neutralisation of the ostensible critique 
of capitalism is the scenes near the end of the film. Having to play backup for Sirintra, a 
country music singer of the same studio, makes Aed feel that the band lacks a true 
identity and spirit of being a dontri pheua chiwit (art-for-life music) band. This feeling 
develops primarily because the owner of the studio often asks Terry, Carabao‘s 
guitarist, to play for another band, while Carabao is on tour. During the tour one day, 
Aed suddenly announces the temporary disbanding of Carabao and tells everyone to re-
think their ideological goal in being part of the band. After the film shows everyone 
spending their personal time to think about their ideological stance in being part of 
Carabao, and eventually reuniting, Aed takes his band members to the Philippines to see 
the water buffalo monument, where Aed originally found his inspiration to form 
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Carabao. This scene is also presented as a kind of rite of a passage ritual, where 
everyone is seen symbolically transformed to truly become a member of Carabao. After 
they have returned to Bangkok, the film shows that Aed and his Carabao band have 
become more famous through a new album, Made in Thailand—which was released in 
1984. One scene also shows many people storming a cassette shop, giving the shop 
owner 10 baht bank notes to buy the new album (see Figure 6.5). The ending of the film 
here, with an emphasis on the commercial popularity of the band, is highly contrasted 
with the beginning when the film shows Aed and Khiew struggling and being treated 
unfairly by the manager of the café and the first music studio where they auditioned 
their album. I would argue that reading the film from the moment when Aed dissolves 
the band to the conclusion, where it shows the band has become highly successful, 
clearly reveals that the critique of capitalism in Young Bao has only been utilised by the 
filmmaker to celebrate the band‘s commercial success rather than its ideological legacy. 
 The analysis in this section has shown the paradoxical aspect of the critique of 
capitalism in Young Bao. While the film itself seems to try to deliver a message of a 
critique of capitalism, which is enacted through various cultural references of anti-
capitalism in Thai history, the film, in actual fact, is a commodity being sold and 
consumed by a specific group of consumers within the market of commodified cultural 
ideologies of modern capitalistic Thai society. What this really suggests is that the 
market economy of Thai society, which is controlled by the middle class in coalition 
with the establishment, is capable of constructing cultural forms that seem to be the 
antithesis of itself, while making the circulation of these faux-critiques benefit its own 
market system and the people who dominate the market. In the next section, I take this 
paradoxical aspect in Young Bao to read the political situation in Thai society after 
2006. In particular, I use the film as a conceptual lens to look for a more critical 
understanding of the polarised perception of many of the Thai urban middle class, who 
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believe that Thaksin is the most potent agent of the ―corrupt form‖ of capitalism in 
modern Thai history. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. A film montage from the film showing Carabao‘s success at the end of the film. 
 
VI.IV  Young Bao and the Commodification of the Critique of Thaksin’s “Vulgar 
 Capitalism” 
 In 2004, a book titled Plaeng Thaksin Pen Thun (Capitalising on Thaksin) was 
published (see Figure 6.6). The book was written by Thaksin‘s long-time opponent, 
Jermsak Pinthong (2004a), who has been criticising Thaksin since the first day he rose 
to power in 2001. The main idea of the book is that since Thaksin rose to power (for 
three years when the book was published in 2004), many groups of people found that 
allying with Thaksin and exploiting Thaksin‘s political power was both politically and 
financially beneficial. As Jermsak comments in the book,  
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In the paternalistic social structure in Thailand, one who rises high will feel even 
colder. Though one is surrounded by many people but will feel lonely. In this 
situation, not only one will not receive true information, but also will always be 
exploited by others who want to promote their self-interest.
122
  
 
To put it more precisely, Jermsak‘s book is a critique not just of Thaksin alone, but the 
entire network of Thaksin‘s so-called ―vulgar capitalism‖ or thun-niyom saman,123 the 
kind of monopolistic capitalism and politics which Thaksin was believed— by many 
people of the coalition of the Thai middle class and the establishment, including 
Jermsak—to have adopted, and which undermined the interest of the members of this 
coalition. 
 
Figure 6.6. The front cover and inside back cover of Jermsak Pinthong‘s 2004 Plaeng Thaksin 
Pen Thun (Capitalising on Thaksin).  
 
                                                     
122 ―ในระบบอุปถมัภ ์คนยิง่สูงยิง่หนาวยิ่งถูกห้อมลอ้มยิง่อา้งวา้ง นอกจากจะไม่ไดข้อ้มูลท่ีเป็นจริงแลว้ ยงัถูกใชเ้ป็นเคร่ืองมือหา
ผลประโยชน์ตลอดเวลา‖ (Jermsak, 2004, p. 3). 
123
 The expression of thun-niyom saman has been used to specifically criticise Thaksin‘s 
political regime, which has been accused of seeking benefit from monopolising the state assets 
of telecommunication. The term has been popularised by anti-Thaksin public intellectuals. 
Apart from the term, thun-niyom saman, others expressions have also been used, such as 
khorrapchan cherng nayobai (corruption through policy) or thun-niyom pheua phuak phorng 
(crony capitalism) (Thak, 2007b, p. 84). However, these expressions have not been as popular 
as thun-niyom saman in critique of Thaksin. Nidhi Eoseewong has commented on the 
popularisation of the term, thun-niyom saman, and how it has been represented to mean only 
Thaksin‘s political power, but not other corrupt forms of monopoly capitalism in the country. 
See http://www.matichon.co.th/ news_detail.php?newsid=1346044936. Retrieved 9 August 
2015. 
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 When I read this book today in 2015, at a time when the anti-Thaksin spirit has 
grown widely and strongly among many middle-class people, despite Thaksin having 
been in exile abroad since 2006 after the military coup, I find the title of this book to be 
most ironic among other materials which were produced to criticise Thaksin in the past 
decade. The irony is that while the book, which is a critique of Thaksin‘s political 
power in 2004, is titled Capitalising on Thaksin and talks about Thaksin as a form of 
capital, the book has also become a commodity for readers who dislike Thaksin and 
who like to consume materials which include critiques of Thaksin. In this section, I 
argue that when expanding the analysis of Young Bao to reflect the political context of 
Thai society after 2006, the film represents the process by which the coalition of the 
middle class and the establishment commodifies the forms of the critique of Thaksin‘s 
so-called thun-niyom saman (vulgar capitalism), as well as other cultural references that 
have been placed in opposition with Thaksin. This commodification of the cultural 
forms that criticise Thaksin not only strengthens the stigmatisation of Thaksin as a so-
called ―enemy of the state‖ and, thus, prevents him and his network from undermining 
the status quo, but also enhance the market economy, which is dominated by the 
coalition, and contributes to a more firmly established cooperation between the middle 
class and the establishment. 
 Since Thaksin rose to power, he and his political network have been represented 
by the coalition of the middle class and the establishment to be the sole representatives 
of ―vulgar capitalism‖. The view that Thaksin represented the vulgar side of capitalism 
is derived from two main sources. The first one is the way Thaksin ran the government 
and developed the country‘s economy. Especially, Thaksin‘s so-called ―Thaksinomic‖ 
economic policies, which were aimed to boost domestic consumption and raise funds by 
allowing people to have more credit and by privatising state assets, had continuously 
made many members of the coalition of the middle class and the establishment lose 
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their existing access to privilege and socio-economic interests, and, hence, to turn 
against him (Pasuk & Baker, 2009, pp. 104, 118). Another example of Thaksin 
becoming represented as a spearhead of ―vulgar capitalism‖ is the construction of the 
idea that Thaksin‘s political and economic power is in opposition to King Bhumibol, 
who has been symbolically represented by royalist intellectuals as an alternative to 
neoliberal-globalising capitalism since the financial crisis in 1997 (Jackson, 2010, p. 
51). As I have discussed in Chapter II, since the 1997 crisis, while the King and his 
alternative economic philosophy, called the Sufficiency Economy (setthakit phor 
phiang), have been received more by many people, the stigmatisation of many 
politicians, especially Thaksin‘s political group, as supposed trouble makers of the state 
has become even stronger and more apparent. By the second term of Thaksin‘s 
premiership (in office: 2005–2006), his name has come to be represented by people of 
the pro-establishment middle-class, in every possible way, as being at the opposite pole 
to the head of state, the King. For many middle-class people, Thaksin has now become 
a symbol of the corrupt form of capitalism and the enemy of the country. 
The extreme polarisation between Thaksin and the Thai state can be seen clearly 
articulated in the speeches of Sondhi Limthongkul, the leader of the mass demonstration 
of the urban middle class, The People‘s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), which rose up 
against Thaksin in 2006. As Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker comment on Sondhi‘s 
speeches that were often made for the protestors, ―[B]y criticizing Thaksin as corrupt, 
and presenting the King as a moral contrast, Sondhi yoked the two themes together‖ 
(2009, p. 256). After the PAD protest in 2006, this polarisation did not resolve, but 
rather intensified, especially through the uprising of Thaksin‘s political supporters, the 
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Red Shirts, who are often believed by the pro-establishment middle class to be 
―exploited‖ by Thaksin.124 
 What Young Bao represents in this specific political context after 2006 is the 
continuing intensification in a popular entertainment cultural form of the collective 
attempt of many middle-class people in alliance with the establishment to maintain the 
image of Thaksin and his political and economic power as being corrupt through 
commodifying every form of the criticism of Thaksin. From the same example above of 
Jermsak‘s book, Plian Thaksin Pen Thun (Capitalising on Thaksin, 2004a), it is clear 
that this book was written as an anti-Thaksin ideological commodity to meet the then 
growing demand of the Thai readers who wanted to consume material that critiqued 
Thaksin. The inside back cover of Jermsak‘s book also advertised his next book, Ru 
Than Thaksin (Keeping Ahead of Thaksin, 2004b), and invited readers to buy the next 
volume with the following statements, ―Do not be late. Otherwise you will miss keeping 
up [with Thaksin]‖, and ―Keeping ahead [of Thaksin] today on the shelves of every 
bookstore‖ (see also Figure 6.6). The critique of capitalism (whose meaning has largely 
been politicised to associate with Thaksin since 2006) in Young Bao can serve to 
―upvalue‖ or strengthen the anti-Thaksin ideology, although the film‘s content does not 
have an obvious link to Thaksin‘s capitalistic regime. Yet, it is the symbolic verbal, 
cinematic narratives and plot structure in the film, in which many of them can be seen 
recycling the language discourse of anti-Thaksin ideology, that make Young Bao a 
politically conservative piece of entertainment art. As I have shown in the analysis 
above, Young Bao clearly highlights the music industry as a corrupt space that strips 
                                                     
124
 The belief that the Red Shirts have been manoeuvred by Thaksin can be seen to be widely 
held by conservative middle-class people. For example, in another protest of the urban middle 
class against Thaksin‘s so-called ―proxy government‖, that of his sister Yingluck Shinawatra (in 
office: 2011-2014), under the lead of the People‘s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), 
from October 2013 to May 2014, Chitpas Kridakorn, one of the leaders of the PDRC, told her 
supporters that the villagers (the Red Shirts) had to be taught the right kind of democracy, or in 
other words, not to be tricked by Thaksin, who is the enemy of the PDRC. See 
http://news.voicetv.co.th/thailand/91266.html. Retrieved 2 August 2015. 
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away the anti-capitalist idealism of dontri pheua chiwit (art-for-life music). The 
character of Aed is projected in the film as a hero who shows that he can ―keep ahead 
of‖ (ru than) the capitalist regime of the music industry, and who struggles and tries to 
resist it, similar to Jermsak, who presents himself in his two books as a public 
intellectual who knows Thaksin‘s supposedly ―vulgar capitalistic plan‖. In this case, to 
reflect Fisher‘s idea, the character of Aed in Young Bao then becomes a filmic device 
that performs anti-capitalism for the audience, and also effectively performs a form of 
anti-Thaksin for audiences who have been subjected to the contemporary discourse of 
―vulgar capitalism‖, defined as being represented by Thaksin. 
The commodification of the critique of Thaksin and his ―vulgar capitalism‖ can 
be seen occurring in other cultural forms. In the protest of the People‘s Democratic 
Reform Committee (PDRC) in 2013, in which many members of the urban middle class 
rose against then Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin‘s sister and who was 
labelled as his proxy, the pattern of the Thai national flag was used to create various 
gadgets and accessories. These Thailand-pattern gadgets were used by the protestors to 
show their disagreement with Thaksin and Yingluck‘s political regime (see Figure 6.7). 
At the same time, these gadgets also helped many producers who participated in the 
rally to gain more financial profit. As the Positioning Magazine website reports, one of 
the producers who made Thailand-pattern t-shirts to sell to the protestors could make 
around 40,000 to 50,000 baht a day.
125
 From the political event of the PDRC protest, the 
national flag has also been co-opted and commoditised by pro-establishment middle-
class people in order to undermine Thaksin and Yingluck‘s political regime, as well as 
maintain the economy and the firm cooperation of the middle class and the 
establishment. The producers who politicised and commodified the Thai national flag as 
a symbol that criticises Thaksin gaining profits while the official ideology of the 
                                                     
125
 http://www.positioningmag.com/contentเศรษฐกิจขา้งมอ็บเฟ่ืองฟ-ูอูฟู้่ กนัถว้นหนา้. Retrieved 7 May 2015. 
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establishment was empowered. The commodification of the critique of capitalism by the 
middle-class agents in Young Bao reflects this situation that occurred with Thaksin, who 
has been represented as the main agent of ―vulgar capitalism‖ and being an ―enemy‖ of 
the state. 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Gadgets with the national colour flag pattern sold at the PDRC protest sites in 2013 
and 2014.
126
 
 
 
VI.V  Conclusion 
 This chapter has revealed another way in which the forms of individuality in 
post-2006 biographical films reflect the middle-class cultural practice that maintains the 
coalition of the middle class and the establishment. Unlike in the previous chapters, 
which have shown a direct promotion of the establishment‘s ideologies and values, this 
chapter has shown that the maintenance of the coalition can be achieved in an indirect 
way through a discourse that at face value might be considered to undermine the 
political legitimacy of the establishment. In Young Bao, while the surface level of the 
film celebrates the life of the country music cultural icon, Aed of Carabao, who among 
his musical fans represents an anti-capitalist idealist, the film commodifies this message 
of the critique of capitalism and enhances the economy of the entertainment industry, 
                                                     
126
 Photos taken from the news report of the protest in Positioning website. See 
http://www.positioningmag.com/contentเศรษฐกิจขา้งมอ็บเฟ่ืองฟ-ูอูฟู้่ กนัถว้นหนา้. Retrieved 7 May 2015. 
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which is dominated by the pro-establishment middle class. In light of Fisher‘s argument 
(2009), Young Bao serves as a cinematic commodity for people who believe in the anti-
capitalist idealism of donti pheua chiwit (art-for-life music) to consume and let the film 
perform anti-capitalism for them.  
 This particular characteristic of Young Bao also reflects a critical aspect of the 
middle class‘s coalition with the establishment in the political context of Thai society 
after 2006, when Thaksin was made by the pro-establishment members of the middle 
class into the sole representative of the corrupt aspect of capitalism, or as they have 
called it in Thai, thun-niyom saman. While the power of Thaksin has been subjected to 
an on-going demonisation by the coalition of the middle class and the establishment, 
even after he was ousted from his premiership by the military coup in 2006, the 
production of cultural forms that criticise Thaksin has also benefited the coalition. 
Similar to Young Bao, the materials that represent the critique of Thaksin have become 
valuable objects for the members of the coalition to consume and use to perform anti-
Thaksin ideology. This condition where the forms of the criticism of Thaksin have been 
commodified benefits the middle class and the establishment in that it not only helps the 
establishment to remain politically legitimate, but also generates profits for the middle-
class agents who are the ones who (re)produce these forms of the critique of the 
establishment‘s enemy. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Conclusion: The Good Individuals of the Thai State 
 
 
VII.I  Introduction 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Siamese elites were facing pressure 
from the colonial powers. According to historian Saipin Kaew-Ngarmprasert (1994), to 
maintain their power and political legitimacy, the Siamese ruling elites of this period 
invented the concept of the ―good citizen‖ (phonlameuang thi di), implemented as a 
cultural policy, and urged the people to follow this political norm. The promotion of this 
idea of the ―good citizen‖ was part of the attempt of the elites to reinforce the image of 
Siam as a civilised nation (Saipin, 1994, p. 255). Some of the characteristics of a good 
citizen were, for example, being loyal to the monarchy, knowing the geographical areas 
of Siam (Saipin, 1994, pp. 255–256), and ―donating some extra money‖ to the state 
(Saipin, 1994, p. 259).
127
  
In the 21st century, when the power of the establishment has been challenged by 
new socio-political forces, the ―good individual‖ (khon di), a concept similar to that of 
the good citizen, has also emerged to protect and secure the power and legitimacy of the 
establishment of the state. Particularly in the political uprising of the urban middle class 
from October 2013 to May 2014, under the movement titled The People's Democratic 
Reform Committee (PDRC), the ideological concept of the ―good individual‖ was 
recycled and promoted by the protestors, and the protestors even defined themselves as 
being such individuals. Suthep Thaugsuban, the main leader, made an announcement on 
the protest stage one night, encouraging the fellow protestors not to afraid because they 
were ―good people‖ and were fighting for the right thing, which was to elimitate the 
                                                     
127 ―เสียสละกาํลงัทรัพย‖์ (Saipin, 1994, p. 259). 
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Thaksin and Yingluck regime, which has been perceived by the conservatives and the 
establishment elites as a great threat to the state and throne.
128
 It is the pro-establishment 
middle class who have been the main agents advancing and exploiting the power of this 
concept of ―good individual-citizen‖, as historically (re)constructed by the state 
authorities, to more firmly secure their coalition with the establishment, and thus access 
to socio-economic privilege and interest. 
This thesis has sought to expand knowledge on Thai middle-class culture and 
popular cinema, which is one of the most significant forms of the entertainment mass 
media of Thai middle-class culture. The thesis has specifically focused on the aspect of 
individuality that is reflected in post-2006 biographical films. As I have elaborated in 
Chapter I, individuality is an integral and fundamental aspect of the middle-class 
mentality, and studying it can help one critically understand this class‘s culture. 
Biographical films released after 2006 constitute a significant body of filmic texts that 
not only shows the characteristics of the Thai middle class, but also how the culture of 
this class has been transformed by the political crises and conflicts within society. As 
shown throughout this thesis, 2006 marks the onset of a period of intense anxiety 
among many members of the coalition of the middle class and establishment, which has 
also become more clearly expressed in public through forms, such as public 
movements, statements, or representations. One of the most influential factors that has 
heightened this anxiety is the enfranchisement of the Red Shirts, the political supporters 
of the former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, after Thaksin was toppled by the 
military coup in September 2006. I approach the intersection of these issues in 
biographical films from a historical perspective, by looking at how the Thai middle 
class developed and how the ideologies of this class, which is the result of class 
development, are reflected in the films. 
                                                     
128
 See the news report of Suthep‘s speech in 
https://www.prachatai.com/journal/2014/01/51365#main-content. Retrieved 13 April 2016. 
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What is revealed about the culture of the Thai middle class, and the forms of 
their individuality illustrated in the biographical films selected for study in this thesis, is 
as follows. Similar to the traditional ideological concept of a good citizen imposed by 
the Siamese elites of the absolute monarchy period, the forms of bourgeois individuality 
of the Thai middle class, as reflected in the films, have played a critical role in directly 
and indirectly promoting the power of the establishment. Moreover, these forms of 
individuality also reflect the attempt of many members of the middle class to strengthen 
their coalition with the establishment in order to prevent being undermined by the new 
political power of Thaksin and his political supporters from provincial areas, 
represented by the Red Shirt protestors, who have become increasingly politically active 
and achieved electoral success after their political leader, Thaksin, was toppled by the 
coalition of the middle class and the establishment in the 2006 coup. In the following 
sections, I describe in more detail the important points about the middle class‘s 
promotion of the ruling power and legitimacy of the establishment, which can be seen 
as having been achieved through representations in post-2006 biographical films.  
 
VII.II  Cinema as a Medium that Reinforces the Coalition of the Middle Class and 
the Establishment 
In this thesis, I have referred to a situation in which the two social groups, the 
middle class and the establishment, have worked together to gain reciprocal power, 
privilege and socio-economic interests, and to advance their respective social groups. 
This kind of class development has occurred since the rise of Bangkok in the early 19th 
century. As I discuss in Chapter I, it was the Chinese immigrants, who were mostly 
merchants and who were not confined by the sakdina (feudal) social structure, who 
allied themselves with the Siamese state and helped the state gain benefit through their 
businesses. As Thai society has developed, this group of Chinese immigrants has 
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grown, under the patronage of the establishment, into a larger social group, which has 
also taken control of the market and the capitalist economy of the country, yet is still 
dependent on the political power of the state. In 21st century Thailand, the same 
situation, whereby the middle class helps the establishment of the state, and vice versa, 
still pertains. To gain privilege and commercial opportunity, many members of the 
middle class become subservient to the power of the establishment and often help to 
directly and indirectly promote the ideologies or social norms and values of the 
establishment. 
I restate here the nature of the coalition of the middle class and the establishment 
in this concluding chapter because the coalition is a phenomenon that most significantly 
determines the ideological stance of many forms of Thai middle-class culture, including 
mainstream popular cinema, which by and large has become a cultural product made 
―for entertainment purposes‖ that nonetheless supports the establishment‘s values. The 
adoption of this particular framework in explaining biographical films places this study 
in a different scholarly lineage from other studies about Thai middle-class culture and 
ideology in cinema, which have a tendency to view or generalise the middle-class 
culture and ideologies represented in Thai cinema as self-contained, or independent 
from other social classes (for example Kamjohn, 2009, 2013; Lee 2010; Natawan, 
2015), especially the establishment elites. The arguments about the cinematic 
representation of this class‘s culture and ideology discussed in this thesis through 
biographical films are more in line with the study of May Adadol Ingawanij (2006), 
who has examined the specific film genre of heritage cinema. In her study, May Adadol 
views the ―bourgeois sensibility‖, as she calls it, of the Thai middle class, as being 
―subjected to the state‘s institutionalisation of official nationalism, propagated through a 
combination of ideological inculcation and censorship‖ (May Adadol, 2006, p. 18). As I 
have similarly shown through the analysis of the biographical film genre, the middle-
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class ideology and values, as represented in the films, do not challenge or undermine the 
state or the establishment. On the contrary, the films construct what I have been calling 
in this thesis a ―hybrid bourgeoisie-feudal‖ set of ideas or values that help promote the 
establishment‘s power and legitimacy, although the films may appear, at their surface 
level, to be popular or everyday life subjects of people in general. As these biographical 
films show, popular cinema can be viewed as a disguise, made to be conceivable and 
enjoyable, of the state‘s conservative ideologies and cultural values. 
 
VII.III Hybrid Bourgeois-Feudal Individuality as a Thread that Binds the Middle 
 Class and the Establishment 
Individuality has been central and essential to the promotion of the legitimacy 
and the power of the establishment, and as a consequence the strong coalition of the 
middle class and the establishment. As the analyses of the biographical films in this 
thesis show, the way in which this ideological aspect works to promote the bourgeois-
feudal coalition can be viewed in two overlapping ways. The first is through the forms 
of individuality expressed by the middle class that promote the establishment and 
reinforce their coalition through the direct promotion of the establishment‘s constructed 
ideologies and values. The other way is an indirect promotion by means of, for example, 
enhancing the socio-economic structure of their coalition, or preventing that socio-
economic structure from being undermined or taken over new political forces.  
 By direct promotion, I do not mean that the films promote the official ideologies 
constructed by the establishment in an open or one-dimensional way like other pieces of 
propaganda made by the state authorities. The main purpose of these biographical films, 
like other film genres in mainstream cinema are still to show the lives of people whom 
the filmmakers see as important or who would attract the interests of mass audiences, 
and to make the lives of these actual persons entertaining. However, as I have discussed 
throughout this thesis, in showing the lives of these persons certain forms of state or 
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establishment ideologies and values have also been incorporated into the filmic 
adaptations, making the lives of these figures not only enjoyable, but also normatively 
meaningful.  
 This particular kind of direct promotion of the establishment‘s ideologies can be 
seen in several chapters in this thesis. For example, in Chapter II on The Unsung Hero 
(Khun Rorng Palat Chu, dir. Surasawadi Chuachat, 2011), a film about Chu, a historical 
hero from medieval Ayutthaya, I show that royal nationalism, the most important 
ideology of the establishment and conservative Thai state, is promoted by the filmmaker 
through the life journey of an individual figure, whose character embodies the 
ostensibly universal moralistic notions of jit asa (self-sacrifice) for one‘s own phaen-
din (land). While Chu, the protagonist, is shown performing ethical deeds, helping to 
protect his homeland, the reasons he uses to rationalise his actions give legitimacy to a 
king, the most cherished figure of the coalition of the middle class and the establishment 
elites, as a righteous ruler. A similar example of the promotion of the establishment‘s 
ideologies can be seen in Chapter III, in which I study Yamada: The Samurai of 
Ayothaya (Samurai Ayothaya, dir. Nopporn Watin, 2010). This chapter explores how 
while the film shows the life journey of a man from a foreign land, Yamada Nagamasa, 
a Japanese samurai who learns to appreciate the state‘s official ideas that constitute 
Thai-ness, the film promotes Thai-ness as an exceptional form of identity that those 
from any ethnic backgrounds can now assume or perform. This particular way of 
promoting Thai national identity makes Thai-ness to be seen as valuable among many 
conservative Thai people, in the time of the neoliberal globalising Thailand.   
 The direct promotion of the legitimacy of the establishment can also be achieved 
by supporting the existing social structures and norms that work to uphold the 
legitimacy of the ruling power of a certain group, and also the particular form of gender 
ideological values of the establishment. This is evident from the analysis of the film in 
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Chapter IV, where I examine The Moon (Pumpuang, dir. Bandit Thongdee, 2011), a 
film that depicts the life of a famous country music singer, Pumpuang Duangjan. In the 
film, the female protagonist‘s success in the music industry is portrayed as owing to her 
obedience to the traditional patriarchal values of Thai society, which in the film are the 
concepts of phor (father) and khru (teacher). Portraying Pumpuang‘s life in this way 
confirms the value and correctness of the dominant position of Thai men in patriarchal 
culture. 
 Apart from these direct ways, the biographical films in this thesis also show that 
the promotion of the establishment can be achieved through indirect means. These 
means mostly involve the process of maintaining the prosperity of the socio-economic 
interests of the coalition of the middle class and the establishment, and the prevention of 
those interests from being challenged by other forces. This is evident, for example, in 
Chapter V, where I discuss The Billionaire (Top Sekhret Wai Run Phan Lan, dir. 
Songyos Sugmakanan, 2011), a film that shows the journey to becoming a billionaire of 
Aithipat, or ―Top‖ Kulapongvanich. As the form of individuality reflected in the film 
shows, the power of the establishment is maintained through the coalition of the middle 
class and the establishment managing to tame new forms of youth culture—that have 
emerged from the rapid expansion of the market economy of the country—to still 
conform with and contribute to the main social institutions of the state. In the film, the 
protagonist not only becomes wealthy through businesses but he also uses the capital 
gained from his businesses to help his family out of financial crisis.  
 The maintenance of the coalition of the middle class and the establishment by 
the middle class culture, as reflected in the films, can be seen mostly evident in Chapter 
VI, where I discuss Young Bao (dir. Yutthakorn Sukmuktapha, 2013), a film about the 
life of Aed, the lead singer of a famous dontri pheua chiwit (art-for-life music) band. As 
I have shown through my analysis, this film reflects the process in which pro-
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establishment middle-class agents are able to reinforce the stigmatisation of a form of 
capitalism that is seen to pose a threat to the power of the establishment, particularly 
that which is represented by former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra‘s politico-
economic regime. This is achieved through the Thai middle class‘s economic logic, that 
is, to commodify the critique of this form of capitalism, which the establishment rejects. 
This is symbolically represented through the character of Aed of Carabao, who achieves 
his anti-capitalist idealism through commodifying his own music, which criticises 
capitalism. In this way, not only is the market economy of the coalition economically 
maintained, but also other forms of economic regime that could emerge to undermine 
that of the coalition are also suppressed. 
 These two ways of promoting the establishment‘s power, directly and indirectly, 
as reflected in Thai biographical films of the Thai middle-class mainstream film culture, 
not only help the status quo of Thai society to be maintained, but also help the society 
of the Thai middle class to prosper from their alliance with the establishment. In other 
words, it is these forms of hybrid feudal-bourgeois individuality performed and 
expressed by the ―good individuals‖ (khon di) of the Thai middle class which have 
served to maintain the power of the establishment and strengthen the coalition of the 
establishment and the middle class, as well as their mutual interests. 
 
VII.IV Hybrid Bourgeois-Feudal Individuality in Film and Thai Middle-Class 
Culture in the Political Context After 2006 
 This thesis attempts to locate the Thai middle class‘s promotion of the 
establishment‘s power within one of the most crucial transformational periods of Thai 
society, which is the period of on-going political conflicts and crises since 2006. From 
2006 on, many members of the middle class, especially those who reside in Bangkok, 
have developed great concern about the stability of their coalition with the 
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establishment. This concern derives primarily from the enfranchisement of the new 
political power represented in the public sphere by the Red Shirt movement, which 
many urban middle-class people view as creating a threat to their socio-economic 
interests and the existing social structure and order of the state. As I suggest in the 
section above, the mutual exchange of socio-economic interests and privileges between 
the middle class and the establishment has been the key element that has firmly 
established their coalition. The cultural forms of bourgeois individuality expressed by 
―the good individuals‖ of the middle class have been one of the most important aspects 
that reinforce this alliance. As the examination of films in this thesis show, amidst these 
on-going political crises, the forms of hybrid feudal-bourgeois individuality of Thai 
middle-class culture, as reflected in the films, can be seen as integral to the practices of 
many middle-class people who aim to protect the national institutions and the power of 
the establishment‘s elites. 
 For example, in Chapter II on The Unsung Hero, I show that the promotion of 
royal nationalism through the seemingly ethical concept of jit asa (self-sacrifice) and 
discourse of phaen-din (land) resembles the ideological attempt of many members of 
the urban middle class in Bangkok to defend the socio-political structure and their 
physical space in Bangkok from the political uprisings of the Red Shirts in 2009 and 
2010. The protagonist in this film symbolises the pro-establishment people who sought 
to protect their kingdom, while the Burmese symbolise the supposedly barbaric Red 
Shirts who come from regional provinces. A similar kind of political agenda can be seen 
represented in Yamada in Chapter III and The Moon in Chapter IV. The ostensible 
projection of Thai-ness as an exceptional form of identity that other cultural-ethnic 
individuals can learn to appreciate is an allegory of an indirect attempt to suppress those 
who do not conform to the official ideas of Thai-ness. The Japanese protagonist of this 
film, who eventually becomes ―Thai‖ and pledges to destroy anyone who seeks to 
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undermine Ayutthaya, is a metaphor for this political pursuit of suppressing non-
conformity to Thai-ness. From The Moon, the conformity of the protagonist to the 
traditional forms of patriarchal values can be read as representing the disturbing mindset 
of many Thai middle-class people who are willing to give up their political rights for the 
unconstitutional rise to absolute power of the male agents of the state authority, such as 
the monarch and the military.  
 The effort of this group of the middle class to protect the status quo, as Thailand 
goes through a deepening stage of political conflict after 2006, has not been achieved 
only through political means, but also through economic means. During this period of 
political anxiety, another way in which the members of the coalition of the middle class 
and the establishment have acted to promote the establishment‘s power, and thus their 
coalition, is to maintain the socio-economic structure of the state which they dominate. 
This is evident in the analysis of Young Bao in Chapter VI. As I show in that chapter, 
the commodification of the critique of Thaksin not only reinforces the already 
established image of Thaksin as an enemy of the state, but also enhances the market 
economy—which is dominated by the coalition of the establishment and the middle 
class—by establishing a niche, yet politically powerful, market of the ―anti-Thaksin 
ideology commodity‖. From the comparisons of the representations of the bourgeois 
individuality in these films and the middle-class political sensibility in the period after 
2006, it is perhaps not too exaggerated to maintain that the ―good individuals‖ in these 
biographical films are microcosms of the good individuality of many Thai middle class 
people who are allied with the establishment. 
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VII.V The Suppression of Other Forms of Middle-Class Individuality and Culture 
 While this thesis focuses on the sector of the Thai middle class who have sought 
to secure the power of, and the coalition with, the establishment, it does not reject the 
idea that there exist other sectors of middle-class people, who might have not been so 
active in nurturing the establishment‘s values, or who might have been in opposition to 
the establishment. Certainly, these sectors exist and, from time to time, can gain 
substantial momentum to present themselves in the public to counter hegemony. The 
gathering of many middle-class intellectuals under the group called Khana Ronnarong 
Kae Khai Mattra 112, also known through the group‘s initials, Khor. Ror. Kor. 112, 
(Committee to Campaign for the Amendment of Article 112), which tried to encourage 
the government to amend the lèse-majesté law, is an example of one of the alternative 
forms of middle-class culture. Some of the films of Apichatpong Weerasethakul, the 
director whose film Uncle Boonmee Who Can Recall His Past Lives (Lung Boonmee 
Releuk Chat) won the Palme d‘Or at the Cannes Film Festival in 2010, can be viewed as 
a cinematic form that represents another mode of Thai middle-class culture that 
emerged to challenge the normative Bangkok-based middle-class cultural forms.
129
 
Apichatpong‘s Syndromes and a Century (Saeng Sattawat, 2006), which shows 
alternative views of the agents of respected national institutions, such as a monk playing 
a guitar or a physician drinking an alcoholic beverage, visibly challenges the existing 
set of cultural values of the coalition of the middle class and the establishment. 
Apichatpong‘s film, Syndromes and a Century, was banned by the Thai censorship 
committee. 
                                                     
129
 Not all films of Apichatpong are regarded as representing other forms of middle-class 
culture. For example, Benedict Anderson has argued that Apichatpong‘s Tropical Malady (Sat 
Palat, 2004), which is set in a location upcountry and explores the relationships of two male 
protagonists, was rather made by ―world of the chao baan [villagers] of Siam… ‗from inside‘ 
that world‖ (Anderson, 2012, p.155). 
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Given the firm and long inherited alliance of the pro-establishment middle class 
and the establishment, the question is, how far can this form of counter-hegemony go to 
subvert, or at least alter, the current hegemony? Since Thai society has been undergoing 
intense socio-political conflict and crises since 2006, the establishment has also become 
tougher and has developed a more authoritarian form of governance to suppress these 
forms of counter-hegemony. Notably, after the military coup in May 2014, the military 
government began to crack down on those who had been involved in Khor. Ror. Kor 
112 and others who had expressed critical views of the monarchy, by charging them 
under Article 112.
130
 The suppression of other forms of Thai middle-class culture has 
also been carried out by the conservative members of the Thai middle class. For 
example, in the online social media platform, Facebook, the group called Ongkorn Kep 
Khaya Phaen-din (The Association for Cleaning Up the Trash of the Country) has been 
set up to police Facebook users who criticise the monarchy. Given the strict and 
powerful authority of the establishment, and the docility of many members of the 
middle class who are typically in support of the establishment, these cultural forms 
expressing counter-hegemony seem to have a lesser chance, at present, to remain in the 
public sphere, let alone other forms of middle-class culture that oppose the 
establishment‘s cultural values. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
130
 After the coup in May 2014, the authorities from the military dictatorship government, led by 
General Prayuth Chan-O-cha, started to regulate and seek out those who disobeyed the 
military‘s orders. When the military authorities found these people, these people would be 
questioned whether they were involved in the Khor. Ror. Kor. 112 campaign. If they were 
found to be part of the campaign, they were detained by the military and questioned further 
about whether they intended to topple the monarchy (lom chao). See the news report about these 
crackdowns in http://www.khaosod.co.th/view_newsonline.php?newsid 
=TVRReU5UVTJPVFUyTmc9PQ==. Retrieved 3 September 2015.  
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APPENDIX 
 
The list of Thai biographical films in the tables below was compiled by the 
author of this thesis. They are not a comprehensive list of all biographical films in the 
history of Thai cinema. The list starts from the oldest film that the author can find, 
which is in 1968, and can identify with the genre convention of the film as fitting within 
this thesis‘ conceptualisation of the biographical film genre. Possibly, there may be 
other older biographical films made before this year. Extensive archival research is 
needed in order to complete the whole list. However, making a complete list of Thai 
biographical films or studying the history of the film genre, from the origin of Thai 
cinema, was not the main purpose of this thesis. The list of the films below are divided 
into two tables for the purpose of the reader‘s understanding of the periodisation of the 
films, which are after 2006, the timescale on which this thesis focuses, and the rise in 
the number of biographical films in Thai film culture after the  2000s. 
 
Table 1: List of Thai Biographical Films from the 1960s to 2005 
Films  Names of Persons Depicted 
 
- 16 Pi Haeng Khwam Lang (―in the 
past 16 years‖, dir. Anumat Bunnag, 
1968) 
 
- Suraphol Sombatcharoen (1930-
1968) 
  
- Nampu (―fountain‖, dir. Euthana 
Mukdasanit, 1984) 
 
- Nuanchawi (dir. Banjong Kosanwat, 
1985) 
 
- Wanli (dir. Ekalak, 1985) 
 
- Wongmueang or ―Nampu‘ 
Nandakwang (1956-1974) 
 
- Nuanchawi Rungpetch (1932-1959) 
 
 
- Wanli Boonseng (1968-present) 
 232 
- Khru Janraem (Teacher Janraem, 
dir. Phan Kham, 1992) 
 
- Amdaeng Meuan Kap Nai Rit (Ms. 
Meuan and Mr. Rit, dir. Cherd 
Songsri, 1994) 
 
- Dang Bireley and Young Gangsters 
(2499 Anthaphan Khrorng Meuang, 
dir. Nonzee Nimitbutr, 1997) 
 
- Janraem Sirikhamfu (unknown 
D.O.B.-present) 
 
- Meuang and Rit (during the reign of 
King Rama 5th: 1868-1910) 
 
 
- Bangcha Srisuksai or ―Daeng‖ 
(1940-1964) and his friends 
- The Iron Ladies (Satri Lek, dir. 
Yongyoot Thongkongtoon, 2000) 
 
- Bang Rajan  (dir. Tanit Jitnukul, 
2000) 
 
- The Moonhunter (14 Tula 
Songkhram Prachachon, dir. Bandit 
Rittakol, 2001) 
 
- Sherry Ann (dir. Charoon 
Wattanasin, 2001) 
 
- The Legend of Suriyothai 
(Suriyothai, dir. Chatri Chalerm 
Yukol, 2001) 
 
- Beautiful Boxer (dir. Ekachai 
Uekrongtham, 2003) 
 
- Macabre Case of Prom Pi Ram 
(Kheun Bap Phrom-Phi-Ram, dir. 
Manop Udomdet, 2003) 
 
- The Iron Ladies II (Satri Lek II, dir. 
Yongyoot Thongkongtoon, 2003) 
 
- The 1996 Lampang Province 
volleyball team  
 
- Bang Rajan villagers (1760s 
Ayutthaya) 
 
- Seksan Prasertkul (1949-present) 
 
 
 
- Sherry Ann Duncan (1970-1986) 
 
 
 
- Queen Suriyothai of  
Ayutthaya (1511-1548) 
 
 
- Parinya Charoenphol or ―Norng 
Tum‖ (1981-present) 
 
- An unknown woman who was 
murdered in Phitsanulok Province 
in 1977 
 
- The same group of the Lampang 
Province volleyball players as 
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- Nai Khanom-Tom (Mr. Khanom-
Tom, dir. Phaitoon Ratanon, 2003) 
 
- The Man Eater (Zee-Oui, dir. 
Buranee Rachjaibun & Nida Suthat 
Na Ayutthaya, 2004) 
 
- The Overture (Hom Rong, dir. 
Ittisoontorn Vichailak, 2004) 
 
above 
- Kanom-tom (1750s Ayutthaya)  
 
 
- Zee-oui Sae-Ung (1927-1959) 
 
 
 
- Luang Pradit Phairor (1881-1954) 
  
 
 
 
Table 2: List of Thai Biographical Films from 2006 to the Present 
Films  Names of Persons Depicted 
 
- The Legend of King Naresuan I (dir. 
Chatri Chalerm Yukol, 2007) 
 
- The Legend of King Naresuan II (dir. 
Chatri Chalerm Yukol, 2007) 
 
- Siyama: Village of Warriors 
(Siyama, dir. Preecha Songsakul, 
2008) 
 
- Nu Kan Phai (Nu, ―the Protector‖, 
dir. Nattapira Chomsri, 2010) 
 
- Bang Rajan II (dir. Tanit Jitnukul, 
2010) 
 
- Yamada: The Samurai of Ayothaya 
(dir. Nopporn Watin, 2010) 
 
 
- King Naresuan of Ayutthaya 
(1555-1605) 
 
- Same as above 
 
 
- A group of Ayutthaya villagers 
from Siyama Village (around the 
1760s) 
 
- Sompong Kanpai or ―Ajan Nu‖ 
(1963-present) 
 
- Bang Rajan villagers (1760s 
Ayutthaya) 
 
- Yamada Nagamasa (1590-1630) 
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- The Moon (Pumpuang, dir. Bandit 
Thongdee, 2011) 
 
- The Legend of King Naresuan III 
(dir. Chatri Chalerm Yukol, 2011) 
 
- The Legend of King Naresuan IV 
(dir. Chatri Chalerm Yukol, 2011) 
 
- The Billionaire (Wairun Phan Lan, 
dir. Songyos Sugmakanan, 2011) 
 
- The Unsung Hero (Khun Rorng 
Palat Chu, dir. Surasawadee 
Chuechat, 2011) 
 
- Gangster (Anthaphan, dir. Kongkiat 
Khomsiri, 2012) 
 
- Young Bao (dir. Yuthakorn 
Sukmuktapha, 2013) 
 
- The Legend of King Naresuan V (dir. 
Chatri Chalerm Yukol, 2014) 
 
- The Last Executioner (Petchakhat, 
dir. Tom Waller, 2014) 
 
- Khun Phan (dir. Kongkiat Khomsiri, 
2015) 
 
- F.Hilaire (dir. Surasawadee 
Chuechat, 2015) 
 
- Pumpuang Duangchan (1961- 
1992) 
 
- King Naresuan of Ayutthaya 
(1555-1605) 
 
- Same as above 
 
 
- Aithipat or ―Top‖ Kulapongvanich 
of the Thao Kae Noi seaweed snack 
brand (1984-present) 
- Khun Rorng Palat Chu (1750s 
Ayutthaya) 
 
 
- Bangcha or ―Daeng‖ Srisuksai 
(1940-1964) and his friends 
 
- Yuenyong Opakul or ―Aed 
Carabao‖ (1954-present) 
 
- King Naresuan of Ayutthaya 
(1555-1605) 
 
- Chaowaret Jaruboon (1948-present) 
 
 
- Khunphan Rakratdet (1903- 2006) 
 
 
- François Touvenet Helaire (1881-
1968) 
 
 
